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Abstract
The purpose of the present study was to examine the feasibility of choiceless control in
determining perceptions of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness over
outcomes. After reviewing and critiquing some traditional theories and research that
exist in the control literature, a new conceptualization of control is presented. Based on
research by Nickels et al. (2005), an extended research design was proposed and tested,
which examined the separate effects of actual control, choice, and predictability. The
present findings show significantly higher ratings of perceived influence under conditions
in which individuals made their own choice (whether voluntary or involuntary) between
options that made a difference (actual control) in a failed outcome that was predicted.
Whereas perceived control ratings were significantly higher with actual control, feelings
of responsibility over the outcome were significantly higher when actual control was
combined with a voluntary choice. Although feelings of helplessness were not
significantly affected, ratings of frustration over the outcome were significantly higher
when actual control was combined with the prediction that a failed outcome would occur.
The theoretical relevance of these findings is discussed, and the generalizability of the
new conceptualization of control is explored in terms of its relation to positive
psychology (e.g., humour) and cross-cultural research frameworks.
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1
CHAPTER 1
Overview
Over the past few decades, the notion of personal control has played an important
role in many psychological investigations. Specifically, a number of these studies have
reported that controlling important outcomes is instrumental in the development of
self-esteem (e.g., Rodin & Langer, 1980), fulfilment of personal goals, reduction of stress
(e.g., Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Elliott, Trief & Stein, 1986), higher levels of well-being
(Matheny & Cupp, 1983; Mineka & Henderson, 1985; Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978;
Thompson, 1981), and lowered cardiovascular responses (e.g., Baker & Stephenson,
2000a; Breier, Albus, Pickar, Zahn, Wolkowitz, & Paul, 1987; Carr & Wilde, 1988;
Corah & Boffa, 1970; Geer & Maisel, 1972; Peters, Godaert, Ballieux, Vliet, Willemsen,
Sweep, & Heijnen, 1998). Conversely, the absence of control has been linked with the
likelihood of experiencing learned helplessness (e.g., Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993;
Seligman, 1975), general physical illness (e.g., Lin & Peterson, 1990), and psychological
distress (e.g., Cohen & Edwards, 1989; Lachman, Ziff, & Spiro, 1994).
Despite extensive research demonstrating the benefits of control, more recent
findings have indicated that people do not always prefer to control the situations they
encounter (e.g., Burger, 1989; Perreault & Towson, 2005; Thompson, Cheek, & Graham,
1987). For example, if individuals believe that others are better able to deal with the
serious consequences of a difficult situation, then they may prefer giving control to these
others (Burger, McWard, & LaTorre, 1989; Perreault & Towson, 2005).
Debate still surrounds the definition and conceptualization of control, particularly
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with regard to people’s beliefs about the causal connections between their actions and
efforts, and outcomes. Whereas traditipnal control theorists postulate that providing a
choice for an individual’s actions increases feelings of control and decreases feelings of
helplessness (e.g., Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1975), recent findings indicate that the
benefits of control result only when a person’s choices make a difference in the outcome
(e.g., Cramer, Nickels, & Gural, 1997; Langlois, Cramer, & Mohagen, 2002; Nickels,
Cramer, & Gural, 1992). These recent findings have instigated a new conceptualization
of the traditional views o f control, choice, and prediction in explaining responses to
challenging situations.
Whereas traditional views have failed at unconfounding the concepts of control,
choice, and prediction, the new conceptualization has permitted the separation of the
effects of control and prediction (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Nickels, Gural, Cramer, &
Ross, 1992). In addition, proponents of the new conceptualization have not only
emphasized the importance of examining both choice and control as conceptually
separate entities, but have also successfully demonstrated their separate effects in the
laboratory (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Cramer & Perreault, 2005).
At present, however, choice and control have only been completely unconfounded
under conditions of unpredictability (i.e., Nickels, Peters, & Twerdochlib, 2005). In other
words, the complete separation of the concepts of choice and control has not yet been
examined under conditions of predictability due to the conceptual and methodological
difficulties of such an investigation (Nickels et al., 2005).
One of the purposes of the present paper is to review and critique the theory and
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research on control to determine its importance in explaining why people respond or fail
to respond in the face of challenge. This will be accomplished by examining some
traditional views of control, which will determine the use of this concept as a foundation
for explaining individuals’ perceptions of various types of events. In addition, the
procedures that appear necessary to test these concepts and theories will be presented, and
experimental evidence will be examined in order to determine its support for the various
conceptualizations of control discussed in the literature.
Due to its consistent success at unconfounding the effects of control, prediction,
and choice, there will be a particular emphasis on a recent reconceptualization of control
(e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al,
1992; 2005). Specifically, this new conceptualization will be presented as having:
(1) successfully unconfounded control and prediction whilst others had failed;
(2) systematically investigated the separate effects of control and choice; and
(3) developed an unique experimental design which permitted the examination of
choiceless control without prediction.
The purpose of the present study is to further disentangle the effects of control and
choice in determining perceptions of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness
over outcomes. This will be accomplished by examining the conceptual and empirical
feasibility of choice and control variations under conditions of predictability, where
choiceless control will be discussed in terms of its potential confound with prediction.
Furthermore, the relevance of choiceless control will be examined in social psychological
contexts, such as situations in which personal information is gleaned for exclusory or
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4
discriminatory purposes. Finally, some hypotheses will be generated, and a
methodological design which extends and refines Nickels et al.’s (2005) investigation
of unpredictable choice and control variations will be presented.
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5
CHAPTER 2
Some Traditional Views of Control
A vast amount of research has been conducted in the area of control, and
consequently several operational definitions of the term have been proposed. For
example, some researchers suggest that the amount of control individuals have is
determined by the number of choices available in their environment and the amount of
responsibility provided by their environment (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976). In this case,
as induced responsibility and the number of available choices increase, the amount of
control also increases.
Other researchers propose that control should be defined in terms of probable
(rather than absolute) response effectiveness. According to this view, Seligman (1975,
p. 17) explains that the outcome is controllable “if the probability of an outcome when
some response occurs is different from the probability of the outcome when that response
doesn’t occur...” In other words, outcomes are controllable when they depend upon one’s
response. However, the outcome is uncontrollable “when the probability of an outcome
is the same whether or not a given response occurs” (Seligman, 1975, p. 16). In other
words, outcomes are uncontrollable when they occur independently of one’s response.
Others take this definition one step further, and suggest that control is defined as
response effectiveness in addition to the achievement of a desired outcome
(see Thompson, 1981, for a review). In this case, merely having an influence over an
outcome does not imply control unless the end result was desired. For example, Suzanne
is reaching for the last handhold on a difficult rock climbing route. She wants to use this
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hold so she can complete the route by pulling herself over the cliff edge. If Suzanne
succeeds, she has control over the outcome. However, if an alternative finish is required
because the handhold crumbled under her weight, Suzanne does not have control.
The concept of response effectiveness is central to many operationalizations of
control. According to this view, control exists when individuals are capable of
influencing an outcome through their actions. For example, if Agnes gives her nephew
smothering kisses every time he sits on her lap, but does not smother him when he
refrains from sitting in her lap, the kisses are controllable. On the other hand, if Agnes
smothers her nephew affectionately regardless of whether or not he sits on her lap, the
kisses are not controllable.
A study by Alloy and Abramson (1979) tested the conceptualization of control as
determined by response effectiveness. Specifically, objective contingencies occurred
when the outcome was, in actuality, contingent upon one’s response. Subjective
contingencies occurred when the outcome was perceived as contingent upon one’s
response, which could include accurate estimations as well as underestimations or
overestimations. It was expected that perceptions of control should increase with
increases in actual control.
Presented with various degrees of actual control, participants estimated the degree
of contingency between their responses and an environmental outcome. Actual control
was measured by the percentage of trials (i.e., 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on which the
outcome (i.e., onset of a green light) occurred when the participant responded
(i.e., pressing or not pressing the button). Consistent with the conceptualization,
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participants perceived more control when they actually had more control over the onset of
the light. In other words, a link was found between objective (i.e., actual control) and
subjective (i.e., perceived control) contingencies. Similar results are also reported by
Mikulincer, Gerber, and Weisenberg (1992), Tang and Critelli (1990), and Vasquez
(1987; see also Alloy & Abramson, 1988).

Some Psychological and Physiological Effects o f Control
A number of studies have been conducted based on these traditional views of
control. Consequently, due to the variability in the operationalizations and methodologies
utilized, a variety of findings has been reported regarding the psychological and
physiological effects of control. For instance, whereas some studies have examined
conditions of both control and uncontrol, other research has solely investigated situations
o f control. Therefore, findings range from ‘control as beneficial’ to ‘control as
detrimental.’

Some Benefits o f Control
A number of research findings have demonstrated the benefits of having control.
For example, in older adults, increased control has been linked with significant physical
and psychological changes such as increased alertness and more active participation
(Langer & Rodin, 1976), lower mortality rates (Rodin & Langer, 1977), fewer health
problems (Rodin, 1983), a decrease in required medication (Schulz, 1976), and improved
memory (Langer, Rodin, Beck, Weinman, & Spitzer, 1979).
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Many studies report that having control not only benefits older adults but people
of all ages. For example, a study by Eitel, Hatchett, Friend, Griffin, and Wadhwa (1995)
examined the effects of control over treatment in patients with end-stage renal disease.
Level of control of dialysis patients was determined by whether the treatment was selfadministered (high control) or administered by medical staff (low control). Results
showed that if the illness was not severe, patients who self-administered their treatment
had lower depression rates than those who had their treatment administered by medical
staff.
In addition, several researchers have considered the impact of control in the
workplace. For example, Carayon and Zijlstra (1999) examined the effects of three types
of control: (1) Organization-Control (i.e., influence over the distribution of work, timing,
policies, and training of employees); (2) Task-Control (i.e., influence over the variety and
order of tasks, the amount of, pace of, and quality of work, and timing of work schedule
and rest breaks); and (3) Resource-Control (i.e., influence over the availability of
supplies, equipment, and materials). The findings indicated that high Task-Control
resulted in lower total mood disturbances, and both high Task-Control and high
Organization-Control resulted in higher job satisfaction.

Some Negative Consequences o f Absence o f Control
Whereas some research has explored the psychological effects of having control,
other studies have focused on exposure to outcomes in the absence of control.
Specifically, it appears that absence of control can have devastating consequences such as
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an increased likelihood of learned helplessness (Abramson, Garber, & Seligman, 1980).
Researchers have documented the development of learned helplessness in a wide variety
of animals such as dogs, cats, fish, rats, and subsequently, in humans (Abramson et al.,
1980).
One of the initial learned helplessness studies, conducted by Overmier and
Seligman (1967), examined the responses o f adult mongrel dogs to controllable and
uncontrollable shocks. Three groups of dogs received unsignalled inescapable shocks of
varying duration and intervals. The fourth group was not exposed to shock. After twenty
four hours, all groups were exposed to instrumental training that consisted of several
presentations of escapable shock. During the instrumental training, the authors found that
dogs with no previous exposure to inescapable shocks responded by barking, yelping,
running, and jumping until they escaped. Similarly, dogs that were previously exposed to
inescapable shocks reacted much the same way in response to the initial shock but, over
subsequent trials, these dogs became quiet and passively accepted the shocks. Overall,
dogs previously exposed to controllable shocks were more likely to jump the barrier and
escape shocks during instrumental training. On the other hand, dogs exposed to
uncontrollable shocks later failed to develop appropriate escape behaviour when the
shocks were controllable.
A study by Hiroto (1974) represents a typical learned helplessness experiment
involving humans. College students were divided into three groups: ( I) exposure to
controllable noise; (2) exposure to uncontrollable noise; or (3) no exposure to noise.
Some participants had to figure out a solution to a problem in order to terminate the
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aversive tone (i.e., noise). Others were told that the experimenter would control the
solution to the problem, and if they guessed the solution correctly, the aversive tone
would automatically stop. For participants with direct control, the noise could be
terminated by pressing a button four times. For participants with no control, the noise
stopped independently of their responses. Later, participants were tested on a hand task
involving a hand shuttle box. All participants could control the termination of noise by
moving their hand from one side to the other. The results showed that participants in the
control condition (or no exposure condition) learned to terminate the noise in the hand
task, whereas those in the no control condition failed to terminate the noise.
As these studies illustrate, learned helplessness results when one is repeatedly
exposed to outcomes that cannot be affected, and can ultimately lead to deficits that
include cognitive, motivational, and emotional components (Abramson et al., 1980).
First, a cognitive deficit occurs when there is a failure to perceive a contingency between
responses and outcomes, and is reflected in one’s inability to learn when outcomes
become controllable. For example, dogs that are exposed to uncontrollable shocks will
fail to learn how to escape the shocks when they later become controllable
(e.g., Overmier & Seligman, 1967). Second, a motivational deficit occurs when the
desire to control outcomes is reduced, leading to passivity, social impairment, and
intellectual slowness (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). For example, dogs that
have been exposed to uncontrollable shocks will passively accept the shocks even after
they have become controllable (Overmier & Seligman, 1967). Finally, when an
unpleasant experience is prolonged, emotional deficits, such as increased anxiety and
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depression, can occur. For example, comparable to humans, animals have been shown to
display increases in general activity level, high autonomic arousal, passivity, social
isolation, and/or feeding disturbances when they are exposed to prolonged stress
(see Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978).
This learned helplessness theory was later reformulated due to a number of
conceptual and methodological difficulties (Abramson et al., 1978). The theory remains
consistent with regard to uncontrollability as crucial to the development of learned
helplessness, but it now takes three types of attributions into consideration: (1) internal/
external; (2) stable/unstable; and (3) global/specific. The reformulated theory proposes
that the development of learned helplessness is dependent upon why people think they
lack control (Abramson et al., 1978). For instance, individuals who attribute lack of
control to internal, stable, and global causes are more likely to experience long-lasting,
generalized effects such as performance deficits, lowered self-esteem, and depression
(Burger & Arkin, 1980; Mineka & Hendersen, 1985; Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987). On
the other hand, individuals who attribute lack of control to external, unstable, and specific
causes are less likely to experience generalized effects and major mood changes (Mineka
& Henderson, 1985).
Abramson et al.’s (1978) reformulated learned helplessness theory also considers
the distinction between personal and universal helplessness. Whereas personal
helplessness may occur when individuals believe they cannot solve a solvable problem,
universal helplessness may occur when people believe that a problem cannot be solved by
anyone. However, despite much empirical support for learned helplessness theory, there
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exists some evidence that disproves the premise that non-contingent reinforcements lead
to feelings of helplessness (e.g., Matute, 1994; 1995).

Some Negative Effects of Control
While it has generally been acknowledged that having control leads to positive
effects, some researchers have challenged this conclusion. For example, in their review
of the control concept, Rodin, Rennert, and Solomon (1980) challenged two assumptions
about the traditional views of control: (1) that people are intrinsically motivated by the
opportunity to gain control; and (2) that the enhancement of self-esteem is an important
process involved in making control desirable.
First, Rodin et al. (1980) presented some studies that were conducted to test the
assumption that people value control for its own sake. In one study, choice was
investigated because it seemed to be the form of control closest to White’s (1959) classic
description of control as environmental manipulation. Whereas some participants worked
on a visual perception task in order to obtain a choice of some flavours that were
guaranteed to taste good, others were given the same choices but were not guaranteed a
successful outcome (i.e., obtaining a tasty flavour was determined by work on a visual
perception task). The findings indicated that choice was motivating in itself only when a
good outcome was guaranteed (Rodin et al., 1980).
After reporting the findings of similar studies, Rodin et al. (1980) concluded that,
although control may be the motivating factor in many instances, it is not the result of an
intrinsic need for environmental manipulation. Rather, it is a response to the belief that
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having control will increase the odds of a positive outcome. The fact that there exists a
condition under which people are not motivated to exert control challenges White’s
(1959) assumption that people are intrinsically motivated by the opportunity to gain
control.
Second, Rodin et al. (1980) presented some studies that tested White’s (1959)
assumption that enhancing self-esteem is important in making control desirable. In one
study, half of the participants selected which three personality questionnaires they wanted
to complete (i.e., Control condition). The other half were simply given three personality
questionnaires that the experimenter had selected for them (i.e., No-Control condition). It
was found that, in comparison to those in the No-Control condition, participants with
control over the task scored lower on subsequent self-esteem measures (Rodin et al.,
1980).
Miller (1980) has reported similar findings in her review of the control literature.
In one study using the yoked control paradigm (i.e., a stimulus is presented to the person
with control is also presented in exactly the same way to the individual without control),
participants were led to believe that either their reaction time ability or their memory task
ability was superior, comparable, or inferior to that of a yoked confederate. Participants
were then given a choice of either retaining control or relinquishing control (i.e., to a
yoked confederate) over administering an electric shock. It was found that the
participants who retained control were more anxious and more hostile than the
participants who chose to relinquish control, regardless of which task they performed and
regardless of whether their performance was superior, comparable, or inferior to that of
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the confederate.
Burger’s (1989) review further explained individuals’ negative reactions to
personal control by suggesting three features of increased personal control that may
decrease the desirability of that control: (1) concern for self-presentation; (2) achievement
of desired outcomes; and (3) increase in predictability. In essence, situational and
personality variables that increase the probability and the severity of negative
consequences of a poor outcome will lead to a greater chance that the person will
relinquish control, experience anxiety, and perform more poorly on a subsequent task.
First, Burger (1989) explains that personal control will be seen as less desirable
when it leads to an uncomfortable level o f concern for self-presentation. The individual
with the most influence in a situation is also most likely to be held responsible for the
outcome. When the possibility of failure is high and the price for failure is significant, a
person who has a high degree of control over an event may also be concerned about the
possibility of social disapproval following a poor outcome. In this type of situation,
individuals are likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing or reducing their amount of control over
the situation (e.g., Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984; Rothbaum,
Weisz, & Snyder, 1982); (b) to experience negative affect such as lower feelings of selfworth and lower self-esteem (e.g., Rodin et al., 1980) or higher anxiety and hostility
(e.g., Burger, Brown, & Allen, 1983); and (c) to perform more poorly on the task over
which they have personal control (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister, Hamilton, & Tice,
1985; Baumeister & Steinhilber, 1984).
Second, personal control will also be seen as less desirable when it decreases the
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likelihood that one will achieve desired outcomes (Burger, 1989). When a person who is
in control believes that the probability of a poor outcome is higher than the probability of
a good outcome, then that person is more likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing control
(e.g., Ball & Vogler, 1971; Miller, 1980); (b) to respond with negative affect such as
increased anxiety and hostility (e.g., Miller, 1980; Mills & Krantz, 1979); or/and
(c) to perform more poorly (e.g., Keinan, 1987).
Finally, personal control will be seen as less desirable when increased
controllability leads to a person’s increased attention to the aversive aspects of a
predictable event (Burger, 1989). Although the findings concerning predictability have
been inconsistent (cf. Averill, 1973; Miller, 1981; Thompson, 1981), Burger (1989)
explains that individuals are more likely: (a) to opt for relinquishing control when their
cognitive response styles fall under high blunting (i.e., typically prefer a less active role
with regard to their response to threat-relevant information) and low monitoring
(i.e., typically prefer less information about potentially stressful events) (Miller, 1987;
Miller, Brody, & Summerton, 1988); (b) to respond with negative affect such as increased
physiological and/or self-reports of stress when their attention is drawn to a predictable
stressor (e.g., Matthews, Scheier, Brunson, & Carducci, 1980; Monat, Averill, & Lazarus,
1972); and (c) to perform more poorly when their focus is on unpredictable stressors
which require more attention than predictable ones (e.g., Cohen, 1978).
The fact that personal control has been demonstrated to have detrimental effects
for individuals’ psychological well-being has also been reported in some of the research
examining human physiological responses to stressful situations. For instance, several
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studies have shown that situations involving instrumental control lead to increased
cardiovascular responses (e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997; Bongard,
Hodapp, Frisch, & Lennartz, 1994; Hodapp, Bongard, & Heiligtag, 1992; Hodapp,
Heiligtag, & Stormer, 1990).
Burger et al. (1983) explain that having control in these experiments resulted in
negative effects because the participants were not allowed to demonstrate personal
competence. These participants were either given a choice about which tasks they would
complete (i.e., Control), or were assigned a task by the experimenter (i.e., No-Control).
Participants were also either given a choice or were assigned to an easy block design task
(i.e., competence), or were given a choice or were assigned to a difficult anagram or
mirror drawing task (i.e., incompetence).
Burger et al. (1983) found that personal control, or having choices, resulted in
positive effects only when individuals were allowed to demonstrate competence. Perhaps
control leads to lowered self-esteem and negative mood in situations where people cannot
demonstrate their mastery over a task (Burger et al., 1983). This suggests that personal
characteristics (e.g., competence), and perhaps even other stressor variables
(e.g., prediction), may play an important role within the control framework.
Vogeltanz and Hecker (1999) examined neuroticism as a personal characteristic,
and both prediction and control as stressor variables in their study. Specifically, they
investigated physiological and subjective arousal following exposure to mildly aversive
stimuli (i.e., viewing unpleasant slides). Participants were first divided into high and low
neuroticism groups based on test scores and then they were given either: (1) both control
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and prediction over slide onset and duration; or (2) no control and prediction over slide
onset and duration. In the Control/Prediction condition, participants could terminate an
aversive photo if they chose to do so by pressing a button on a hand-held box. They were
also informed, at the beginning of the experiment, when a warning signal would occur
and how long inter-trial intervals would last. In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition,
participants were not instructed of the option of terminating the photo presentation, nor
were they given information about warning tones or the duration of inter-trial intervals.
The results showed that the high neuroticism group was more physiologically and
subjectively aroused than the low neuroticism group. However, there were no differences
between groups with regard to control and prediction. This suggests that personal
(i.e., neuroticism) rather than stressor characteristics (i.e., control and prediction) exerted
more influence on participant arousal (Vogeltanz & Hecker, 1999).

Some Control-Related Conceptual Confounds

Due to the lack of consistent findings regarding the psychological and
physiological effects of control, researchers have questioned the assumption that ‘control
is beneficial.’ This has involved a re-examination of some of the traditional views of
control as well as the operationalizations and methodologies employed to test the effects
of control. As a result, a number of conceptual and methodological confounds have been
observed in the traditional control literature, many of which appear to stem from the
conceptual heterogeneity and interchangeable use of control-relevant terms. Table 1
illustrates, in chronological order, a variety of traditional conceptualizations of control.
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Table 1
Some Traditional Conceptualizations o f Control
STUDY

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTRCI
AN

CH

white ( 1959)

CO

PC

RE

Manipulation of environment

✓

Overmier & Seligman (1967)

✓

(jeer & Maisel (1972)

✓

Other

Averill (1973)

Behavioural, cognitive, &.
decisional control

Hiroto (1974)

Potential contingency

Langer (1975)

✓

Langer & Roth (1975)

✓

Seligman (1975)

✓

Wortman (1975)
Langer & Rodin (1976)

✓

✓

Schulz (1976)

✓

Alloy & Abramson (1979)

✓

✓

Burger & Arkin (1980)

✓

✓

Rodin, Rennert, & Solomon (1980)

✓

Burger, Brown, & Allen (1983)

✓

Tiggeman & Winefeld (1987)

Perceived competence

✓

Taylor & Brown (1988)

✓

Helgeson (1992)

✓

Hodapp, Bongard, & Heiligtag (1992)

✓

Reed, Taylor, & Kemeny (1993)

✓

Perceived vicarious control

Perceived vicarious control
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Table 1 (cont’d)
Some Traditional Conceptualizations o f Control
STUDY

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTROL
AN

Thompson et al. (1993)
Bongard (1995)

CH

CO

PC

Other

✓
✓

Eitel et al. (1995)
Vogeltanz & Hecker (1999)

RE

✓
✓

Baker & Stephenson (2000a)

✓

Baker & Stephenson (2000b)

✓

Note. AN = Actual contingency; CH = Choice; CO = Competence; PC = Perceived

contingency; RE = Responsibility.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Conceptual Heterogeneity o f Control

For decades, research has variably conceptualized and/or operationalized control
as a term ranging in meaning from environmental manipulation (e.g., White, 1959), locus
of control (e.g., Lefcourt, 1966, 1991a, 1992; Rotter, 1966, 1975), perceived locus of
control (e.g., Lefcourt & Telegdi, 1974), locus of desired control (e.g., Reid & Zeigler,
1981), desire for personal control (e.g., Burger, 1989, 1992; DeCharms, 1968), potential
control (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972), illusory control (e.g., Langer, 1975; Lefcourt, 1973),
choice (e.g., Rodin et al., 1983), personal responsibility (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976),
response effectiveness or actual control (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979), perceived
competence (e.g., Burger, Brown, & Allen, 1983), belief in personal efficacy (e.g., Taylor
& Brown, 1988), perceived vicarious control (e.g., Helgeson, 1992), actual contingency
or instrumental control (e.g., Bongard, 1995), and perceived contingency (e.g., Baker &
Stephenson, 2000a).

Confounding Control with Choice

For example, Langer and Rodin (1976) tested “the generalizability of feelings of
control” (p. 193) by operationalizing control as “perceived choice and decision-making
responsibility” (p. 197). Participants with control were informed that they had choice
and responsibility over environmental variables such as caring for a plant and watching a
movie, whereas participants with no control were told that they had no options and no
personal responsibility. The results indicated that increases in control had beneficial
effects. In comparison to those who had no control (i.e., decisions made for them and the
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plant cared for by the nursing home staff), the participants with control showed
significant improvements on alertness, active participation, and a general sense of
well-being.
By comparison, Burger et al. (1983) examined why increases in personal control
sometimes lead to negative reactions such as lowered self-esteem and increased negative
mood. In their investigation, control was operationalized as choice and perceived
competence (rather than choice and responsibility; cf. Langer & Rodin, 1976). In
Experiment 1, participants either had choice or no choice of experimental tasks.
Participants were also led to believe that they were either competent or incompetent
regarding the task they had selected. Although perceived competence had no effect,
increases in negative mood were found among participants who had choice. In
Experiment 2, participants again were allowed either a choice or no choice of tasks, but
half of the participants were led to believe that their performance on the task would be
unknown to the experimenter. Lower self-esteem and increases in negative mood were
found only among participants who had both choice and the perception that the outcome
of their performance would be known. In Experiment 3, the results indicated that
participants who were given a choice of two tasks at which they believed they were
competent did not display the increases in negative mood that were found in participants
who were given a choice of one task at which they believed they were competent and one
task at which they believed they were incompetent.
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The Conceptual Interchangeability o f Control-Related Terms

In addition to the variety of meanings attributed to traditional conceptualizations
of control is the variable way in which these terms have been used interchangeably
throughout much of the relevant literature. For example, in their conceptualization of
control, Langer and Rodin (1976) presented various terms such as personal control,
perceived competence, perception of control, perceived personal control, feelings of
control, choice, perceived choice, freedom to choose, personal responsibility, decision
making responsibility, and perceived responsibility. Simultaneously referring to such a
variety of concepts confounds terms that may have similar but not synonymous meanings,
embraces an ambiguous operationalization of control, fosters much variance in the
methodologies used to examine the concept, and creates difficulties with regard to
interpreting and discussing findings pertaining to control.
Nevertheless, a number of classic literature reviews have included discussions of
varied control-related terms without differentiating one conceptualization from another.
For example, in their review of the positive and negative effects of control, Burger et al.
(1983) considered, en masse, a cluster of studies examining “personal control” as choice
(e.g., Savage, Perlmuter, & Monty, 1979), response effectiveness (e.g., Abramson et al.,
1978; Garber & Seligman, 1980), actual control (e.g., Schulz, 1976; Schulz & Hanusa,
1978), potential control (e.g., Glass & Singer, 1972), and desire for control
(e.g., DeCharms, 1968).
The interchangeable use of conceptually and/or operationally distinct terms still
occurs, at present, in the control literature. For example, Baker and Stephenson (2000a)

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23
reviewed, as an assemblage, a variety of studies involving distinct conceptualizations of
control, such as active and passive coping (e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp,
1997; Bongard, Hodapp, Frisch, & Lennartz, 1994), actual and potential stressor control
(e.g., Carr & Wilde, 1988), perceived control (e.g., Corah & Boffa, 1970), actual control
(e.g., Geer & Maisel, 1972; Nickels et al., 1992), and choice (e.g., Miller, 1979b; Phillips,
1989). In addition, Baker and Stephenson (2000a; 2000b) used the terms control,
instrumental control, control-beiief, perceived control, perceived instrumental control,
active coping, and/or subjective awareness of control interchangeably throughout their
research.
Despite its intuitive appeal and its preponderance in the literature, the absence of a
standard and organized conceptualization of control has resulted in substantial differences
in methodological approaches. It has also led to ambiguities regarding any clear effects
of this concept. In considering such inconsistencies, some researchers have attempted to
separate the effects of various control concepts.

Confounding Actual Control with Perceived Control

Traditional research has tended to utilize the term “control” interchangeably with
other related concepts, such as illusion of control (e.g., Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth,
1975). For instance, some researchers specifically refer to the term “illusion of control”
in their conceptualization of perceived control. According to Langer (1975) and Langer
and Roth (1975), the illusion of control occurs when individuals overestimate the control
they have over events. Their research indicated that people are more likely to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
overestimate their control over an outcome when competition, choice, stimulus/response
familiarity, or passive/active involvement are introduced into a chance situation, such as
gambling. But by unsystematically manipulating these variables, however, concepts such
as perceived control, perceived choice, and actual control (i.e., passive/active
involvement in affecting an outcome) have been confounded. For example, in their
literature review, Taylor and Brown (1988) present a variety of studies that have applied
different terms in reference to the general concept of perceived control (e.g., illusion of
control, positive illusions, perceptions of control, personal control beliefs, beliefs in
personal efficacy). In fact, a literature review solely examining previous illusion of
control studies concluded that it is still debatable what illusion of control is, and that the
findings of these studies need to be reconsidered due to differences in the types of
independent and dependent variables examined (Masuda, Sakagami, & Hirota, 2002).
Consequently, in order to avoid confounding such conceptualizations, more recent
investigations have emphasized the distinction between different types of control,
specifically, between the concepts of actual control and perceived control. For instance,
Cramer (1988) distinguished the two concepts by operationalizing actual control as the
extent to which the outcome is actually and objectively affected by an action (i.e., actual
contingency). Perceived control was operationalized as the extent to which an individual
subjectively believes (perceives) that the outcome is affected by an action (i.e., perceived
contingency).
As a result of such distinctions, it has been possible to separate the effects of
actual and perceived control. For instance, studies examining the theory of planned
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behaviour have differentiated actual control from perceived control (see Armitage &
Conner, 2001 for a review). For example, in the context of antenatal screening for Down
syndrome, one study explained that returning to the hospital for a separate visit (rather
than screening during a routine visit) may involve barriers such as transport difficulties or
taking time off work, which influence actual control rather than perceptions of control
(Michie, Dormandy, French, & Marteau, 2004).
A number of recent findings have clarified the fact that individuals do not
necessarily need to have actual control in order to reap benefits. Merely believing that
one has control is enough to produce positive psychological and physiological effects.
For example, lower levels of depression and better physical and psychological adjustment
have been linked with greater perceptions of control over symptoms and course of illness
in cancer patients (Thompson, Sobolow-Shubin, Galbraith, Schwankovsky, & Cruzen,
1993), cardiac patients (Helgeson, 1992), and gay men living with AIDS (Reed, Taylor,
& Kemeny, 1993).
Some researchers have also examined a distinction between different types of
perceived control. For example, Helgeson (1992) investigated hospitalized cardiac
patients’ adjustment to chronic illness by examining perceived personal control (i.e., the
perception that one has control over outcomes) and perceived vicarious control (i.e., the
perception that someone or something other than oneself has control over outcomes).
Perceived personal control was assessed by asking patients whether they thought their
heart problem was something over which they themselves had control. Perceived
vicarious control was assessed by asking patients whether they thought their heart
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problem was something that could be controlled by someone or something other than
themselves. The results indicated that internal health locus of control and perceived
personal control (i.e., feelings of control stemming from oneself) were associated with
adjustment for all of the participants. Vicarious control (i.e., perception that control
stems from something or someone other than oneself) was only adaptive for patients who
had undergone invasive procedures by physicians (e.g., angioplasty or bypass surgery).
Similarly, Reed et al. (1993) examined the concept of perceived control with
AIDS patients. Personal control beliefs were measured as the extent to which the patients
felt they had control over their symptoms, their health, and their medical care and
treatment. Vicarious control beliefs were measured as the extent to which people or
things outside themselves had control over their symptoms, their health, and their medical
care and treatment. The results indicated that beliefs in personal control over day-to-day
symptoms and over course of illness were positively related to adjustment, whereas
beliefs in control by others over course of illness and over medical care and treatment
were negatively related to adjustment. Since it can include any number of variables, such
as physicians, other individuals, or other things such as luck, God, or some other spiritual
element, the operationalization of vicarious control has been criticized for being
imprecise (e.g., Helgeson, 1992).
While some researchers have separately examined different conceptualizations of
perceived control, others have integrated both actual control and perceived control into
their conceptualization. For instance, in the context of stressful or aversive situations,
Cramer (1988) presents a conceptualization of control which consists of two levels of
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actual control (i.e., Control/Uncontrol) that cross two levels of perceived control
(i.e., Veridical/Illusory) (see Figure 1). Specifically, in Veridical-Control, individuals
have actual control and they hold accurate perceptions of their level of control
(e.g., correctly believing that the stereo volume will turn down when turning the volume
button to the left). In Veridical-Uncontrol, individuals do not have actual control and
they hold accurate perceptions of their level of control (e.g., correctly believing that, as an
unfortunate bystander with no access to the neighbour’s stereo, one cannot turn down the
volume). In Illusory-Control, as presented by Langer (1975), individuals incorrectly
overestimate the probability that they will succeed in influencing an outcome
(e.g., by cursing loudly at the ceiling, an unfortunate bystander inaccurately expects that
the volume of the neighbour’s stereo will inevitably turn down). Finally, in
Illusory-Uncontrol, individuals underestimate their ability to influence an outcome
(e.g., incorrectly believing that absolutely nothing can be done to influence the volume of
the neighbour’s stereo). It is noteworthy that, consistent with Seligman (1975), Cramer’s
(1988) conceptualization of control is defined in terms of probable (rather than absolute)
response effectiveness.
In the past, distinguishing actual control from perceived control has allowed
researchers to examine separate instances of illusory control and uncontrol (e.g., Alloy
& Abramson, 1979). Such distinctions have also refined our understanding of situations
in which individuals are led to believe that they either have control or not, even under
conditions of constant actual uncontrol (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980). By further
acknowledging the clear distinction between the two concepts, Cramer’s (1988)

j

i

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
Figure I. An illustration of Cramer’s (1988) conceptualization of actual control versus

perceived control (adapted from Cramer, 1988, p. 25).
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model emphasizes the continued importance of separating the effects of actual control
and perceived control.

Confounding Control with Prediction

In addition to the importance of unconfounding actual control from perceived
control is the relevance of separating the effects of control from those of prediction.
Indeed, prediction plays a significant role within the control framework, and is most
commonly defined as the ability to anticipate an outcome regardless of whether or not one
has influence over that outcome (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Miller, 1979a). According to
some findings, a person’s ability to predict an outcome is at least as important as actual or
perceived control.
In fact, several positive effects that had previously been attributed to control have
recently been attributed to prediction. For example, Rosellini and colleagues found that
animals exposed to controllable shocks showed less fear than animals exposed to
uncontrollable shocks (DeCola, Rosellini, & Warren, 1988; Rosellini, DeCola, & Warren,
1986; Rosellini, Warren, & DeCola, 1987). However, animals exposed to uncontrollable
shocks but provided with an external feedback stimulus (i.e., prediction) also showed a
reduction in fear. Based on these findings, it appears that prediction alone is capable of
decreasing feelings of helplessness.
The preference for predictable rather than unpredictable outcomes has been well
documented in both animals and humans (Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978). Furthermore,
prediction has been considered a building block of perceived control (Fisher, 1984).
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For instance, Baker and Stephenson (2000a) have demonstrated that both prediction and
perceived control are instrumental in determining cardiovascular responses to mildly
aversive situations.
Although many studies have shown the importance of control and/or prediction
(e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Schulz, 1976; Wortman, 1975), interpretational problems
exist due to the fact that these variables are typically confounded. Burger and Arkin
(1980) argue that participants who are provided with control over outcomes are also
characteristically provided with prediction of outcomes. In other words, individuals may
perceive control over an outcome, not simply because they affect the likelihood of that
outcome, but because they can predict or anticipate the likelihood of that outcome
(Craske, Glover, & DeCola, 1995; DeCola et al., 1988; Mineka & Henderson, 1985;
Mineka & Kihlstrom, 1978; Nickels et al., 1992; Rosellini et al., 1987; Veltman, van
Zijderveld, van Dyck, Bakker, 1998; Vogeltanz & Hecker, 1999; Wortman, 1975).
Indeed, individuals may feel control, not only because they can exert an influence on the
outcome but also, because they are able to predict the outcome.
For example, Alloy and Abramson’s (1979) participants may have felt control, not
because pressing or not pressing a button influenced whether the light turned on
(i.e., actual control), but because they anticipated (via a feedback signal) whether the light
would turn on (i.e., prediction). Even traditional control theorists recognize the existence
of the control-prediction confound. For instance, Seligman (1975, p. 124) admits that
“these two variables are very hard to separate, for when control is present, prediction is as
well.” In agreement, Peterson et al. (1993, p.58) explain that “there are many potential
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interactions between control and prediction, and they will not be easy to separate.”
According to Langlois et al. (2002), the control-prediction confound is best
illustrated by examining the four combinations that result from crossing two levels of
prediction (i.e., prediction and no-prediction) with two levels of actual control
(i.e., control and no-control). In the Control/Prediction condition, the individual knows
the outcome and influences it (e.g., the manager of a fast food chain types Command-A
into the computer, which expectedly deletes a customer’s food order). In the No-Control/
Prediction condition, the individual knows the outcome but does not influence it (e.g., the
manager of a fast food chain knows that Command-A deletes a customer’s food order, but
must patiently wait for an employee-in-training to commit the action herself). In the
No-Control/No-Prediction condition, the individual does not know the outcome and does
not influence it (e.g., the manager o f a fast food chain must patiently wait for an
employee-in-training to type a command which may or may not actually delete the
customer’s food order as intended). Finally, in the Control/No-Prediction condition, the
individual does not know the outcome but influences it. This final arrangement of
predictionless control has been especially difficult for traditional theorists to
conceptualize (Langlois et al., 2002).

Early Attempts at Predictionless Control

Most studies that have manipulated control independently from prediction have
examined learned helplessness in animals (see Mineka & Henderson, 1985 for a review).
For instance, physiological investigations of animals demonstrate that control leads to
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greater reductions in gastric ulcerations in prediction rather than no prediction conditions
(e.g., Weiss, 1971). In studies examining human participants, it has been shown that both
action (i.e., actual control) and prediction are related to perceptions of control. For
example, Taylor and Brown (1988) report that individuals infer that they have greater
control when they personally throw dice (i.e., action) than when someone else does it for
them.
Furthermore, Miller and Ross (1975) explain that, when individuals expect to
produce a certain outcome and the outcome then occurs (i.e., prediction), they often
overestimate the degree to which they were instrumental in bringing it about. Indeed, a
number of findings indicate that, in comparison to individuals with either control and/or
prediction, those having neither control nor prediction over aversive events demonstrate
greater performance deficits (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Winefield & Tiggeman, 1978).
Over the years, some researchers have attempted to include a predictionless
control (i.e., control/no-prediction) condition in their studies. However, most of these
attempts involved methodological difficulties which confounded the concepts of control
and prediction. For example, Wortman (1975) conducted a study that involved three
experimental conditions: (1) the experimenter chose a marble for the participants who
knew beforehand which marble stood for which outcome (i.e., No-Control/Prediction);
(2) the participants themselves selected a marble, knowing beforehand which marble
stood for which outcome (i.e., Control/Prediction); and (3) the participants themselves
selected a marble and assigned themselves an outcome, knowing only after their selection
which marble stood for which outcome (i.e., Control/No-Prediction).
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The results indicated that prediction induced feelings of perceived control.
However, all of the participants were aware of which prize they would receive before
perceptions of control, choice, and responsibility were measured. In other words, the
No-Prediction condition was quite similar to both Prediction conditions. Although
participants with no prediction found out which outcomes they would receive only after
(rather than before) marble selection occurred, the fact remains that the participants in
each experimental condition knew their outcome before their perceptions were assessed
on the dependent measures questionnaire. Therefore, the Control/No-Prediction
condition was not truly “predictionless.”
«

Burger and Arkin (1980) also attempted to include a predictionless control
condition in their study. The four following conditions were examined: (1) in Control/
Prediction, participants were able to terminate an aversive noise by correctly solving an
anagram problem; (2) in Control/No-Prediction, participants were informed that if they
solved an anagram problem correctly, the length of the next noise would be cut in half.
In reality, the noise blasts were presented at random intervals and for various durations
regardless of the participants’ anagram performance; (3) in No-Control/Prediction,
participants were unaware of a connection between solving the anagram problem and the
duration of noise blasts that were presented at consistent intervals and durations; and
(4) in No-Control/No-Prediction, participants were unaware of a connection between
solving anagram problems and the duration of noise blasts that were presented at
inconsistent intervals and durations. The results indicated that participants who had
either control or prediction experienced positive performance and positive emotional
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effects. Only participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition displayed
performance deficits and depressive affect.
Burger and Arkin’s (1980) findings are difficult to interpret because the
experimental groups differed both in the instructions they received and in the way that
prediction was operationalized. For instance, the outcomes involving control and the
outcomes involving prediction differed depending on the experimental condition.
Participants in the Control/Prediction condition were able to predict both noise onset and
noise termination, but participants in the No-Control/Prediction condition were only able
to predict noise onset. Furthermore, participants in the Control/Prediction condition had
control over absolute noise duration while participants in the Control/No-Prediction
condition (i.e., predictionless control) actually had no control over the noise, even though
they were led to believe that the duration of the next noise blast could be reduced by
solving the anagram.
This last point also demonstrates an incongruence within Burger and Arkin’s
(1980) conceptualization of control. For instance, in the predictionless control condition,
the experimenters wanted participants to perceive control without actually having control.
But by unintentionally manipulating the participants’ perceptions of control in only some
of the experimental conditions, perceived control and actual control (two separate
concepts) were confounded. Specifically, in the predictionless control condition, which
included perceived control but no actual control, two control variables were
unintentionally manipulated. The Control/Prediction condition only manipulated actual
control.
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Acknowledging such conceptual difficulties, other researchers have opted to
either completely omit the predictionless control condition, or to replace it with a
no-treatment condition. Unfortunately, this makes it impossible to determine whether
positive effects are attributable to control or to prediction. For example, Geer and Maisel
(1972) exposed participants to a slide show o f aversive photographs using only three
conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; and (3) No-Control/
No-Prediction. In the Control/ Prediction condition, participants could turn off the slides
when they became too aversive, thus making the viewing time predictable. Participants
in the No-Control/Prediction condition could not terminate the photographs but were told
how long each photograph would be viewed. In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition,
participants could not turn off the slides and were not told how long each photograph
would be viewed. The results indicated that participants who could terminate the viewing
of aversive photographs (i.e., Control/Prediction) had significantly lower galvanic skin
responses than both the participants who had No-Control/Prediction and those who had
No-Control/No-Prediction. This finding suggests that the positive effects are attributable
to having control rather than prediction.
Geer and MaiseFs (1972) results too are difficult to interpret because: (1) the
control and prediction variables were only partially manipulated in the absence of a
predictionless control condition; and (2) the operationalization of prediction was flawed
due to a methodological consideration in the Control/Prediction condition which involved
imposing a 35-second time limit for viewing a photograph regardless of a participant’s
decision to continue viewing a slide for a longer period of time. In fact, it was not
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reported whether or not it became necessary to limit participants’ viewing time, which
would consequently take away the individual’s ability to control and predict the length of
time exposed to a slide.
In contrast to the other studies examining both control and prediction, Schulz
(1976) examined positive rather than negative outcomes. The predictionless control
condition was replaced with a no-treatment condition, and the effects of control and
prediction were examined in older adults living in institutions. The study involved four
experimental conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; (3) Random;
and (4) No-Treatment. Participants in the Control/Prediction condition had the
opportunity to control the duration and frequency of the visits they received. Participants
in the No-Control/Prediction condition were informed when a visit would take place, but
were not given the opportunity to control the duration and frequency o f the visits.
Participants in the Random condition were neither given the opportunity to control the
frequency nor the duration of the visits, and were not notified when a visitor was coming.
In the No-Treatment group, there were no visits at all, thus serving as a baseline group.
The results showed that, in comparison to the random and no-treatment groups,
the participants in both the Control/Prediction and No-Control/Prediction groups
demonstrated significantly higher levels of activity as well as physical and psychological
well-being (e.g., decrease in the quantity of daily medication, happier, more hopeful, and
more zest for life). Whereas Geer and Maisel’s (1972) results seemed attributable to
controlling rather than predicting an aversive event, Schulz’s (1976) findings suggest that
predicting is more important than controlling a positive event. Once again, however,
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these results remain difficult to interpret because a predictionless control condition was
absent in both studies.
Tiggeman and Winefield (1987) also replaced the predictionless control condition
with a No-Treatment condition. Participants were randomly assigned to the following
experimental conditions: (1) Control/Prediction; (2) No-Control/No-Prediction;
(3) No-Control/Prediction; and (4) No-Treatment. All of the participants in the treatment
conditions were informed that a buzzer would turn on, and their task was to find a way to
stop it. The noise generated by the buzzer was not considered aversive, and all of the
treatment groups received the same instructions.
Participants in the Control/Prediction condition could terminate the tone by
pressing a switch four times. Participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition
could not terminate the noise and were exposed to the same pattern of tone duration as the
yoked participants in the Control/Prediction condition. For participants in the
No-Control/Prediction condition, the buzzer consistently sounded for a set amount of
time. Comparable to Burger and Arkin’s (1980) findings, the results confirmed that it is
necessary to consider both the roles of control and prediction in explaining learned
helplessness. Specifically, only participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition
displayed performance deficits when completing the same task at a later time.
Although their results confirmed that unpredictability and uncontrollability need
to be considered separately in explaining helplessness, Tiggeman and Winefield (1987)
emphasized that their study was limited in the fact that they “were unable to form a
feasible controllable/unpredictable condition within the standard instrumental
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helplessness induction procedure” (p. 261). Due to this limitation, it was not possible to
satisfactorily examine the effects of predictionlessness alone (Tiggeman & Winefield,
1987).
In sum, the predictionless control condition has posed a great deal of difficulty for
researchers. While some investigators have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to include
predictionless control in their studies (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Wortman, 1975),
others admittedly excluded the condition due to conceptual difficulties (e.g., Tiggeman
& Winefield, 1987). The resulting findings have been inconsistent, which has admittedly
hindered any fruitful elaboration of the roles of control and prediction within the learned
helplessness framework.
Even more encumbering is the belief in the unfeasibility of unconfounding control
and prediction, a conviction held by many researchers. For example, Peterson et al.
(1993, p. 58) explain that “there are many potential interactions between control and
prediction, and they will not be easy to separate.” Tiggeman and Winefield (1987,
p. 154) agree that, even if a predictionless control condition could be arranged, “it is hard
to see how one could convince people that they were controlling outcomes they were
unable to predict.” Further deterring any attempt at finding any clear answers is
Seligman’s (1975, p. 128) remark that “the problem of disentangling the effects of
controllability from predictability may be next to logically impossible.”

Recent Attempts at Predictionless Control

In comparison to previous studies, recent investigations have provided both
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alternative operationalizations of control and prediction, as well as alternative methods of
assessing participants’ responses to an aversive situation. Specifically, the latter
investigations have included: (1) the manipulation of perceived control rather than actual
control (e.g., Geer & Maisel, 1972); (2) the assessment of participants’ objective
physiological responses rather than participants’ subjective self-rated experiences
(e.g., Wortman, 1975) of a mildly aversive rather than a harsher event (e.g., Geer
& Maisel, 1972), or a more positive event (e.g., Schulz, 1976); and (3) the measurement
of actions that lessened the severity of the duration of an aversive event rather than
actions that involved either the termination (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980) or avoidance
(Wortman, 1975) of an event.
For instance, a recent study by Baker and Stephenson (2000a) kept control and
prediction methodologically distinct by randomly assigning the participants to one of four
experimental conditions: (1) in Perceived-Control/Prediction, a warning signal permitted
the prediction of the onset o f an aversive noise and participants were led to believe that
they could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to the message “press button now”
occurred within pre-determined limits; (2) in No-Perceived-Control/Prediction, a warning
signal permitted the prediction of noise onset and, having no knowledge of a contingency
between reaction time and noise duration, participants were instructed to press the
reaction time button as quickly as possible; (3) in Perceived-Control/No-Prediction,
participants were informed that a warning signal and noise onset would occur randomly
while being led to believe that they could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to
the message “press button now” occurred within pre-determined limits; and (4) in
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No-Perceived-Control/No-Prediction, participants were informed that a warning signal
and noise onset would occur randomly while being led to believe that they had no control
over noise duration.
Although participants in the control conditions were led to believe that they could
alter noise duration, the noise was actually under experimenter control (i.e., actual control
was held constant at “no control”, across all trials, regardless of experimental condition).
Consistent with the yoked control paradigm, all of the participants were matched in terms
of the nature of the task, as well as the number and time of reception of both a warning
signal (i.e., prediction) and the aversive noise. Heart rate reactivity, reaction time, and
performance increase were measured.
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) reported the finding that both control and
prediction functioned independently in reducing heart rate responses to the aversive noise.
Furthermore, a combination o f prediction and control led to greater ratings of perceived
control, which suggests that prediction facilitated feelings o f control (Baker
& Stephenson, 2000a). Neither perceived control nor prediction led to better
performance in the reaction time task.
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) point out that these findings are difficult to
interpret due to some methodological limitations related to the fact that some participants
in the control condition perceived little or no control over noise duration, and therefore
did not recognize a contingency between their task performance and noise duration. It
was explained that this may have been caused by the fact that, regardless of reaction time,
noise duration was held constant (i.e., 3 seconds) across all four experimental conditions.
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Consequently, participants may have realized over time that, irrespective of their
performance, noise duration was the same in all trials, thus weakening their control belief.
Baker and Stephenson (2000a) also considered the possibility that their study was limited
in the fact that the level of noise stimuli was mild in comparison to that of other studies
examining performance and physiological responses to aversive stimuli such as shock
(e.g., Light & Obrist, 1980).
In a separate investigation of the relative contributions o f perceived control,
feedback, and prediction in determining cardiovascular function, Baker and Stephenson
(2000b) examined eight experimental conditions: (1) Perceived-Control/Feedback/
Prediction; (2) Perceived-Control/Feedback/No-Prediction; (3) Perceived-Control/
No-Feedback/Prediction; (4) Perceived-Control/No-Feedback/No-Prediction;
(5) No-Perceived-Control/Feedback/Prediction; (6) No-Perceived-Control/Feedback/
No-Prediction; (7) No-Perceived-Control/No-Feedback/Prediction; and (8) No-PerceivedControl/No-Feedback/No-Prediction.
Participants in the Perceived-Control conditions were led to believe that they
could reduce noise duration if their reaction time to the message ‘‘start” occurred within
pre-determined limits. In the No-Perceived-Control conditions, participants were
instructed to press the button as quickly as possible to the word “start” without being
informed of any relationship between reaction time and noise duration. In the feedback
conditions, participants received the message “noise duration will be (2 or 5) seconds”.
In the No-Feedback conditions, participants received the message “the noise will follow”.
In the Prediction conditions, a warning signal was presented before the noise occurred.
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In the No-Prediction conditions, the mildly aversive noise was presented either before or
after the warning signal, and participants received different durations of inter-stimulus
intervals across trials.
Although participants in the control conditions were led to believe that they could
alter noise duration, the noise was actually under experimenter control (i.e., consistent
across all trials regardless of experimental condition). All o f the participants were
matched in terms o f the nature of the task, as well as the number and time of reception of
both a warning signal (i.e., prediction) and the aversive noise. Heart rate reactivity and
reaction time were measured.
Baker and Stephenson (2000b) found that, in comparison to the No-Feedback
conditions, participants who received feedback displayed greater increases in heart rate
following the aversive noise as well as smaller decreases in heart rate during the period
following the stimulus impact, particularly in the Prediction conditions. However,
contrary to previous investigations describing stronger heart rate reactions with control
(e.g., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997; Muller, Gunther, Habel, & Rockstroh,
1998), perceived control had no effect at all on participants’ heart rates. Instead, it was
found that prediction (i.e., rather than control) was responsible for changes in heart rate
function (Baker & Stephenson, 2000b). None o f the variables led to better reaction time.
The fact that Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) perceived contingency
(i.e., perceived control) had no effect on heart rate is in direct contrast with similar
studies. Investigations examining actual contingency (i.e., actual control) between
performance and aversive outcomes have found that contingency leads to increases in
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heart rate (i.e., Bongard, 1995; Bongard & Hodapp, 1997). Baker and Stephenson
(2000b, p. 249) suggested “that the manipulation of instrumental control leads to
differences in heart rate responses, whereas manipulation of subjective awareness of
control does not.” Perhaps differences in results exist due to differences in
operationalizations of actual control on the one hand, and perceived control on the other.
Despite operational differences between actual and perceived contingency,
however, there was also an important difference within Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a;
2000b) results, which still remains unaddressed. Whereas perceived control reduced
heart rate activity in the earlier study, it did not affect cardiovascular responses in the later
study. Baker and Stephenson (2000b, p. 249) attempted to justify the discrepancy
between their findings and the findings of other active coping studies by stating that
“results from previous studies that have utilized perceived instrumental control (Manuck
et al., 1978; Sherwood et al., 1986) have shown differential cardiovascular effects of
control.”
Alternatively, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) differential findings might
be due to the fact that perceived control, feedback, and prediction were confounded. For
instance, in Baker and Stephenson (2000b, p. 243), feedback was operationalized as the
knowledge of the duration of the mildly aversive noise (i.e., participants received the
message: ‘noise duration will be 2 or 5 seconds’), and no-feedback was defined as no
knowledge of duration (i.e., participants received the message: ‘the noise will follow’).
Consistent in both feedback conditions, however, was the appearance of a message before
noise onset.
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Furthermore, Baker and Stephenson (2000a; 2000b) operationalized prediction as
participants’ knowledge of the feedback/outcome relationship (i.e., a warning signal
preceded the noise and the duration of inter-stimulus intervals was consistent). In
no-prediction, participants had no knowledge of a contingency between the warning
signal and the noise (i.e., the warning signal either preceded or followed the noise, and
the duration of inter-stimulus intervals was inconsistent).
Conceptually, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) prediction conditions
resemble the perceived contingency conditions from past studies (e.g., Alloy &
Abramson, 1979; Thompson et al., 1993). Specifically, in the former, prediction was
operationalized as the perceived contingency between an uncontrollable event
(i.e., warning signal over which participants had no control) and the outcome
(i.e., duration of noise).
In addition, given the fact that it permitted participants to predict the outcome they
would receive, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) feedback condition appears to mimic
conceptualizations of prediction (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980; Nickels et al., 1992). For
example, Nickels et al. (1992, p. 159) define prediction as “knowing which outcome will
likely occur before it occurs.” Therefore, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000b) feedback
condition did mimic prediction in the fact that it informed participants of the outcome
they would receive before it even occurred.
Furthermore, Baker and Stephenson’s (2000a; 2000b) predictionless perceived
control conditions resemble the random conditions included in some of the early attempts
at achieving predictionless actual control (e.g., Schulz, 1976). Whether examining actual
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control or perceived control, an unconfounded predictionless control condition seems to
have consistently eluded researchers. However, as remarked by Cramer and Perreault
(2005), what researchers have consistently overlooked amidst the control-prediction
confound is the uncertainty in explaining participants’ ratings of perceived control:
Is it a function of individuals’ level of actual control, level of outcome predictability,
or some combination of the two? Under the traditional conceptualization, it is impossible
to know which.
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CHAPTER 3
A New Conceptualization of Control
Due to the variety of meanings that have been attributed to both control and
prediction, it has been difficult for social scientists to systematically examine the
literature. In their approach to the problem, many have attempted to convey a
conceptualization of control and prediction that incorporates a number of studies that
differ in their methodology and operationalization of the terms. Consequently, many
definitions of control and prediction have either been too limited (e.g., control is
determined by meaningful choices available in the environment; Rodin et al., 1980) or too
broad (e.g., “Controllability...means that you can do something about the event.
Predictability merely means that you know something about the event, whether or not you
can do anything about it”; Miller, 1980, p. 288).

Separating the Effects o f Control and Prediction

In their approach to further understand the effects of control and to rectify the
control-prediction confound, Nickels et al. (1992) reconceptualized control as
independent from prediction. Consequently, control was redefined as “exerting an
influence over which outcome will likely occur” (Nickels et al., 1992, p. 160). In other
words, “one’s characteristic actions or aspects completely determine (make a difference
in) the outcome received, which may or may not be realized” (Cramer and Perreault,
2005, p. 6). For example, if a game show contestant can choose either of two doors in the
hopes o f uncovering a desired prize, there is control because the contestant will get a
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different outcome (desired or undesired) depending upon the door that is chosen.
Conversely, there is no control if both doors conceal the desired prize (or both doors
conceal the undesired prize), because the player will receive the same outcome, regardless
of the door that is chosen.
Prediction, on the other hand, “refers to knowing which outcome will likely occur
before it occurs” (Nickels et al., 1992, p. 159). To use the above example, if the
contestant learns the outcome of a choice, then there is prediction because the contestant
can anticipate the receipt of the prize. Under this reconceptualization, the traditionally
impossible predictionless control condition becomes possible. For instance,
predictionless control exists if one door conceals a prize and (after choosing either door),
the player does not learn the result of that choice until after the assessment of perceived
control. Table 2 illustrates both some traditional studies which include control-prediction
confounds, and studies based on the new conceptualization which have successfully
separated control from prediction by including a predictionless control condition.
Situations of predictionless control, wherein an individual performs an action
without knowing its effect on the outcome (Nickels et al., 1992), occur in everyday life.
For example, the owner of a new video game system decides to influence the movements
of his game character by using the buttons on a joystick with which she is unfamiliar.
The new player does not know which joystick button makes the character kick its
opponent, and which one makes the character throw fire. However, she knows that
pushing either of the two buttons will have some kind of effect on the character’s
movements. The video game player has control but cannot predict what the outcome of
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Table 2
Traditional Views o f Control: A Chronological Survey o f Some Conceptual Confounds
Based on a New Conceptualization o f Control
STUDY

TR A D ITIO N A L CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONTROL
CN

CH

White (1959)

CO

PC

RE

✓

CONFOUNDS

Other

AC

PR

Manipulation of environment

X

X

Overmier & Seligman
(1967)

✓

*

X

Geer & Maisel (1972)

✓

X

X

Averill (1973)

Behavioural, Cognitive, &
Decisional control

X

X

Hiroto (1974)

Potential contingency

X

X

Langer (1975)

✓

X 1

Langer & Roth (1975)

✓

X'

Seligman (1975)

✓

Wortman (1975)
Langer & Rodin (1976)

✓

✓

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Schulz (1976)

✓

Alloy & Abramson (1979)

✓

✓

X

X

Burger & Arkin (1980)

✓

✓

X'

X

X '2

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

n.a.!

X

X

X

Rodin et al. (1980)

✓

Burger et al. (1983)

✓

Tiggeman & Winefeld
(1987)

Perceived competence

✓

Taylor & Brown (1988)

✓

Helgeson (1992)

✓

Hodappetal. (1992)

✓

Reed et al. (1993)

✓

Perceived vicarious control

Perceived vicarious control
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Table 2 (cont’d)
Traditional Views o f Control: A Chronological Survey o f Some Conceptual Confounds
Based on a New Conceptualization o f Control
TR AD ITIO NA L CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF
CONTROL

STUDY

CN

CH

Thompson et al. (1993)
Bongard (1995)

CO

PC

Other

✓

AC

PR

X

X

X

X

X

X

✓

Eitel et al. (1995)
Vogeltanz & Hecker (1999)

RE

CONFOUNDS

✓
✓

Baker & Stephenson (2000a)

✓

X 1

X

Baker & Stephenson (2000b)

✓

X ‘

X3

Note. CN = Actual Contingency; CH = Choice; AC = Actual Control; CO = Competence;

PC = Perceived Contingency; PR = Prediction; RE = Responsibility. Superscript1=
Perceived Control; Superscript2 = Potential Control; Superscript3= Feedback;
Superscript4 = Knowledge of Control.
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those actions will be.
In a further example, hospital beds contain a number of buttons which can affect
bed position. Individuals who are lying in a hospital bed cannot clearly see any of these
buttons, but they know that pushing any one of these buttons will have some kind of
effect over bed height (i.e., control), even though it is unknown (i.e., no prediction) what
that effect will be (e.g., the bed might rise as desired).
Another example of predictionless control involves ordering a meal in a restaurant
from a foreign language menu that one does not comprehend (Cramer et al., 1997). The
individual has control because her choice makes a difference in the type of food that will
arrive (i.e., control). However, she cannot predict exactly what that food will be (i.e., no
prediction). Finally, an individual may take care of a cold by eating properly and taking
medication (i.e., control), even without knowing for certain (i.e., no prediction) how long
the recovery will take (Burger & Arkin, 1980).
Cramer and Perreault (2005) describe yet another example of predictionless
control which involves a student who has enrolled in a course taught in equivalent
timeslots and buildings by either an excellent or a terrible professor without knowing
which professor will teach which section because that information has not yet been
released by the registrar’s office. Whereas the registrar’s office knows which professor
will instruct which section (i.e., prediction), the student does not (i.e., no prediction).
Nevertheless, the student’s choice of section will completely determine the quality of
course instruction received (i.e., control).
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Recent Success at Achieving Predictionless Actual Control

Although predictionless control situations are possible to arrange, some
researchers remain doubtful of the possibility that individuals will actually recognize that
their actions are indeed controlling an unpredictable outcome (e.g., Tiggeman &
Winefield, 1987). In order to test this possibility, Nickels et al. (1992) conducted two
innovative experiments. Experiment 1 consisted of four conditions: (1) Control/
Prediction; (2) No-Control/Prediction; (3) Control/No-Prediction; and (4) No-Control/
No-Prediction. Participants were informed that they would listen to an aversive noise for
either a short or a long time period. Some of the participants inserted plugs (which
looked identical but were believed to determine a given time period) into a box. Fast
plugs were preferred because they made the counter device briefly cycle faster, resulting
in what appeared to be less time spent listening to the aversive noise. On the other hand,
slow plugs made the device briefly cycle slower, which seemed to increase aversive
listening time. In actuality, the device produced the aversive noise for the same period of
time for all of the participants. Therefore, perceived control and prediction were
manipulated while actual control was held constant.
In the Control/Prediction condition, participants selected one of two plugs
(i.e., control) and later viewed either a slow or fast cycling of numbers (i.e., prediction).
In the No-Control/Prediction condition, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine
which plug would be inserted (i.e., no control) and the participant viewed either a slow or
fast cycling of numbers (i.e, prediction). In the Control/No-Prediction condition,
participants selected a plug (i.e., control) but were prevented from viewing the counter
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(i.e., no prediction). In the No-Control/No-Prediction condition, the experimenter flipped
a coin to determine which plug would be inserted into the box (i.e., no control), and the
participants were prevented from viewing the counter (i.e., no prediction).
The findings indicated that the participants did in fact recognize that they had
control even without prediction. Specifically, participants with control (i.e., those who
freely chose a plug) rated themselves as having more ‘influence’ in determining which
time period they received, regardless of prediction. Furthermore, participants with
prediction (i.e., those who viewed cycling numbers) rated themselves as more confident
in their ability to predict how long they would be listening to the aversive noise.
Despite the encouraging finding that it is methodologically possible to test
predictionless control, Nickels et al. (1992) noted some key shortcomings to
Experiment 1. First, it is possible that an illusion of control, or “an expectancy of a
personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would
warrant” (Langer, 1975, p. 311), presented itself. In Nickels et al. (1992), an illusion of
control may have been induced due to the element of choice involved in selecting a plug.
Whereas the participants in the control group chose either one of two plugs, those with no
control were not presented with a selection of options at all. Furthermore, the term
“control” was mentioned in the instructions, which may have led to demand
characteristics. Therefore, Nickels et al. (1992) designed a second experiment that
addressed these concerns.
In Experiment 2, participants were placed into like-sexed pairs and informed that
they would engage in an aversive task (i.e., repetitive and boring) for either a short or a
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long period of time. Two cards containing the invisible words “short” or “long” were
placed on a platform. One person in the pair was either (a) controller-shooter,
(b) controller-watcher, (c) uncontroller-shooter, (d) uncontroller-watcher; the other person
was designated as the opposite (i.e., d, c, b, a, respectively). To determine each pair’s
time period, the controller selected a card, and the shooter (possibly the same person as
the controller) hit the selected card with a toy dart gun. In this case, only the person who
chose the card (controller) had control regardless of whether he or she was also the person
who shot the card. Half of the pairs were assigned to the Prediction condition, so the time
period indicated on the chosen card was revealed before the questionnaire and aversive
task were completed. The other half of the pairs were assigned to the No-Prediction
condition. This meant that the time period indicated on the chosen card was only
revealed after the questionnaire had been completed.
Similar to the findings obtained in Experiment 1, regardless of control,
participants with prediction provided higher ratings of prediction and confidence than
participants with no prediction. Furthermore, regardless of prediction, participants with
control provided higher ratings of control, influence, responsibility, and credit or blame;
and lower ratings of helplessness. Since no difference was found between shooters and
watchers in terms of ratings o f influence and control, it was concluded that an illusion of
control due to choice had not actually been induced in the first experiment. In other
words, shooters did not feel more control simply because they were responsible for
shooting the card.
Nickels, Gural, Cramer, and Ross (1994) also conducted a study that would
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provide further evidence that predictionless control is not only recognized, but also
preferred over predictionless uncontrol. In this instance, however, only two conditions
were examined: (1) Control/No-Prediction; and (2) No-Control/No-Prediction.
Participants were presented with two trays. Each tray contained two envelopes, and each
envelope contained a card that indicated whether or not they had won a prize.
Participants first selected a tray and then selected one of the two envelopes in that tray.
Participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition were informed that one tray held
envelopes containing different outcomes (i.e., one offering a prize and one offering no
prize), while the other tray held envelopes containing the same outcome (i.e., both
offering a prize or both offering no prize), but the participants were not told which
outcome to expect. Participants in the No-Control/No-Prediction condition were
informed that all of the envelopes in both trays contained the same outcome (i.e., either
all offering a prize or all offering no prize), but the participants were not told which
outcome to expect. After selecting a tray, it was explained that participants could choose
an envelope if they were willing to wait for up to 20 minutes. I f they decided not to wait,
the participants were permitted to choose an envelope from the unselected tray.
The results indicated that participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition
preferred having a choice between envelopes containing different and unpredictable
outcomes (i.e., blind control) than envelopes containing the same unpredictable outcome
(i.e., no control). Furthermore, participants in the Control/No-Prediction condition
waited longer in order to be able to choose between envelopes in their preferred tray than
those in the No-Control/No- Prediction condition. The findings demonstrated that
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predictionless control was both recognized and preferred over no control. These findings
are difficult to interpret, however, because actual control was confounded with yet
another variable - choice.

Separating the Effects o f Control and Choice

Both theoretically and empirically, the new conceptualization has allowed the
separation o f the effects of control and prediction, thus making predictionless control
scenarios possible (Cramer et al., 1997; Gural, 1992; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et
al., 1992, 1994). Despite theoretically and empirically separating the effects of control
and prediction, however, deficiencies still exist with regard to disentangling the concepts
of control and choice.
For instance, despite successfully separating the effects of control and prediction,
Nickels et al.’s (1992) manipulation of control was still confounded with choice.
Whereas participants with control were permitted to choose a plug, participants without
control were not. Therefore, it is unclear whether enhanced feelings of control, influence,
and responsibility were actually due to the veridical influence of the cycling speed
(i.e., actual control), or to the act of selecting a plug (i.e., choice). Were Nickels et
al.’s (1992) results due to the level of actual control, the level of choice, or the
combination of both actual control and choice?
Advocates of the illusion of control would certainly challenge Nickels et
al.’s (1992) results by intimating that the higher ratings of controllability found in the
control condition were illusory, simply produced by the act of selecting a plug

I
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(i.e., Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Indeed, recent findings support the notion that,
regardless of actual control, individuals who are given a choice show better personal
adjustment and better coping (e.g., Burleson, Kegeles, & Lund, 1990; Harchik, Sherman,
Sheldon, & Bannerman, 1993), as well as increased feelings o f comfort (Mills & Krantz,
1979) and perceived control (Feehan & Enzle, 1991; Langer, 1975).
A number of studies commonly conceptualize control as choice and no-control as
no-choice. For example, in Langer (1975), whereas participants in the control condition
chose their lottery ticket, individuals in the no-control condition did not make a choice.
When asked to estimate the resale value of their ticket, the participants in the control
(i.e., choice) condition appraised their ticket at a higher value, therefore implying that
ticket choice gave individuals a greater sense of control at winning at this chance task.
Similarly, in their investigation of the effects of repeated movie exposure in postsurgical patients, Rotton and Shats (1996) operationalized perceived control as giving
patients a movie choice and giving them information about the benefits of watching
movies. It was found that choice interacted with benefit expectations in affecting the
amount of medication that patients self-administered. Specifically, patients who were
neither given a choice nor informed about the benefits of movie-watching self
administered the most medication.
Tafarodi, Milne, and Smith (1999) separated their choice conditions into three
categories: (a) effective (i.e., difference-making) choice; (b) ineffective choice; and
(c) no choice. The participants who made an effective choice provided significantly
higher ratings of control than those who had made either an ineffective choice or no
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choice at all. Therefore, only effective choices (which impacted the outcome) were
associated with perceptions of control.
Although many studies have demonstrated the benefits of choice, it is clear that
choice and control are often confounded. This confound exists in the literature despite
the caution that these two concepts are not interchangeable (e.g., Nickels et al., 2005;
Williams, 1998). Consequently, the results of many studies have been questioned whether choice independently increases or decreases perceptions of control remains an
empirical question (Skinner, 1996).
Paterson and Neufeld (1995) suggest that the point of contention is not related to
the simpler confound between two variables (i.e., control and choice, or control and
prediction). Rather, the confound exists among all three variables, in the fact that choice
influences the amount of control a person feels while anticipating a stressful event. In
their investigation of this triple confound, Paterson and Neufeld (1995) manipulated the
availability of information (i.e., prediction) about coping options in an imagined scenario,
and then examined the effects of anticipated stress and control in selecting coping
options. The results indicated that, when information about choice was available,
actually having choices among coping options increased perceived control and reduced
stress. This suggests that providing non-productive choices does not increase perceptions
of control nor reduces perceptions of threat. Rather, it was the rational anticipation of the
effects on the outcome which governed participants’ perceptions.
Several studies have avoided the triple confound of control, choice, and prediction
by holding one variable constant while manipulating the other two. For instance, Cramer
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et al. (1997; see also Gural, 1992) held choice constant, but manipulated prediction and
control. Choice was held constant by allowing all participants to make a choice on every
trial. Multi-trial control conditions were also included within this context. In addition,
whereas Nickels et al. (1992) only compared the effects of 0% with 100% actual control,
Cramer et al. (1997) compared the effects of 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75% actual control.
In Cramer et al.’s (1997) study, participants were informed that they would listen
to an aversive noise for the length of time determined by the positioning of a card
(i.e., which end of the card was placed in the slot). Each participant was given a total of
24 cards that the experimenter placed in either the A or B slot of the card reader.
Participants received a time reduction if a white square on the card was positioned
opposite the card-reader photocell. Card position made no difference for cards with
either two white or two black squares (i.e., No-Actual-Control). However, card position
did make a difference for cards with one white and one black square (i.e, Actual-Control).

Participants were informed whether their choice o f card position (A or B) would make a
difference for each card, and then they were randomly assigned to one of twelve
conditions derived by crossing three levels of prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success,
Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction) with four levels of actual control (0%, 25%, 50%,
and 75%).
Participants in the Predicted-Success condition knew they had received more than
13 time reductions, while participants in the Predicted-Failure condition knew they had
received less than 11 time reductions. Participants in the No-Prediction condition did not
know how many time reductions they received. Level o f actual control (0%, 25%, 50%,
I
i
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and 75%) was determined by how many cards the participants received with one white
and one black square (0, 6, 12, and 18 cards, respectively). It was found that, regardless
of prediction, participants with no actual control over the length of time of an aversive
noise felt less control, less responsibility, less influence, and more helplessness than those
with any amount of actual control (25%, 50%, or 75%).
Cramer and Nickels (2005) addressed the triple confound by manipulating actual
control while holding both choice (all participants made one selection) and prediction
constant (at No-Prediction). To determine how long they would engage in a boring motor
task, participants blindly selected among a series of letters (A and B) denoting short and
long time periods. Similar letters (all A or all B, e.g., “AA”, “BBB”, “AAAA”)
represented the same time period (i.e., No-Actual-Control) while different letters (mix of
A and B, e.g., “AB”, “AAB”, “BBAA”) represented different time periods (i.e., ActualControl). Whereas some participants selected a letter and then completed the dependent
measures, others completed the dependent measures first and then selected a letter. It was
found that participants who made a choice among different options (i.e., Actual-Control)
had higher ratings of perceived control than participants choosing among identical
options (i.e., No-Actual-Control). Interestingly, there was no difference in control ratings
when measures were taken either before or after the choice of option. In other words,
control ratings were equivalent whether a choice was made or not, which emphasizes the
unimportance of choice in determining perceptions of control.
In order to further investigate the three-variable confound, Langlois et al. (2002)
conducted two experiments. In Experiment 1, based on the findings of Alloy and
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Abramson (1979) and Nickels et al. (1992), it was hypothesized (1) that even without
being able to predict the outcome, participants with actual control will report higher
perceived control, responsibility, influence, and lower levels of helplessness than
participants with no actual control. Furthermore, based on the findings of Langer (1975)
and Wortman (1975), it was hypothesized (2) that even without being able to predict the
outcome, participants with choice of option will report higher perceived control,
responsibility, influence, and lower levels of helplessness than participants with no choice
of options. These hypotheses were tested by considering control as implying choice,
although having a choice did not necessarily imply having control. In other words,
participants with actual control had the opportunity to make a choice that made a
difference in the outcome they received.
First, the participants were informed that they would engage in a boring
proofreading task for either a short 2-minute or a long 20-minute period of time. Then,
one of three experimental conditions was introduced: (1) Actual-Control/Choice;
(2) No-Actual-Control/Choice; and (3) No-Actual-Control/No-Choice. In the
Actual-Control/Choice condition, participants were informed that their choice would
involve selecting one of two envelopes containing different time periods (i.e., one
envelope contained the 2-minute time period and the other contained the 20-minute time
period), but they didn’t know which envelope contained which time period. Participants
in the No-Actual-Control/Choice condition were aware that they would choose one of
two envelopes containing the same time period (i.e., both envelopes contained either
2-minute or 20-minute time periods), but they didn’t know which time period the
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envelopes contained. The No-Actual-Control/No-Choice participants watched the
experimenter select one of the two envelopes by flipping a coin. Since flipping a coin
generally involves neither knowledge nor selection skills on the experimenter’s part,
illusory control by choice was considered to be justifiably minimized. In order to keep
both No-Actual-Control conditions consistent, both envelopes actually did contain the
same outcome. For all three experimental conditions, the outcome was not disclosed
until the experiment and questionnaire had both been completed by the participant. The
participants did not actually have to engage in the proofreading task.
The results of Experiment 1 confirmed the first hypothesis. Participants with
actual control and choice reported significantly more perceived control, responsibility,
and influence (but not any less helplessness) than participants with no actual control,
regardless of choice. In the fact that providing a choice failed to produce higher ratings
of perceived control in participants with no actual control, the second hypothesis was
disconfirmed. Langlois et al. (2002) concluded that, in order to feel control, one’s actions
must make a difference in the outcome that is received.
Contrary to learned helplessness theory, which predicts that a lack of actual
control is sufficient to produce emotional deficits (Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1975),
the results of Experiment 1 showed no significant differences in the helplessness ratings
between participants with actual control and those with no actual control (Langlois et
al., 2002). This finding is inconsistent with the results of past studies, which have
demonstrated that helplessness decreases with increased actual control (e.g., Burger
& Arkin, 1980; Nickels et al., 1992; Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987). However, as
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Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 1) explain, this discrepancy may be due to
methodological differences such as the time of outcome disclosure. For example,
whereas previous studies have typically shared the outcome with participants before
assessing dependent measures (e.g., Cramer & Nickels, 2005), Langlois et al. (2002,
Experiment 1) disclosed their participants’ outcomes only after all measures were
assessed, and upon completion of the experiment.
The finding that one’s actions must make a difference in order to feel control can
be applied to a number o f situations. For example, Langlois et al. (2002) describe a
cancer patient who is given the choice of receiving a new drug that may either completely
9

eradicate the liver tumour (desired outcome), or may not at all have an effect on the
tumour (undesired outcome). What becomes important for control is not choosing
between the drug treatments, but the understanding that the choice will actually have an
effect on the patient’s own health. Therefore, it is not the act of making a choice that
makes an individual feel control; it is the fact that one’s choice will make at least some
difference in the outcome.
Whereas some studies had held both choice and prediction constant
(e.g., Cramer & Nickels, 2005), or held either choice (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997) or
prediction (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment 1) constant, Langlois et al.’s (2002,
Experiment 2) manipulated all three variables (i.e., actual control, choice, and prediction),
and considered desire for control and locus of control as individual difference covariates
that might affect the dependent variables of perceived ratings of control, influence,
responsibility, and helplessness.
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Specifically, in Experiment 2, the participants were randomly assigned to one of
four levels of the actual control variables: (1) in the Actual-Control/Choice condition,
participants blindly selected one of two envelopes containing different time periods, but
were not informed which envelope contained which time period; (2) in the No-ActualControl/Choice condition, participants blindly selected one of two envelopes which both
contained either a 2-minute or a 20-minute time period, but were not informed which
time period the envelopes contained; (3) in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (same
outcomes) condition, participants were assigned one of two envelopes which contained
the same time period and were selected by the experimenter using a spinner; and
(4) in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (different outcomes) condition, participants were
assigned one of two envelopes that contained different time periods and were selected by
the experimenter using a spinner. Whereas Experiment 1 examined different outcomes
only under the Actual-Control/Choice condition, Experiment 2 examined different
outcomes under both Actual-Control/Choice and No-Actual-Control/No-Choice
conditions. These last two conditions permitted the comparison of situations in which
participants actively chose a meaningful option versus situations in which participants
were simply assigned a meaningful option.
Participants were also randomly assigned to one of three levels of prediction:
(1) in Predicted-Success, participants were informed that they had received the short time
period before completing the dependent measures; (2) in Predicted-Failure, participants
were informed that they had received the long time period before completing the
dependent measures; and (3) in No-Prediction, participants were not aware of the time
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period they had received until after the dependent measures were completed.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that desire for control and locus of control
did not significantly relate to the dependent variables. Consistent with the results of
Nickels et al. (1992), it was found that participants in the prediction conditions were more
confident about the time period they received than those who did not learn their time
period. Also supporting previous findings that indicate prediction is not needed in order
for participants to perceive control (Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment
1, Nickels et al., 1992), the results demonstrated that regardless of prediction, participants
with actual control and choice felt more control, responsibility, and influence, and
reported feeling less helplessness than participants in all other conditions. Although it
was expected that participants’ ratings of control, influence, and responsibility in the
No-Actual-Control/Choice and No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (same outcomes)
conditions would be similar, the results were inconclusive due to insufficient evidence
(Langlois et al., 2002). It was found, however, that a meaningless choice neither reduced
nor increased feelings of helplessness. Finally, it was also demonstrated that an illusion
of control was not induced in the No-Actual-Control/No-Choice (different outcomes)
condition.
Langlois et al.’s (2002) results are consistent with past findings (Cramer et
al., 1997; Nickels et al., 1992; Paterson and Neufeld, 1995) and provide further support
for the new conceptualization of control. In short, actual control is beneficial only when
one’s actions make a difference in one’s outcome. Furthermore, merely providing a
choice neither increases feelings of control nor decreases feelings of helplessness unless
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the individual is aware that the choice of options will yield different outcomes, whether
the outcome is known or not.
In sum, support has been provided for the new conceptualization of control and
prediction despite many researchers’ doubts (e.g., Tiggemann & Winefield, 1987).
Indeed, people are able to recognize that they have control over an outcome even if they
are unable to predict what that outcome will be (Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et
al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). Research has also demonstrated that these instances of
predictionless control are sometimes preferred over conditions of no control (Nickels et
al., 1994). Surprisingly, research has shown that 100% control is not needed to prevent
feelings of helplessness but rather even a little control (25%) will provide equivalent
beneficial effects (Cramer et al., 1997). Cramer and Nickels (2005) shed doubts on the
necessity of choice by demonstrating that control can be perceived even before a choice is
made. Finally, Cramer and Perreault (2005), Langlois et al. (2002), and Paterson and
Neufeld (1995) demonstrated that choice will not yield benefits unless meaningful
options are provided.
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CHAPTER 4
Choiceless Control: Its Conceptual and Empirical Feasibility
Although the new conceptualization has successfully separated the effects of
control from the effects of prediction (i.e., Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005;
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992; 1994), there has not yet been success at
completely unconfounding control from choice. In fact, the conceptual difficulty of
unconfounding these variables appears to be the key reason why proponents of the new
conceptualization have had problems in completely crossing choice with control. For
instance, Langlois et al. (2002, p. 172) admit that, in their study, a choiceless control
condition “was omitted due to conceptual difficulties.” Specifically, while some
participants had choice but no control (e.g., participants could choose an envelope
containing identical time periods), no participants had control without choice (Langlois et
al., 2002).
Langlois et al. (2002) suggested that one reason why choiceless control has been a
challenge for researchers is the existence of an ambiguity inherent in the new
conceptualization of control. For instance, Nickels et al. (1992) broadly explain that
having control involves affecting an event, contributing to it, making an impact on it, or
even simply bringing it about. In addition to implying that actions or behaviours may not
necessarily be required for actual control to occur, this explanation also suggests that
control may even imply choice. It is quite possible for individuals to make choices that
affect an event, contribute to it, or make an impact on it. Consequently, it remains
unclear whether any observed benefits are due to simply having control (i.e., without
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choice), or due to having both control and choice.
Langlois et al. (2002) admit that the new conceptualization has been inconsistent
at uncovering significant differences in helplessness, and suggest that future research
should also consider awareness of choice (see also Cramer et al., 1997). In Langlois et al.
(2002), participants were informed (by a clearly visible sign) whether their choice of
envelope made a difference in the outcome. But would participants still feel control if
they: (1) were unaware of the fact that the envelopes contained same or different time
periods; or (2) were unaware that they were even making a choice (Langlois et al., 2002)?
By systematically crossing two levels of actual control (i.e., control and no
control) with two levels of awareness o f choice (i.e., awareness and no awareness), it may
be possible to determine the specific conditions under which individuals feel helpless or,
alternatively, perceive control, responsibility, and influence over the outcomes they
receive. Figure 2 illustrates the four conditions which are derived by combining actual
control with awareness o f choice variables: (1) Actual-Control/Awareness; (2) ActualControl/No-Awareness; (3) No-Actual-Control/Awareness; and (4) No-Actual-Control/
No-Awareness.
A variety of such conditions occur in everyday life events such as job interviews,
dating situations, and sport competitions. For example, an employer may prefer to
promote an employee who sits in the chair nearest the interviewing team because it
indirectly demonstrates positive character traits such as bold assurance, self-confidence,
and assertiveness. In this situation, a number of scenarios are possible: (1) A candidate
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair, being entirely
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Figure 2. An illustration of two levels of actual control crossed with two levels of

awareness of choice.
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aware that this choice will lead to the promotion (i.e., Actual-Control/Awareness);
(2) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair,
even though he is unaware that this choice will lead to the promotion (i.e., ActualControl/No-Awareness); (3) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses
to sit in the nearest chair, being entirely aware that he will get the promotion regardless of
the chair he chooses (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Awareness); and (4) A candidate
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses to sit in the nearest chair, being unaware
that he will get the promotion regardless of the chair he chooses (i.e., No-Actual-Control/
No-Awareness).
Another example which demonstrates the four combinations of actual control with
awareness of choice occurs in the context of dating relationships. For example, Chris
wishes to impress Sam during their first dinner date in order to win her love and approval
for a second date. Sam is very impressed by a person’s good judgement and careful
consideration, personal traits that can be inferred when individuals taste their food first,
before adding any additional spices or condiments. For instance, adding salt to a steak
before tasting it first is considered by Sam as a sign of hastiness and impatience.
In this situation, a number of possibilities present themselves: (1) Chris chooses to
add salt to his steak after tasting it first, being entirely aware that this choice will
determine his success in getting a second date (i.e., Actual-Control/Awareness); (2) Chris
chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it first, even though he his unaware that this
choice will determine his success in getting a second date (i.e., Actual-Control/
No-Awareness); (3) Chris chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it, being entirely
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aware that he will get a second date regardless of when he salts his steak (i.e., No-ActualControl/Awareness); and (4) Chris chooses to add salt to his steak after tasting it while
being unaware that he will get a second date regardless of when he salts his steak
(i. e., No-Actual-Control/No-Awareness).
Yet other situations that combine variations of actual control and awareness of
choice occur in the context of sport competitions. For example, Sandy wishes to obtain
first place in a bouldering competition for which she has trained intensely for many
months. Her odds of winning are increased if she uses smaller rather than larger holds.
The following scenarios may occur: (1) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold,
being entirely aware that this choice will determine a first place win (i.e., Actual-Control/
Awareness); (2) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold even though she is unaware
that this choice will determine her first place win (i.e., Actual-Control/No-Awareness);
(3) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller hold, being entirely aware that she will win
first place regardless of whether or not she has chosen the smaller hold over the larger
one (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Awareness); and (4) Sandy chooses to grab onto the smaller
hold, being unaware that she will win first place regardless of the hold she has chosen
(i.e., No-Actual-Control/No-Awareness).
Although a number of scenarios illustrate how different levels of actual control
can be combined with different levels of awareness of choice, the specific conditions
under which individuals feel helpless or, alternatively, perceive control, responsibility,
and influence over outcomes remain unknown. Do people need to be aware that they are
making a choice in order to reap positive effects (Langlois et al., 2002)? Is awareness of
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choice required in order for individuals to perceive control? Furthermore, what would
occur if various levels of prediction were examined in addition to variables o f actual
control and awareness of choice?

Separating the Effects o f Control, Prediction, and Awareness o f Choice

Cramer and Perreault (2005) researched these questions by examining the effects
o f control, awareness of choice, and prediction. Based on the findings obtained by
Cramer et al. (1997), Langlois et al. (2002), and Nickels et al. (1992), three hypotheses
were tested. It was hypothesized that: (1) regardless of prediction and awareness of
choice, ratings of control, influence, and responsibility will be higher and ratings of
helplessness lower for participants with actual control. It was also hypothesized that:
(2) ratings of control, influence, responsibility, and helplessness will not vary by
participants’ awareness that their choice made a difference in the time period they
receive. Finally, it was hypothesized that: (3) ratings of prediction and confidence will be
higher for participants who knew which time period they would receive and, specifically,
ratings of success will be higher for participants who knew they would receive a short
time period.
In Experiment 1, Cramer and Perreault (2004) asked participants to choose
between two pencils of either identical or different colours, which would determine the
time they would spend engaging in a boring motor task. Whereas some participants
chose a pencil before knowing the implications of their choice, others were fully
informed about what their choice implied. After making their selection, participants with
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prediction were informed that they would work on the boring motor task for either a short
or long time period, and then they completed some dependent measures examining levels
of helplessness, perceived control, influence, and responsibility over the outcome.
Participants without prediction completed the dependent measures without knowing
which time period they would receive.
Experiment 1 examined three independent variables: (1) in actual control,
participants’ choice of pencil-either made a difference (i.e., Actual-Control: where one of
two different-coloured pencils was selected) or not (i.e., No-Actual-Control: where one of
two same-coloured pencils was selected) in how long they would engage in a boring
motor task; (2) in prediction, participants were informed that they would engage in the
motor task for a short time period (i.e., Predicted-Success), a long time period
(i.e., Predicted-Failure), or not informed at all about the outcome (i.e., No-Prediction);
and (3) in awareness of choice, participants were informed of the ramifications of their
choice either before (i.e., Awareness) or after their choice o f pencil (i.e., No-Awareness).
In support of the first hypothesis, the results showed higher ratings of perceived
control, influence, and responsibility under conditions of actual control where participants
selected between options that yielded different outcomes. These results were consistent
regardless of variations in prediction and awareness of choice. This finding has also been
observed in several prior studies (cf. Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005;
Gural, 1992; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992).
Curiously, however, the results also showed that participants felt more helpless in
achieving the desired time period when they selected among identical options, knowing
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that they would receive a short time period. Cramer et al. (1997) have reported a similar
effect for helplessness across variations in prediction, but this result has occurred without
any interaction with the actual control variable. In short, it appears that feelings of
control and influence are enhanced by making a choice between options that yield
different outcomes.
In partial support of the second hypothesis, the results showed no significant
differences in awareness of choice for perceived control, influence, and helplessness.
However, individuals felt more responsibility over the outcome they received when they
knowingly made a choice, regardless of whether or not they knew exactly what that
outcome would be. Overall, however, it appears that awareness of choice is somewhat
less important than actual control in determining individuals’ control-related perceptions.
Finally, the results of Experiment 1 supported the third hypothesis. Participants
who knew the outcome they would receive, whether it was a short time period or a long
time period felt they could better predict their outcome than participants who did not
know their time period at all. Furthermore, participants who knew they would engage in
the boring motor task for a short time period felt more successful than participants who
either knew they would work for a long time period, or did not know their time period at
all.
Despite these overall corroborative findings, Cramer and Perreault (2005) admit
that the results of Experiment 1 may have been contaminated by a methodological flaw.
Specifically, by randomly assigning participants to an experimental condition in the
context of a group setting, it was possible for individuals to observe the materials given to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74
others. For example, the fact that some participants received two red pencils may have
aroused suspicion in those in adjoining seats who received one red and one blue pencil.
This unintentional display of stimuli may have provided the participants with visual cues,
leading them to make inferences about the experimental hypotheses. In short, the
conspicuous protocol of materials may have led to demand characteristics which biased
the participants to behave a certain way while inviting them to make assumptions about
the purpose of the study.
Therefore, Cramer and Perreault (2005, Experiment 2) addressed this flaw by
replicating the first study and using less conspicuous materials. Seated in a large
classroom, participants each received a booklet with an instruction page on the cover.
Participants were asked to complete a demographic survey. Instead of choosing between
same- or different-coloured pencils, participants selected between same or different birth
year formats (i.e., two-digit or four-digit birth year).
Based on the same hypotheses and experimental conditions as the first
experiment, Experiment 2 examined the following independent variables: (1) in actual
control, participants’ choice of birth year format (in the context of a demographic
questionnaire) either made a difference (i.e., Actual-Control: where one of two different
birth year formats was selected) or not (i.e., No-Actual-Control: where one of two same
birth year formats was selected) in how long they would engage in a boring motor task;
(2) in prediction, participants were informed that they would engage in the motor task for
a short time period (i.e., Predicted-Success), a long time period (i.e., Predicted-Failure),
or not informed at all about the outcome (i.e., No-Prediction); and (3) in awareness of
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choice, participants were informed of the ramifications of their choice either before
(i.e., Awareness) or after their choice of birth year (i.e., No-Awareness).
In partial support of the first hypothesis, the results of Experiment 2 showed that
participants felt more control and responsibility under conditions of actual control.
Specifically, individuals whose choice of birth year format made a difference in the time
period they received felt both more perceived control and more perceived responsibility
than individuals whose choice made no difference. However, there were no significant
effects for influence, helplessness, or frustration. These findings were consistent
regardless of the variations in prediction and awareness of choice. In other words,
participants with actual control felt more control and responsibility regardless of whether
or not they knew which outcome they would receive, and regardless of whether or not
they knew exactly which choice would determine the outcome they received. The
significant effects found for perceived control and perceived responsibility are consistent
with previous findings (cf. Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Nickels, 2005; Gural, 1992;
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992).
Consistent with the second hypothesis, there were no significant differences in the
awareness of choice variable. In other words, being aware that one’s choice makes a
difference in the outcome does not affect feelings of control, influence, responsibility, and
helplessness. As demonstrated in the first experiment, it appears that awareness of choice
is less important than actual control in determining individuals’ control-related
perceptions.
Inconsistent with the third hypothesis, there were no significant differences in the
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prediction variables (either by main effect or interaction effect with actual control). In
other words, perceptions of prediction, confidence, and success were the same for all
participants; whether they knew that they would engage in a boring motor task for a short
time period, a long time period, or could not predict their outcome at all.
In summary, Cramer and Perreault’s (2005) findings are consistent with those of
past investigations. Consistent with Langlois et al. (2002), Cramer and Perreault (2005)
found that choices are important only under conditions of actual control where they make
a difference in the outcome received, even when that outcome is unpredictable. It
appears that simply making a choice, or being aware that an important choice is being
made, is not enough - it must also be a choice that matters in order for control and
responsibility to be perceived (see also Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels
et al., 1992).
These findings are corroborated by Paterson and Neufeld (1995), who examined
the effects of control and choice when coping with a stressful event. In their study, the
availability of information was manipulated (i.e., prediction) regarding options to a
fictitious stressful event. It was found that participants who were given several options
(in addition to having further information available) had higher ratings of perceived
control and reduced stress than participants who were provided with several options but
no available information. Paterson and Neufeld’s (1995) findings suggest that being
provided with non-productive choices will neither increase perceptions of control nor
reduce perceptions of threat. Rodin et al. (1980) also report that individuals feel
inadequate when they are given choices that are not meaningful. In fact, having no choice
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at all may be more beneficial than being presented with a meaningless choice (Rodin et
al., 1980).
Despite the knowledge gained by investigations of choice as embedded in actual
control (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002; Paterson & Neufeld, 1995; Rodin et al., 1980) and
awareness of choice (i.e., Cramer and Perreault, 2005), the control and choice variables
still remain partly confounded because a choiceless control condition has still not been
examined. Until choice is completely separated from control, it will be difficult to
determine for certain whether or not actual control can exist without any choice at all. As
suggested by Langlois et al. (2002), a next step might include examining how individuals
feel toward outcomes that are determined by factors that cannot be chosen, such as age,
height, sex, and ethnicity. For instance, even in cases of extreme aesthetic or surgical
procedures, one’s chromosomal sex will remain unchanged regardless of genital
reconstruction, one’s age will remain unchanged regardless of any plastic surgery that is
performed to enhance appearance, and one’s ethnicity will remain unchanged regardless
of the superficial changes that are made to skin or hair colour. Therefore, in following
this recommendation, Nickels et al. (2005) developed a model in which actual control
variables were entirely separated from choice variables, two of which were based on
either externally-based (i.e., voluntary choice) or internally-based (i.e., involuntary
choice) factors.
The Feasibility o f Choiceless Control Without Prediction

Nickels et al.’s (2005) model thus systematically crosses two levels of actual
control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Control) with three levels of choice
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(i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and No-Choice). Voluntary-Choice denotes
a choice that is made based on factors that are external to the individual (e.g., choosing an
ice cream flavour). Involuntary-Choice consists of a choice that is made based on factors
that are internal to the individual (e.g., choosing a vitamin supplement that is specific to
one’s gender). Finally, situations involving No-Choice consist of instances in which
options have been pre-selected for the individual (e.g., assigning a child to a classroom
seat based on family name).
In the fact that it attempted the complete separation of choice from actual control,
Nickels et al.’s (2005) model was developed in order to determine the feasibility of
choiceless control. Figure 3 illustrates the various combinations for two levels of actual
control crossed with three levels of choice: (1) Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice;
(2) Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice; (3) Actual-Control/No-Choice; (4) No-ActualControl/Voluntary-Choice; (5) No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice; and
(6) No-Actual-Control/No-Choice.
As with situations pertaining to awareness of choice, many circumstances exist
which combine variations of actual control and choice. In revisiting the awareness of
choice example in which an employer may prefer to promote an employee who sits in the
chair nearest the interviewing team because it indirectly demonstrates positive character
traits, a number of new scenarios become possible: (1) A candidate interviewing for the
desired promotion chooses one of two chairs, where the selection of one chair will lead to
the promotion but the other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice);
(2) A candidate interviewing for the desired promotion chooses one of two chairs based
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Figure 3. An illustration of two levels of actual control crossed with three levels of

choice.
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on her own gender, where the selection of one chair will lead to the promotion but the
other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice); (3) A candidate interviewing for
the desired promotion is assigned one of two chairs pre-selected by the employer’s
administrative assistant, where the one pre-selected chair will lead to the promotion but
the other will not (i.e., Actual-Control/No-Choice); (4) A candidate interviewing for the
desired promotion chooses one of two chairs, where both chairs will lead to either the
promotion or no promotion (i.e., No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice); (5) A candidate
interviewing for the desired promotion chooses one of two chairs based on her own
gender, where both chairs will lead to either the promotion or no promotion
(i.e., No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice); and (6) A candidate interviewing for the
desired promotion is assigned one of two chairs pre-selected by the employer’s
administrative assistant, where both chairs will lead to either the promotion or no
promotion (i.e., No-Actual-Control/No-Choice).
Although it is possible to list a number of additional examples which illustrate
how different levels of actual control can be combined with different levels of choice, the
specific conditions under which individuals feel helpless or, alternatively, perceive
control, responsibility, and influence over outcomes remain unknown. How important is
choice in determining individuals’ positive perceptions over situations? Is choice
required in order for individuals to perceive control? Specifically, what would occur if
variations of actual control and choice were examined in the context of unpredictable
events?
In attempting to answer these questions, Nickels et al. (2005) conducted two
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experiments that differed only in the unpredictable outcomes that participants would
receive. Specifically, whereas Experiment 1 involved re-rating a questionnaire about how
strongly one identified with 25 self-descriptions, either once (non-aversive condition)
or five times (aversive condition), Experiment 2 involved having to solve (aversive
condition) or not (non-aversive condition) three pages of simple but tedious math
problems. In both studies, actual control and choice were examined in terms of their
effects on ratings of: (a) control over; (b) influence on; (c) responsibility for; and
(d) making a difference in the outcomes received.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions which included a
combination of two levels of actual control (i.e., Actual-Control, or No-Actual-Control)
with three levels of choice (i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, or No-Choice).
All of the participants were asked to tear off one of the two comers at the bottom of a
page and were then informed that the comer which was removed would determine the
outcome they would receive. In Experiment 1, the bottom left-hand comer o f the page
contained the word ‘male’ or ‘plum,’ and the bottom right-hand comer of the page
contained the word ‘female’ or ‘orange.’ In Experiment 2, the bottom left-hand comer
contained the letter ‘M ,’ and the bottom right-hand comer of the page contained the letter
‘N .’
Whereas participants in the Actual-Control condition were informed that they
would receive a different outcome depending upon which word or letter was tom off,
those in the No-Actual-Control condition were informed that they would receive the same
outcome, regardless of the word or letter which was tom. None of the participants knew
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which word or letter was associated with which outcome until after they had tom the
sheet of paper and completed a dependent measures questionnaire (i.e., No-Prediction
was held constant across all conditions).
In addition to being placed into either one of the two actual control conditions, the
participants were also assigned to one of three choice conditions. Participants with
Voluntary-Choice were made to feel as though they had genuine options, and their choice
was both conscious and intentional because it was based on external factors
(i.e., choice of a fruit word or a letter which referred to working on a math problem or
not). Participants with Involuntary-Choice were made to feel as though they were
presented with genuine options, but their choice was inadvertent and was made neither
consciously nor intentionally because it was based on internal factors (i.e., choice based
on a gender word or on a letter referring to family name). Participants with No-Choice
were made to feel as though they had options, but they did not make the choice
themselves (i.e., pre-selection occurred).
Six experimental conditions therefore represented the combination of two actual
control variables and three choice variables: (1) in Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice,
participants were informed that they would receive a different outcome depending upon
which fruit word (Experiment 1) or letter (Experiment 2) they selected; (2) in ActualControl/Involuntary-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive a
different outcome depending upon which gender word (Experiment 1, where the word
indicated the participant’s gender) or letter (Experiment 2, where the letter indicated
either the first or second half of the alphabet in which their family name appeared) they
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selected; (3) in Actual-Control/No-Choice, participants were informed that they would
receive a different outcome depending upon which word or letter had already been pre
selected for them; (4) in No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice, participants were
informed that they would receive the same outcome regardless of which fruit word
(Experiment 1) or letter (Experiment 2) they selected; (5) in No-ActualControl/Involuntary-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive the same
outcome regardless of which gender word (Experiment 1, where the word indicated the
participant’s gender) or letter (Experiment 2, where the letter indicated either the first or
second half of the alphabet in which their family name appeared) they selected; and
(6) in No-Actual-Control/No-Choice, participants were informed that they would receive
the same outcome regardless of which word or letter had already been pre-selected for
them.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that Voluntary-Choice (regardless of actual
control conditions) significantly increased individuals’ perception that they made a
difference in their outcome, as well as significantly increased their feelings of influence,
control, and responsibility. The results of Experiment 2 showed that Actual-Control must
be paired with Voluntary-Choice in order for individuals to feel more control, influence,
and responsibility over outcomes, and to feel that they made a difference in the outcome
they would receive. Involuntary-Choice was interpreted as having no choice at all. These
overall findings challenge the view that making a difference can affect perceptions of
control, regardless of type of choice (Nickels et al., 1992) or whether or not choice makes
a difference in the outcome received (Langer, 1975). In order to perceive control over
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outcomes, it appears necessary to experience the combination of having conscious
intentions toward making a choice between options (i.e., Voluntary-Choice) that lead to
different outcomes (i.e., Actual-Control).
In summary, Table 3 presents an overview of the findings reported by proponents
of the new conceptualization of control. It has been difficult for researchers to adequately
interpret findings pertaining to control and choice variables because investigations have
neglected to examine situations of choiceless control (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005;
Langlois et al., 2002). This has mainly been due to the conceptual unfeasibility of
examining an experimental condition that includes control but not choice. Therefore,
Nickels et al. (2005) devised a model which permitted the complete separation of choice
from actual control variables. It was found that choice did in fact increase perceptions of
control, but only under conditions in which externally-based choices were made between
two options that led to different outcomes. Hence, effective choices alone seem to
facilitate positive perceptions.

The Feasibility o f Choiceless Control with Prediction

In the fact that Nickels et al.’s (2004) model of choiceless control generated clear
and conclusive findings, it appears that a complete separation of choice from control has
finally become feasible, at least under conditions of unpredictability. However, a number
of questions remain which warrant further investigation: How might conditions of
predictability (rather than unpredictability) affect individuals’ feelings of control,
influence, responsibility, and helplessness over outcomes? What would occur if
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Table 3
A Summary o f Some Significant Findings Examining the Effects o f Actual Control,
Prediction, and Choice Conditions on Perceived Control, Influence, Responsibility, and
Helplessness
STUDY

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
PERCEIVED
CONTROL

INFLUENCE

in AC, &
in PD

RESPONSIBILITY

HELPLESSNESS

(data not available)

(data not available)

Nickels et al.
^
(1992, Exp. 1) T

in AC, &
inPD

Nickels et al.
(1992, Exp. 2)

in AC,
regardless of PD

in AC,
regardless of
PD

in AC,
regardless of PD

^

in AC,
regardless of
PD

Cramer et al.
(1997)

in AC,
regardless of PD

in AC,
regardless of
PD

in AC,
regardless of PD

^

in AC, & in
PD-S

Langlois et al.
(2002, Exp. 1) T

in AC, &
in AC with CH,
regardless o f PD

in AC,
regardless of
CH & PD

in AC, &
in AC with CH,
regardless of PD

Langlois et al.
(2002, Exp. 2)

in AC, &
in AC with CH,
regardless of PD

in AC, &
in AC with CH,
regardless of
PD

Cramer &
Nickels
(2005)

in AC,
regardless of CH

(data not available)

•

^
■

in AC, &
in AC with CH,
regardless of PD

(data not available)

n. s.

in AC, &
in AC with
CH, regardless
of PD

(data not available)
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Table 3 (cont’d)
A Summary o f Some Significant Findings Examining the Effects o f Actual Control,
Prediction, and Choice Conditions on Perceived Control, Influence, Responsibility, and
Helplessness
STUDY

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
PERCEIVED
CONTROL

Cramer &
Perreault
(2005, Exp. 1)

*
•

in AC,
regardless of
ACH&PD

Cramer &
Perreault
(2005, Exp. 2)

in AC,
regardless of
ACH&PD

Nickels et al.
(2005, Exp. 1)

Nickels et al.
(2005, Exp. 2)

^
•

RESPONSIBILITY

INFLUENCE

in AC,
regardless of
ACH&PD

in AC, &
in ACH,
regardless of PD

.
n. s.

T

in VCH, &
in AC with VCH

in VCH, &
in AC with
VCH

.
T

in VCH

in VCH

HELPLESSNESS

in AC with
PD-S

in AC,
regardless of
ACH & PD

n. s.

in AC, &
in VCH, &
in AC with VCH

(data not available)

in VCH

(data not available)

Note. AC = Actual control; ACH = Awareness of choice; CH = Choice; PD = Prediction;

PD-S = Prediction-Success; PD-F = Prediction-Failure; and VCH = Voluntary-Choice.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87
prediction variables (i.e., Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction) were
combined with variations in choice (i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and
No-Choice) and actual control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control)?
Specifically, how would individuals feel if they were to learn that they had received either
a positive outcome (Predicted-Success) or a negative outcome (Predicted-Failure) based
on internally-based information such as eye colour (Involuntaiy-Choice)? Exploring such
questions is crucial in order to understand individuals’ experiences of choiceless control
in situations of prediction.
However, before attempting any further investigation it is important to consider a
new confound that may present itself in situations that pair choicelessness with
prediction. Langlois et al. (2002) cautioned that there may be some unique challenges for
researchers investigating situations that pertain to internally-based (unchosen)
characteristics such as gender, age, height, or ethnicity. For example, a female
interviewing for a male-dominated job position may predict that she will not get the job
because of her gender (Langlois et al., 2002). Similarly, a 5-foot tall athlete who tries out
for the National Basketball Association may predict that he will not make the team
because of his lack of height. Likewise, an individual who is severely disfigured can
anticipate being stared at while out in public. In cases such as these, it is involuntary,
unchosen, intrinsically-based characteristics that influence the outcome received.
Situations of choiceless control seem to be characterized by states of being
(i.e., involuntary choices based on internal factors) rather than conditions of doing
(i.e., voluntary choices based on external factors).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
Situations of choiceless control with prediction occur in a number o f‘real’ world
contexts. In the fact that one’s genetic code is not a personal decision, databanking and
genetic profiling are contexts that invite conditions of choiceless control (Caruso, 2002).
For example, Friedrich (2002) describes a case in which more than a dozen middle-aged
Burlington Northern and Sante Fe railroad workers had filed disability claims related to
carpal tunnel syndrome. Consequently, the railroad company surreptitiously performed
genetic tests in order to avoid paying disability claims for any worker carrying the genetic
marker linked to carpal tunnel syndrome. Choiceless control existed in the fact that an
unchosen internal characteristic (i.e., genetic marker vs. no genetic marker) determined
which one of two different outcomes the workers would experience (i.e., disability claim
payed or denied).
Other situations of choiceless control occur within the context of biopiracy
(unauthorized access to a genetic resource and using it in a manner that contravenes a
national regime). For example, DeCODE has constructed three vast databases of
individual Icelanders which will operate as: (1) a geneological database of the Icelandic
population for most of the last millenium; (2) a genetic database of DNA sequence and
other information produced from blood samples; and (3) a database containing past,
present, and future medical records from every Icelander, living or dead, produced from
the nationalized system of health care, and usually referred to as the Health Sector
Database (Caruso, 2002). By national law, the medical records of every Icelander living
or dead were included as part of the database population without asking their explicit
permission. Those still alive can fill out a form to be removed from the database, but
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they have no choice about being included in the first place (Caruso, 2002). The creation
of databases such as those used by DeCODE increases the likelihood of discrimination.
For example, in the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, the U. S. Public Health Service gathered
data on a number of individuals and then withheld appropriate treatment from the syphilis
patients participating in the study.
Choiceless control situations also present themselves in the commercial realm.
For example, through their Info Base Ethnicity System database, Acxiom Corp.
(an information broker that stockpiles names, race, sex, age, and other data on 95 million
American households) provides a breakdown of ethnic and minority classifications
(Stepanek, 2000). This micro-segmentation (Weblining) has permitted companies to
more finely dissect individual profiles, thus determining whether customers will get the
best service, the best price, and the best access to new products and information
(Stepanek, 2000). Acxiom can even help companies target specific individuals
(e.g., middle-aged African American women), hence creating situations of choiceless
control in which different outcomes (e.g., being offered vs. denied an unlimited range of
products) are experienced based on an unchosen set of characteristics (e.g., age and
ethnicity).
The Present Study: Purpose and Hypotheses

The purpose of the present study is to contribute to the new conceptualization of
control by refining and extending the experimental design used previously. Whereas
Nickels et al. (2004) investigated two levels of actual control and three levels of choice
under conditions of unprediction, the present study will examine two levels of actual
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control (i.e., Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control), three levels of choice
(i.e., Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, and No-Choice), and three levels of
prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, and No-Prediction). To date,
no study has manipulated all three variables under the new conceptualization, nor refined
the research design to include a condition of choiceless control with prediction.
Based on the findings of Cramer et al. (1997), Langlois et al. (2002), and Nickels
et al. (1992), it is hypothesized that : (1) regardless of the predicted outcome condition,
participants with Actual-Control will perceive significantly more influence,
responsibility, and control over their outcome. Based on the findings of Nickels et al.
(2005, Experiment 1), it is hypothesized that: (2) regardless of the predicted outcome
condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice will perceive significantly more influence,
responsibility, and control over their outcome, but only when Voluntary-Choice is
accompanied by Actual-Control. Based on the findings of Cramer and Perreault (2005),
Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 2), and Nickels et al. (1992), it is hypothesized that:
(3) regardless of the actual control or choice conditions, in comparison to participants
with No-Prediction, those with prediction (either Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure)
will feel significantly more confident in their ability to predict their outcome. Based on
Cramer and Perreault (2005), it is hypothesized that: (4) under conditions of PredictedSuccess, participants with Actual-Control will feel less helpless over their outcome than
those who have No-Actual-Control. Finally, based on the results of Langlois et al.
(2002, Experiment 2), it is hypothesized that: (5) regardless of the predicted outcome
condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice will feel less helpless over their outcome,
but only when Voluntary-Choice is accompanied by Actual-Control.
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CHAPTER 5
Method
Participants and Overview

Five hundred and eight undergraduate students (95 males and 413 females) from a
University of Windsor Introduction to Psychology class participated in the present study.
Participants were not selected based on specific characteristics such as gender, age, or
ethnicity. All of the participants were compensated by having their names entered in a
cash draw.
In order to decide the time period under which they would complete a boring
motor task, some participants were asked to select and tear off either the bottom right or
bottom left comer of a page. Others were asked to tear off a bottom page comer that was
pre-selected. Some participants were informed that the page comer they had chosen or
had been assigned to tear would lead to different time periods. Others were informed that
the page comer they had chosen or had been assigned to tear would lead to the same time
period. Participants with prediction learned which time period they would receive before
completing a dependent measures questionnaire. Those without prediction completed a
dependent measures questionnaire without knowing the time period they had received.

Materials

Each participant received a consent form (Appendix A), and a booklet containing
instructions for one of 18 randomly assigned experimental conditions (Appendix B), and
a dependent measures questionnaire with manipulation checks (Appendix D). As tested
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in previous studies (Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer & Perreault, 2004; Langlois et al., 2002;
Nickels et al., 2004; Nickels et al., 1992), the dependent measures questionnaire
examined perceived control, responsibility, influence, helplessness, frustration, as well as
confidence and ability to predict the time period received, based on 7-point Likert scales
ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 7 = ‘To a great extent.’ The questionnaire also consisted
of three manipulation checks: (1) ‘Did the page comer make a difference in the time
period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’ respectively, denoting either the
Actual-Control or the No-Actual-Control experimental condition; (2) ‘Did you choose
which page comer would be tom?’ where options were ‘Yes (I made a choice between
‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),’ ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’), or ‘No (the
choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective order, denoting the
Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice experimental condition;
and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout task?’
where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes (a 20-minute long time
period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed)’, in respective order, denoting the PredictedSuccess, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental condition.

Experimental Design

The present study utilized a 2 x 3 x 3 randomized between-subjects factorial
design. The first independent variable, ACTUAL CONTROL, was defined in terms of
whether or not the options made a difference (i.e., mattered) in the outcome. Options
mattered based on how the page comer words affected the amount of time participants
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would perform the crossout task. Whereas participants with Actual-Control were
informed that one page comer would lead to performing the crossout task for a short
2-minute period and the other would lead to a long 20-minute period (i.e., meaningful
options), participants with No-Actual-Control were informed that both page comers
would lead to same time period (i.e., options made no difference). In the
No-Actual-Control with Prediction conditions, the time periods were counterbalanced so
that some participants received a short time period and others received a long time period
as their outcome.
The second independent variable, CHOICE, was defined in terms of who
performed the act of choosing between options. A choice was made when a page comer
was tom. In the Voluntary-Choice condition, participants chose one of two page comers
listing the words ‘salt’ or ‘pepper.’ In the Involuntaiy-Choice condition, participants
chose one of two page comers listing the words ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ which had to be
selected based on their own true eye colour. Finally, in the No-Choice condition,
participants were assigned (by written experimenter instruction) to tear off one of two
page comers listing the words ‘right’ or ‘left.’ In all three choice conditions (VoluntaryChoice; Involuntary-Choice; No-Choice), page comer was counterbalanced so that some
participants would tear off the bottom right comer o f the page (i.e., ‘pepper,’ ‘non-blue,’
or ‘right’ respectively) while others would tear off the bottom left comer (i.e., ‘salt,’
‘blue,’ or ‘left’ respectively), and vice-versa.
The third independent variable, PREDICTED OUTCOME, was defined in terms
of whether information about the outcome was provided to the participants. Prediction
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occurred when participants were informed about how long they would perform the
crossout task. Specifically, whereas some participants were informed that they would
perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute time period (Predicted-Success), others
were informed that they would perform the task for a long 20-minute time period
(Predicted-Failure). Finally, some participants were not at all informed of their time
period (No-Prediction). The time periods were counterbalanced based on the words
presented as part of the CHOICE conditions. For example, whereas some participants
received a short time period for choosing the word ‘salt,’ others received a long time
period for choosing the word ‘salt.’

Procedure

Seated in a large Introduction to Psychology classroom, participants received a
consent form. After the consent forms were completed and returned to the experimenter,
the participants were informed that they would be compensated for their efforts by having
their name entered in a cash draw. The experimenter, along with three or four research
assistants, then distributed a booklet that included instructions (specific to the
experimental condition that had been randomly assigned to each participant) as well as a
brief dependent measures questionnaire with manipulation checks. For the PredictedSuccess and Predicted-Failure conditions, the participants were informed of the time
period they would receive before the dependent measures and manipulation checks were
presented. For the No-Prediction condition, the participants were presented with the
dependent measures and manipulation checks before being informed of the time period
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they would receive.
Alter the booklets were distributed, the participants were informed that the
purpose of the study was to test their motor skills by seeing how well they performed at a
boring crossout task (i.e., X-in-the-box) which consists of crossing out small box
characters that are 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm in size. In order for participants to experience what it
is like to engage in this task, all of the participants were then asked to cross out as many
boxes as they could during a one-minute period which was timed by the experimenter.
The participants were then asked to open and complete their booklets. After the
participants completed the experiment, they were informed that they would not actually
perform the crossout task, regardless o f the time period they had received (all verbal
instructions are presented in Appendix C). Finally, participants were debriefed about the
hypotheses, procedures, and expected findings (Appendix E). The research participants
were also given the opportunity to have the results of this study sent to them by e-mail
once they became available (Appendix E).
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CHAPTER 6
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Data Reduction

Prior to conducting the main analyses, all of the experimental conditions were
examined (through various SPSS programs) for missing values, manipulation check
responses, and fit between data distribution and the multivariate assumptions. Each one
o f the 18 experimental conditions was examined separately. Because these data included
few missing values, a case was deleted if it included one or more missing values
(18 cases; see Appendix F for details).
A case was also deleted when an incorrect response was made to the experimenter
instruction regarding the tom word. The tom word manipulation check was considered
incorrect if both words had been tom off the page, or if both words had remained intact
(rather than one word tom by the participant as instructed). Therefore, the remaining
571 cases were examined in terms o f these manipulation check responses, and five
incorrect cases were deleted as a result. All o f the remaining 566 cases were retained for
further analyses.
Because outliers can produce either a Type I or a Type II error, and MANOVA is
sensitive to outliers, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) highly recommend that a test for
outliers accompany any use o f MANOVA. Therefore, in addition to screening for
missing and incorrect cases, the present data were also screened for univariate and
multivariate outliers. Tests for univariate and multivariate outliers were conducted
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separately for each cell of the present 2 x 3 x 3 design.
Using the cutoff criterion o f critical standardized score = ± 3.29, p < .001, a total
of 36 univariate outliers were found among the experimental groups (see Appendix F for
complete details). Tests for multivariate outliers were then conducted separately for each
one of the 18 groups. In considering the four main dependent variables (i.e., perceived
control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness), thus using the cutoff criterion,
%2 (4, n‘) = 18.47,/? = .001, only one multivariate outlier, %2 (4, N = 29) = 22.53, p = .001

was found (Appendix F). In addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate
outlier, the 36 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from their
respective groups, leaving a total o f530 participants across the 18 experimental
conditions.
Both the univariate and multivariate outlier analyses were conducted a second,
third, or fourth time, until no new outliers (p = .001) were found (see Appendix F).
Overall, these analyses yielded 21 new univariate outliers, and one new multivariate
outlier, %2 (4, N = 30) = 18.77, p - .001. In addition to deleting the one case containing a
multivariate outlier, the 21 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from
their respective groups, leaving a total o f 508 participants among the 18 experimental
conditions, where no new outliers were revealed (Table F4 in Appendix F lists the total
number of participants remaining in each experimental condition after completion of the
data reduction analyses).

1 where n = number o f participants in 1 o f the 18 experimental groups
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Data Screening

All of the experimental conditions were further examined to determine which
participants correctly responded to a set o f manipulation check questions. These three
manipulation checks were presented as questionnaire items: (1) ‘Did the page comer
make a difference in the time period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’
respectively, denoting either the Control condition or the No-Control experimental
condition; (2) ‘Did you choose which page comer would be tom?’ where options were
‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),, ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’
or ‘non-blue’), or ‘No (the choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective
order, denoting the Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice
experimental condition; and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage
in the crossout task?’ where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes
(a 20-minute long time period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed),’ in respective order,
denoting the Predicted-Success, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental
condition.
Overall, 210 cases consisted of at least one incorrect value on the manipulation
checks (see Appendix F for complete details). Whereas most cases presented only one
single incorrect value, other cases had incorrect values on two manipulation checks. Due
to the large number of participants who responded incorrectly to the manipulation checks
in many of the experimental conditions, /-tests were conducted to determine whether
significant differences in the four main dependent variables (i.e., perceived control,
responsibility, influence, and helplessness) existed between the responses o f individuals
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who responded correctly to all four manipulation check items and those who responded
incorrectly to one or more items.
In order to compare the two groups, 72 /-tests were performed overall, where each
one of the four dependent variables was examined, in turn, for each one of the
18 experimental conditions (Appendix F). Although some significant values were found
for perceived control, responsibility, or helplessness, these were not considered important
enough to warrant action, because a situation o f inflated Type I error rate was quite likely
present due to the multiple tests that were conducted within each experimental condition
for each one of the four main dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Although it was concluded that no systematically important differences existed between
participants who answered the manipulation checks correctly and those who did not, it is
cautioned that the data be examined while considering the possibility o f Type I error.
Therefore, all 508 cases were retained for further analyses, which examined
significant differences in the frequency o f incorrect manipulation check responses among
the independent variables. Specifically, of the three two-way chi squares that examined
incorrect manipulation check responses, only the ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED
OUTCOME finding was significant, y 2 (2, N - 210) = 21.90,/? < .001 (see Appendix F
for further details).
An examination o f the standard residuals indicated that significantly more
manipulation check errors occurred when the independent variables were incongruent
(i.e., Actual-Control with No-Prediction, and Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure with
No-Actual-Control), and significantly fewer errors occurred when the independent
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variables were congruent (i.e., Actual-Control with Predicted-Success or PredictedFailure, and No-Prediction with No-Actual-Control). Although the decision was then to
proceed with the preliminary analyses, this finding was kept under consideration for later
discussion.

Principal Component Analyses

Before conducting the multivariate analysis o f variance (M ANOVA), it was
important to perform a principal component analysis in order to determine the extent to
which the dependent variables were correlated with one another. Because little is gained
by including several measures o f the same thing, it was important to first organize the
dependent variables, which would simplify subsequent multivariate analyses o f variance
(Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2001). Principal component analyses provided a way o f summarizing patterns
of correlations that would reduce the dependent variables into smaller independent sets
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), thereby ensuring that the subsequent multivariate analyses
o f variance would be performed with appropriate (i.e., correlated) sets o f dependent
variables.
Therefore, principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed
through SPSS FACTOR on 11 items from the present sample o f508 participants. This
procedure was used to estimate the number o f components underlying the dependent
variables. The means, standard deviations, and correlations among the 11 dependent
variables are presented in Table 4. Five components were extracted, explaining 69% of
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among Dependent Variables (N = 508)
Variables

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1. Perc. Control

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

2. Responsbl

.47"”

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

3. Influence

.53” '

.57""

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

4. Helpless

-.25"*

-.23*"

-.23*"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

5. Frustrate

.12”

.02

.10*

.19*"

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

6. Predict

.26""

.18*"

.20*"

-.04

.20"*

-

-

-

-

-

-

7. Confident

.35""

.21'"

.22***

-.09*

.05

.47*"

-

-

-

-

-

8. Want

-.13"

-.08*

-.14"

.14"

.17*"

.02

-.08*

-

-

-

-

9. Motivate

.03

.05

.03

.04

-.04

.02

.12"

-.09*

-

-

-

10. Optimist

.11"

.17"*

.01

-.05

-.04

.10*

.16***

.08*

.14"

-

-

ll.Contribu

.06

.08*

.06

.03

.01

-.00

.10*

.02

.35***

.17***

-

M

2.40

2.81

2.82

4.76

3.20

2.88

3.19

6.36

4.78

4.06

5.02

SD

1.81

2.18

2.07

2.33

221

1.88

2.02

129

1.53

1.75

1.52

* p > .05 ; * * p > .01; * * * p > .001.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102
the total variance, and each component was well defined by the variables in the solution.
Communality values, as seen in Table 5, tended to be high. With a loading cutoff value
o f > .60 for inclusion o f a variable in the interpretation of a component, it was found that
each one of the 11 variables loaded on one o f the components.
Component 1 consisted o f the dependent variables o f influence, responsibility,
and perceived control over the outcome; Component 2 consisted o f confidence in and
prediction of the outcome; Component 3 consisted o f perceived contribution and
motivation to participate; Component 4 consisted of frustration regarding and
helplessness over the outcome; and Component 5 consisted o f optimism toward and
desire for a positive outcome. Loadings o f variables on components and communalities
after orthogonal rotation are shown in Table 5, where variables are ordered and grouped
by size o f loading in order to facilitate interpretation. Sum o f square loadings and
percentage o f variance are also shown in Table 5.

Main Analyses

Because the results o f the Principal Component Analyses sorted the dependent
variables into five separate packages, a 2 x 3 x 3 between-subjects MANOVA was
performed on each one o f the following sets o f dependent variables: (1) influence,
responsibility, and perceived control; (2) confidence and prediction; (3) perceived
contribution and motivation to participate; (4) frustration regarding and helplessness over
the outcome; and (5) optimism toward and desire for a positive outcome. Independent
variables were ACTUAL CONTROL (Actual-Control or No-Actual-Control), CHOICE
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Table 5
Loadings o f Variables and Communalities (hi2) fo r Principal Components Extraction with
Varimax Rotation, and Percentage o f Variance Explained by each o f the Rotated
Orthogonal Components

Item

c,

c2

c3

c4

c.

fr

Influence

.85

.06

.03

.05

-.13

.75

Responsibility

.80

.09

.07

-.08

.11

.67

Perceived Control

.75

.28

.01

-.00

-.02

.64

Predict

.13

.83

-.08

.17

.04

.74

Confident

.20

.81

.13

-.07

.01

.72

Motivate

-.02

.09

.81

.03

-.09

.68

Contribute

.10

-.05

.78

.07

.16

.65

Frustration

.17

.11

-.05

.82

.04

.71

Helplessness

-.40

-.01

.17

.60

-.02

.56

Want

-.11

-.13

-.16

.38

.72

.72

Optimist

.07

.21

.27

-.27

.72

.71

Eigenvalues (SSL)

2.20

1.53

1.43

1.29

1.10

-

Variance %

19.97

13.91

12.96

11.76

10.04

-

Note. Boldface numbers denote variables extracted for each component.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
(Voluntary-Choice, Involuntary-Choice, or No-Choice), and PREDICTED OUTCOME
(Predicted-Success, Predicted-Failure, or No-Prediction).

Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control

The means and standard deviations for the three dependent variables on each
independent variable are presented in Table 6. Table 7 displays the analysis of variance
for the combined dependent variables. With the use o f Wilks’ criterion, a significant
multivariate main effect was found for each o f ACTUAL CONTROL, CHOICE, and
PREDICTED OUTCOME. There was also a significant multivariate two-way interaction
for ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE, and a significant multivariate three-way
interaction.
Table 7 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one o f the
three dependent variables. These findings showed that, regardless o f CHOICE and
PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had ACTUAL CONTROL had a
significant effect on ratings for each o f influence, responsibility, and perceived control.
Specifically, participants with Actual-Control (where options made a difference in the
outcome) felt significantly more influence, M D 2 = 0.62,/? < .001, more responsibility,
M D = 0.69, p < .001, and more perceived control, M D = 0.47, p < .01, than individuals

with No-Actual-Control (where options made no difference in the outcome).

2 M D = Mean difference between the scores o f participants who had Actual-Control
and the scores o f individuals who had No-Actual Control.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control
Scoresfo r each Experimental Condition
Dependent Variables
Influence
IN D E P E N D E N T V A R IA B LES
ACTUAL
CO NTRO L

C H O IC E

P R E D IC T E D
OUTCOM E

M

(SD)

Responsibility

M

(SD)

Perceived Control

M (SD)

Actual-Control (n = 250)

3.14* (2.15)

3.16* (2.28)

2.63* (1.85)

No-Actual-Control (n = 258)

2 2 5 b (1.94)

2.47b (2.02)

2.17b (1.75)

Voluntary-Choice ( n = 177)

3.31* (2.12)

3.32* (2.31)

2.67* (1.85)

Involuntary-Choice (ji = 165)

2.81* (2.00)

2.65b (2.05)

2.25* (1.69)

No-Choice (n = 166)

2.34b (1.98)

2.43b (2.07)

2.25* (1.86)

Predicted-Success ( n = 177)

2.62* (1.96)

2.95* (2.20)

2.40* (1.85)

Predicted-Failure (n = 162)

2.70* (2.10)

2.44* (2.00)

2.10* (1.54)

No-Prediction (n = 169)

3.17b (2.12)

3.02b (2.28)

2.68b (1.97)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 7
Multivariate Analysis o f Variancefo r Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control (DVs)
djs

Wilks’ A

MS

F

Multivariate

3 ,4 8 8

.97

-

5.90“

Influence

1,490

-

48.39

12.69“ ’

Responsibility

1,490

-

59.38

13.40*“

Perceived Control

1,190

-

28.06

8.94“

Multivariate

6 ,9 7 6

.95

-

4.53“ *

Influence

2 ,4 9 0

-

40.08

10.51*”

Responsibility

2 ,4 9 0

-

38.42

8.67"*

Perceived Control

2 ,4 9 0

-

9.34

Multivariate

6 ,9 7 6

.96

-

3.41“

Influence

2 ,4 9 0

-

15.46

4.06’

Responsibility

2 ,4 9 0

-

17.62

3.98’

Perceived Control

2 ,4 9 0

-

13.98

4.46’

Multivariate

6 ,9 7 6

.97

-

2.43’

Influence

2 ,4 9 0

-

20.21

5.30"

Responsibility

2 ,4 9 0

-

15.49

3.49*

Perceived Control

2 ,4 9 0

-

6.95

2.22

Multivariate

6, 976

.99

-

0.68

Influence

2 ,4 9 0

-

6.34

n.s.

Responsibility

2 ,4 9 0

-

3.23

n.s.

Perceived Control

2, 490

-

1.33

n.s.

Source
A C T U A L C O N T R O L (A C )

C H O IC E (Ch)

PR E D IC TE D O U T C O M E (PO)

A C xC h

A C x PO
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Table 7 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis o f Variancefo r Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control (DVs)
dfs

W ilks'A

MS

F

12,1291

.98

-

1.00

Influence

4 ,4 9 0

-

3.29

n.s.

Responsibility

4 ,4 9 0

-

1.80

n.s.

Perceived Control

4 ,4 9 0

-

3.27

n.s.

12,1291

.94

-

2.45“

Influence

4 ,4 9 0

-

18.60

4.88”

Responsibility

4 ,4 9 0

-

3.50

0.79

Perceived Control

4 ,4 9 0

-

5.08

1.62

Influence

490

-

3.81

-

Responsibility

490

-

4.43

-

Perceived Control

490

-

3.14

-

Influence

508

-

12.26

-

Responsibility

508

-

12.64

-

Perceived Control

508

-

9.02

-

Source
C hxPO

A C x Ch x PO

Error

Total

Multivariate

Multivariate

*p < .05; **p < .01; * **p < .001.
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The findings also indicated that, regardless o f ACTUAL CONTROL and
PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had CHOICE had a significant
effect on ratings of both influence and responsibility. Specifically, participants with
Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly
more influence than individuals who had No-Choice (where the experimenter chose
either ‘right’ or ‘left’), M D = .91, p < .001. Furthermore, participants with VoluntaryChoice felt significantly more responsibility than individuals with either InvoluntaryChoice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye
colour), M D = .66, p < .05, or No-Choice, M D = .88,/? < .001.
Finally, the findings also indicated that, regardless o f ACTUAL CONTROL and
CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant
effect on ratings for each o f influence, responsibility, and perceived control. Specifically,
participants with No-Prediction (who were not informed about how long they would
perform the crossout task) felt significantly more influence than individuals who had
Predicted-Success (who were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a
short 2-minute period), M D = 0.56, p > .05. Furthermore, participants who had
No-Prediction felt significantly more responsible and perceived more control over their
outcome than individuals who had Predicted-Failure (who were informed that they would
perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period), MDs = 0.58, ps > .05.
Table 7 also presents the multivariate two-way interactions on each one o f the
three dependent variables. However, only ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE significantly
affected participant scores on influence, F ( 2, 508) = 5.30, p < .01, and responsibility,
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F (2, 508) = 3.49, p < .05. Figure 4 displays the mean scores on influence and

responsibility for the significant multivariate ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE
interaction. The significant effects for influence and responsibility were further examined
using univariate analyses o f variance for each level o f ACTUAL CONTROL by each
level o f CHOICE.
Table 8 reports the means and standard deviations o f influence and responsibility
for each level o f ACTUAL CONTROL by each level o f CHOICE. Tests o f betweensubjects effects for the Actual-Control condition displayed sign ificant differences on
participant scores for influence among levels o f CHOICE, F (2, 247) = 11.89,/? < .001.
Specifically, multiple comparisons tests revealed sign ificant differences between the
mean scores for No-Choice (where the experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’) and
Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’), M D = 1.53,
p < .001, and the mean scores for No-Choice and Involuntary-Choice (where participants

chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour), M D = 1.06, p < .01.
In other words, participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt significantly
more influence over their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control but NoChoice. Furthermore, participants with Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice felt
significantly more influence over their outcome than individuals with Actual-Control but
No-Choice.
Tests o f between-subjects effects for the Actual-Control condition also displayed
significant differences on participant scores for responsibility among levels o f CHOICE,
F (2,247) = 10.06, p < .001. Specifically, multiple comparisons tests (Bonferroni)
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Figure 4. Mean scores on influence and responsibility for the two-way interaction o f

ACTUAL CONTROL by CHOICE conditions.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence and Responsibilityfo r Each Level o f
ACTUAL CONTROL by Each Level o f CHOICE

Dependent Variables
Independent Variables

Influence
n

ACTUAL CONTROL
Actual-Control

N o-Actual-Control

M

(SD)

Responsibility
M

(SD)

CHOICE
V oluntary-Choice

85

3.79a (2.10)

Involuntary-Choice

84

3.32“

No-Choice

81

2.26b (1.96)

2A T

Voluntary-Choice

92

2.86*

(2.05)

2.71“ (2.15)

Involuntary-Choice

81

2.27“ (1.71)

2.28“ (1.93)

No-Choice

85

2.41“ (2.00)

2.40“ (1.97)

(2.12)

3.98“ (2.30)
S.Ol”0 (2.10)
(2.18)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and
Involuntary-Choice, M D = 0.96, p < .05, and the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and
No-Choice, M D =1.51 ,p < .001 (Table 8). In other words, participants with ActualControl (where options made a difference in the outcome received) and Voluntary-Choice
(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper) felt more responsible in determining
their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice (where
participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour).
Furthermore, participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt more
responsible for their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control but No-Choice
(where the experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’).
In summary, participants with Actual-Control but No-Choice felt both the least
amount o f influence and the least amount o f responsibility over their outcome, and
participants with Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice felt both the most influence and
the most responsibility in determining their outcome. Overall, it appears that the
combination o f Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice leads to the highest perceptions of
influence and responsibility over outcomes. For the No-Actual-Control condition, there
were no significant differences on the dependent variables among the levels of CHOICE
(Table 8).
Finally, Table 7 also shows a significant three-way multivariate interaction
(ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME) for influence only,
F (4,490) = 4.88, p < .001. This significant three-way interaction for influence was

further examined using two-way and one-way univariate analyses o f variance for each
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level o f ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of CHOICE by each level o f PREDICTED
OUTCOME.
Specifically, for the Actual-Control condition, a significant two-way interaction
for CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME was found (Table 9). Figure 5 displays the
mean scores on influence for the significant CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME
interaction for participants in the Actual-Control condition and individuals in the NoActual-Control condition. This significant effect on influence for the Actual-Control
condition was further examined using univariate analyses o f variance for each level of
CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Table 10 displays the means and
standard deviations on influence for each level o f CHOICE by each level o f PREDICTED
OUTCOME for the Actual-Control condition. The only significant differences revealed
were among levels o f CHOICE for participants who had both Actual-Control (where
options made a difference) and Predicted-Failure (where participants were informed that
they would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period). Specifically under
this Actual-Control with Predicted-Failure condition, participants with Voluntary-Choice
(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly more influence over
their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice (where the experimenter chose either
‘right’ or ‘left’), M D = 3.19,/? < .001. Similarly, under the specific condition o f ActualControl with Predicted-Failure, participants who had Involuntary-Choice (where
participants chose either ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour) felt
significantly more influence over their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice,
M D = 2.55,p <.001.
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Table 9
Analysis o f Variance on Influence fo r both the Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control
Conditions by CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME

Source

djs

F

MS

Actual-Control
CHOICE (Ch)

2,241

51.06

12.58*'

PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO)

2,241

1.40

0.34

ChxPO

4,241

17.53

4.32*

Error

241

4.06

Total

250

-

-

_

No-Actual-Control
CHOICE (Ch)

2,249

8.16

2.28

PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO)

2,249

20.93

5.86*

ChxPO

4,249

4.51

1.26

Error

249

3.57

-

Total

258

-

-

* p < .01; * * p < .001.
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Figure 5. Mean scores on influence for the significant CHOICE x PREDICTED

OUTCOME interaction for those participants in the Actual-Control condition and the NoActual-Control condition.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations on Influence (DV) fo r each level o f CHOICE by each level
ofPREDICTED OUTCOMEfor the Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control Conditions
Independent Variables

PR E D IC TE D O U TC O M E

C H O IC E

A C T U A L C O N TRO L
Actual-Control

n
Predicted-Success

Predicted-Failure

No-Prediction

M

No-Actual-Control

(SD)

n

M

(SD)

Voluntary-Choice

29

3 .4? (2.11)

32

2.53* (1.93)

Involuntary-Choice

32

3.06 V 2.09)

25

1.92'(1.38)

No-Choice

26

2.46'(2.06)

33

2.18* (1.76)

Voluntary-Choice

29

4.4V (2.04)

28

2.43* (2.06)

Involuntary-Choice

26

3.11K(2.23)

27

1.67* (1.18)

No-Choice

27

122'’ (0,42)

25

2.60 '(2.12)

Voluntary-Choice

27

3.48 '(2.06)

32

3.56'(2.02)

Involuntary-Choice

26

3.19 ‘ (2.06)

29

3.14* (2.05)

No-Choice

28

3.OP (2.34)

27

2.52* (2.21)

Note. 'Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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For the No-Actual-Control condition, the only significant effect revealed was for
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2,249) = 5.86, p < . 01 (Table 9). This significant main
effect is further examined in Table 11, which presents the means and standard deviations
on influence for each level o f CHOICE and each level o f PREDICTED OUTCOME for
the No-Actual-Control condition. Specifically, it was found that participants with
No-Actual-Control (where options made no difference) and No-Prediction (where
participants were not informed about their outcome) felt significantly more influence over
their outcome than individuals who had No-Actual-Control and Predicted-Success (where
participants were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute
period), M D = 0.87, p < .01. Furthermore, participants with No-Actual-Control and
No-Prediction felt significantly more influence than individuals who had
No-Actual-Control and Predicted-Failure (where participants were informed that they
would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period), M D = 0.88, p < .01.
Summary. Significant main effects were found for each o f ACTUAL CONTROL,

CHOICE, and PREDICTED OUTCOME. For ACTUAL CONTROL, participants who
had options that made a difference in their outcome (i.e., Actual-Control, where one
option would lead to performing the crossout task for a short time period, and the other
option would lead to performing the crossout task for a long time period) felt significantly
more influence, more responsibility, and perceived more control in determining their
outcome than individuals who had options that made no difference (i.e., No-ActualControl, where both options would lead to performing the crossout task either for a short
time period, or for a long time period). For CHOICE, participants with Voluntary-Choice
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations on Influencefor Each Level o f CHOICE and Each Level o f
PREDICTED OUTCOMEfor the Actual Control and No-Actual-Control Conditions
ACTU A L CONTRO L
Actual-Control

C H O IC E

P R E D IC TE D O U T C O M E

No-Actual-Control

n

M (SD)

n

M (SD)

Voluntary-Choice

85

3.19'(2.10)

92

2.86'(2.05)

Involuntary-Choice

84

3.32^(2.12)

81

2.27* (1.71)

No-Choice

81

2.26h(1.96)

85

2.41 '(2.00)

Predicted-Success

87

3.01 '(2.10)

90

223'(1.73)

Predicted-Failure

82

2.W (2.23)

80

2.23" (1.86)

No-Prediction

81

3.25* (2.14)

88

3.10 b(2.11)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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(where participants chose either ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’) felt significantly more influence and
more responsibility over their outcome than individuals who had No-Choice (where the
experimenter chose either ‘right’ or ‘left’ for the participant). Furthermore, participants
with Voluntary-Choice felt significantly more responsibility in determining their outcome
than individuals who had Involuntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or
non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour). For PREDICTED OUTCOME,
participants with No-Prediction (who were not informed about how long they would
perform the crossout task) felt significant^ more influence over their outcome than
individuals who had Predicted-Success (who were informed that they would perform the
crossout task for a short 2-minute period). Also, participants with No-Prediction felt
significantly more responsibility and perceived more control over their outcome than
individuals who had Predicted-Failure (who were informed that they would perform the
crossout task for a long 20-minute period).
Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL
CONTROL by CHOICE variables. Participants who made a choice between the options
o f ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ (Voluntary-Choice), where each option led to a different outcome
(Actual-Control), felt significantly more influence and more responsibility than
individuals who did not make a choice (No-Choice) between options that led to different
outcomes (Actual-Control). In addition, participants who made a choice between the
options o f‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ (Voluntary-Choice), where each option led to a different
outcome (Actual-Control), felt significantly more responsibility than individuals who
made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ (Involuntary-Choice) where each option led
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to a different outcome (Actual-Control). Furthermore, participants felt significantly more
influence when they made a choice between ‘blue’ and ‘non-blue’ (Involuntary-Choice)
where each option led to a different outcome (Actual-Control), but felt less influence
when they had no choice (No-Choice) between options that each led to a different
outcome (Actual-Control).
Finally, a significant three-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL
CONTROL by CHOICE by PREDICTED OUTCOME variables. In addition to repeating
the significant two-way interaction findings reported for ACTUAL CONTROL x
CHOICE (where the combinations o f Actual-Control with Voluntary-Choice, as well as
Actual-Control with Involuntary-Choice led to higher perceptions o f influence than the
combination o f Actual-Control with No-Choice), a significant two-way interaction was
also found for ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME. Specifically,
individuals who had No-Actual-Control with No-Prediction felt significantly more
influence over their outcome than participants who had No-Actual-Control with any type
o f prediction (i.e., Predicted-Success or Predicted-Failure). Furthermore, participants
who had Actual-Control with Voluntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure, or Actual-Control
with Involuntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure, felt significantly more influence over
their outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control with No-Choice with PredictedFailure.

Confidence and Prediction

The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
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independent variable are presented in Table 12. Table 13 displays the analysis of
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s criterion3 revealed a significant
multivariate effect for PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2,490) = 4.08, p < .05, and a
significant two-way multivariate effect for CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME,
F ( 4, 490) = 3.07,p < .05.

Table 13 reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one o f the two
dependent variables (i.e., confidence, and prediction). For PREDICTED OUTCOME,
because the linear combinations of the two dependent variables were not significant when
confidence and prediction were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate
level according to Roy’s statistic, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was
observed. In other words, regardless o f ACTUAL CONTROL and CHOICE, whether
participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant effect on the combined
ratings for confidence and prediction.
Table 13 also presents the multivariate two- and three-way interactions on each

3 Although Wilks’ criterion was not significant, Roy’s Largest Root revealed a
significant multivariate effect for PREDICTED OUTCOME. Stevens (2002) explains
that, as a general rule, it makes little difference which one o f the multivariate test
statistics is used. However, if the significant differences among the groups are
concentrated in the first discriminant function (which does occur quite often in practice;
see Bock, 1975), then Roy’s statistic is technically more powerful and therefore preferred.
Nevertheless, Stevens (2002) warns that Roy’s statistic should only be used in this case if
there is evidence to suggest that the homogeneity of covariances matrices assumptions is
tenable. Therefore, Box’s Test of the Equality o f Covariance Matrices was examined for
PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices
o f the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F (6, 6147630) =
0.61 ,p = .72. Therefore, Roy’s statistic was considered in lieu o f Wilks’ Lambda.
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Table 12
Means and Standard Deviations on Prediction and Confidence Scoresfo r each
Experimental Condition

Dependent variables
Prediction
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ACTUAL
CONTROL

CHOICE

PREDICTED
OUTCOME

M

(SD)

Confidence
M

(SD)

Actual-Control (n = 250)

3.05a (1.97)

3.17a (2.06)

No-Actual-Control (n = 258)

2.71b (1.78)

3.20a (1.98)

Voluntary-Choice (n = 177)

2.94a (1.90)

3.30a (2.08)

Involuntary-Choice (n = 165)

2.84a (1.86)

3.02a (1.97)

No-Choice (n = 166)

2.86a (1.89)

3.23a (1.99)

Predicted-Success (n = 177)

2.82a (1.84)

3.26a (2.07)

Predicted-Failure (n = 162)

3.02a (1.93)

2.96a (1.93)

No-Prediction (n = 169)

2.80a (1.87)

3.33a (2.04)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 13
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Prediction and Confidence Scores (DVs)
d/s

Roy’s
Largest Root

MS

F

Multivariate

2,489

.01

-

3.00

Prediction

1,490

-

16.59

n.s.

Confidence

1,490

-

<.01

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

0.77

Prediction

2,490

-

0.44

n.s.

Confidence

2,490

-

2.96

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

.02

-

4.08‘

Prediction

2,490

-

2.36

0.66

Confidence

2,490

-

6.36

1.58

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

0.09

Prediction

2,490

-

0.28

n.s.

Confidence

2,490

-

0.03

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

0.44

Prediction

2,490

-

1.27

n.s.

Confidence

2,490

-

1.27

n.s.

Multivariate

4,490

.03

-

3.07“

Prediction

4,490

-

3.33

0.93

Confidence

4,490

-

12.41

3.07’

Source

ACTUAL CONTROL (AC)

CHOICE (Ch)

PREDICTED OUTCOM E (PO)

AC x Ch

AC x PO

C h xP O
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Table 13 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Prediction and Confidence Scores (DVs)
dfs

Roy's Largest
Root

MS

Multivariate

4,490

<.01

-

Prediction

4,490

-

2.08

n.s.

Confidence

4,490

-

2.83

n.s.

Prediction

490

-

3.57

-

Confidence

490

-

4.04

-

Prediction

508

-

11.82

-

Confidence

508

-

14.22

-

Source

AC x Ch x PO

Error

Total

F

n r\
yj.i y
a

* p < .05.
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one o f the dependent variables. However, according to Roy’s Largest Root4, only
CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on
confidence, F (4, 508) = 3.18,p < .05. Figure 6 displays the mean scores on confidence
for the significant multivariate CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction. The
mean scores on prediction did not differ significantly. The significant effect on
confidence was further examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level of
CHOICE by each level o f PREDICTED OUTCOME.
Table 14 reports the means and standard deviations on confidence for each level
o f CHOICE by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests o f between-subjects
effects for the Voluntary-Choice condition (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or
‘pepper’) displayed significant differences on participant scores for confidence among
levels o f PREDICTED OUTCOME, F ( 2,177) = 4.09,/? < .05. Specifically, multiple
comparisons tests revealed significant differences between the means on confidence for
Predicted-Success (where individuals were informed that they would perform the cross
out task for a short 2-minute period) and Predicted-Failure (where participants were
informed that they would perform the cross-out task for a long 20-minute period),
M D = 0.97, p < .05. In other words, participants who had Voluntary-Choice and

Predicted-Success felt significantly more confident about how long they would perform

4 Box’s Test o f the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for CHOICE x
PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices
o f the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F (24,
743852.80) = 0.97, p = .50. Therefore, as with the findings for PREDICTED
OUTCOME, Roy’s statistic was considered instead o f Wilks’ Lambda for the CHOICE x
PREDICTED OUTCOME interactioa
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Figure 6. Mean Scores on Confidence for the Significant two-way Interaction of

CHOICE by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions.
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Table 14
Means and Standard Deviations on Confidencefo r each level o f CHOICE by each level
o f PREDICTED OUTCOME

Dependent Variable
Confidence

Independent Variables
PREDICTED OUTCOME

CHOICE

n

V oluntary-Choice

Predicted-Success

61

3.90a (2.12)

Predicted-Failure

57

2.93b (1.97)

No-Prediction

59

3.04ab (2.03)

Predicted-Success

57

2.61*

(1.82)

Predicted-Failure

53

2.92*

(1.96)

No-Prediction

55

3.55b (2.07)

Predicted-Success

59

3.22*

(2.08)

Predicted-Failure

52

3.02*

(1.87)

No-Prediction

55

3.44a (2.02)

Involuntary-Choice

No-Choice

M

(SD)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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the cross-out task than individuals who had Voluntary-Choice with Predicted-Failure.
Tests o f between-subjects effects for the Involuntary-Choice condition also
showed significant differences on participant scores for confidence among the levels o f
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F ( 2 , 165) = 3.29, p < .05. Further analyses revealed a
significant difference between the means on confidence for Predicted-Success and
No-Prediction, M D = 0.93, p < .05 (Table 14). In other words, participants with both
Involuntary-Choice and No-Prediction felt more confident about how long they would
perform the cross-out task than individuals who had Involuntary-Choice and PredictedSuccess. No significant differences were found among the levels o f PREDICTED
OUTCOME for the No-Choice condition.
Summary. Neither level o f ACTUAL CONTROL nor level o f CHOICE had any

significant effect on individuals’ perceived ability to predict or on how confident
participants felt about the amount o f time they would engage in the cross-out task.
However, when levels o f PREDICTED OUTCOME were considered, the combination
o f perceived confidence and perceived ability to predict one’s outcome was significantly
affected. Specifically, mean scores on the dependent variables show that participants felt
better able to predict their outcome but felt less confident about their outcome under the
condition o f Predicted-Failure. Furthermore, participants felt less able to predict their
outcome but felt more confident about their outcome both under the conditions of
Predicted-Success and No-Prediction.
Furthermore, a significant effect on perceived confidence emerged when the
CHOICE x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction was examined. Specifically,
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regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL, individuals felt more confident about how long they
would perform the cross-out task when they had both Voluntary-Choice and PredictedSuccess, and felt less confident about their outcome when they had both VoluntaryChoice and Predicted-Failure. In other words, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL:
(a) participants who knew they had received the positive outcome after making a choice
between ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ felt more confident that they would actually experience their
outcome; and (b) participants who knew they had received a negative outcome after
making a choice between ‘salt’ and ‘pepper’ felt less confident that they would actually
experience their outcome.
Also, individuals felt more confident about their outcome when they had both
Involuntary-Choice and No-Prediction, and felt less confident about their outcome when
they had both Involuntary-Choice and Predicted-Success. In other words, regardless of
ACTUAL CONTROL: (a) participants who were not informed of their outcome after
making a choice based on their own true eye colour felt less confident that they would
actually experience their outcome; and (b) participants who knew they had received the
positive outcome after making a choice based on their own true eye colour felt more
confident that they would actually experience their outcome. Finally, in situations where
participants had No-Choice, neither ACTUAL CONTROL nor the CHOICE x
PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction mattered.

Frustration Regarding and Helplessness Over the Outcome

The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
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independent variable are presented in Table 15. Table 16 displays the analysis of
variance for the combined dependent variables. With the use of Wilks’ criterion, a
significant multivariate main effect was found for both ACTUAL CONTROL,
F (2 , 489) = 3.62, p < .05, and PREDICTED OUTCOME, F ( 4, 978) = 26.19, p < .001.

There was also a significant two-way interaction for ACTUAL CONTROL x
PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (4,978) = 4.09.

< -01-

Table 16 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of
the two dependent variables. For ACTUAL CONTROL, because the linear
combinations o f the two dependent variables were not significant when frustration and
helplessness were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate level
according to Wilks’ criterion, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was
observed. In other words, regardless o f CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME, level
of ACTUAL CONTROL had a significant effect on participants’ combined ratings for
frustration and helplessness.
The findings also showed that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and
CHOICE, level of PREDICTED OUTCOME had a significant effect on participants’
ratings of frustration. Specifically, participants who had Predicted-Failure felt
significantly more frustration than individuals who had either Predicted-Success,
M D = 2.18, p < .001; or No-Prediction, M D = 1.19, p < .001. Furthermore, participants

who had No-Prediction felt significantly more frustration than individuals who had
Predicted-Success, M D = 0.99, p < .001.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131
Table 15
Means and Standard Deviations on Frustration and Helplessness Scoresfo r each
Experimental Condition

Dependent variables
Frustration
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ACTUAL
CONTROL

CHOICE

PREDICTED
OUTCOME

M

(SD)

Helplessness
M

(SD)

Actual-Control (n = 250)

3.37a (2.24)

4.62*

(2.29)

No-Actual-Control (n = 258)

3.03“ (2.16)

4.89*

(2.37)

Voluntary-Choice (n = 177)

3.29® (2.32)

4.66® (2.27)

Involuntaiy-Choice (n = 165)

322*

(2.28)

5.03*

(2.27)

No-Choice (« = 166)

3.08® (2.01)

4.60*

(2.44)

Predicted-Success (n —177)

2.17*

(1.76)

4.88*

(2.29)

Predicted-Failure (n = 162)

4.36b (2.23)

5.01*

(2.27)

No-Prediction (n = 169)

3.17°

4.40*

(2.40)

(2.07)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 16
Multivariate Analysis o f Variancefo r Frustration and Helplessness Scores (DVs)
dfs

Wilks'A

MS

F

Multivariate

2,489

.99

-

3.62*

Frustration

1,490

-

14.68

3.67

Helplessness

1,490

-

1124

2.07

Multivariate

4,978

.99

-

0.95

Frustration

2,490

-

1.49

n.s.

Helplessness

2,490

-

8.38

n.s.

Multivariate

4,978

.82

-

26.19"*

Frustration

2,490

-

201.20

50.28*"

Helplessness

2,490

-

16.49

3.04

Multivariate

4,978

1.00

-

0.47

Frustration

2,490

-

0.92

n.s.

Helplessness

2,490

-

2.78

n.s.

Multivariate

4,978

.97

-

4.09“

Frustration

2,490

-

27.52

6.88"

Helplessness

2,490

-

1.86

0.34

Multivariate

8,978

.99

-

0.66

Frustration

4,490

-

4.75

n.s.

Helplessness

4,490

-

0.95

n.s.

Source
A CTUAL CONTROL (AC)

CHOICE (Ch)

PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO)

AC x Ch

AC x PO

C h xP O
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Table 16 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis of Variancefo r Frustration and Helplessness Scores (DVs)
Source
AC x Ch x PO

Error

Total

dfs

Wilks’ A

MS

F

Multivariate

8,978

.99

-

0.63

Frustration

4,490

-

2.24

n.s.

Helplessness

4,490

-

4.50

n.s.

Frustration

490

-

4.00

-

Helplessness

490

-

5.43

-

Frustration

508

-

15.10

-

Helplessness

508

-

28.08

-

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 16 also presents the multivariate two-way interactions on each one of the
two dependent variables. However, only ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED
OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on frustration, F (2,490) = 6.88,/?
< .01. Figure 7 displays the mean scores on frustration for the significant multivariate
ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME interaction. The significant effects
for frustration were further examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level
of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME.
Table 17 reports the means and standard deviations of frustration for each level
of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of betweensubjects effects for the Actual-Control condition displayed significant differences on
participant scores for frustration among levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME,
F (2,247) = 53.25, p < .001. Specifically, multiple comparison tests revealed significant

differences between the mean scores for Predicted-Success and Predicted-Failure,
M D = 2.98, p < .001, the mean scores for Predicted-Failure and No-Prediction,
M D = 1.74,/? < .05, and the mean scores for Predicted-Success and No-Prediction,
M D = 1.23,p < .001.

In conditions of Actual-Control, therefore, participants felt most frustrated when
they Predicted-Failure, felt less frustrated when they had No-Prediction, and felt the least
frustrated when they Predicted-Success. Specifically, participants who had ActualControl with Predicted-Failure felt significantly more frustration over their outcome
than: (a) individuals who had Actual-Control with Predicted-Success; and
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Figure 7. Mean Scores on Frustration for the Significant two-way Interaction of

ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions.
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Table 17
Means and Standard Deviations on Frustration fo r each level o f ACTUAL CONTROL
by each level o f PREDICTED OUTCOME

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
ACTUAL CONTROL
Actual-Control

No-Actual-Control

Frustration

PREDICTED OUTCOME

n

Predicted-Success

87

2.00a (1.69)

Predicted-Failure

82

4.98b (1.94)

No-Prediction

81

3.23°

Predicted-Success

90

2.34a (1.82)

Predicted-Failure

80

3.73b (2.33)

No-Prediction

88

M

3.10*

(SD)

(2.01)

(2.14)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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(b) individuals who had Actual-Control with No-Prediction. Furthermore, participants
who had Actual-Control with No-Prediction felt significantly more frustration over their
outcome than individuals who had Actual-Control with Predicted-Success.
Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control condition displayed
significant differences on participant scores for frustration among levels of PREDICTED
OUTCOME, F (2,255) = 9.25, /? < .001. Specifically, multiple comparison tests
revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Predicted-Success and
Predicted-Failure, M D = 1.38,/? < .001. In other words, participants who had NoActual-Control with Predicted-Failure felt significantly more frustration over their
outcome than individuals who had No-Actual-Control with Predicted-Success.
Summary. Significant main effects were found for each of ACTUAL CONTROL

and PREDICTED OUTCOME. Specifically, regardless of CHOICE and PREDICTED
OUTCOME, whether or not participants had ACTUAL CONTROL significantly
affected the combined ratings for frustration and helplessness. Furthermore, regardless
of ACTUAL CONTROL and CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED
OUTCOME significantly affected ratings for frustration. Specifically, participants who
were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a long 20-minute period felt
significantly more frustration than individuals who were: (a) informed that they would
perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute period; or (b) not informed about how
long they would perform the crossout task. Furthermore, participants who did not know
their outcome felt significantly more frustration than individuals who knew they would
perform the task for 2 minutes. However, level of CHOICE did not significantly affect
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participants’ ratings of frustration or ratings of helplessness over the outcome.
Finally, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL
CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME variables. In situations where each option
presented to the participants actually led to a different outcome (Actual-Control):
(a) those who were informed that they would perform the crossout task for a long
20-minute period felt more frustration over their outcome than individuals who were
informed that they would perform the crossout task for a short 2-minute period and
individuals who were not at all informed about their outcome; and (b) those who were
not at all informed about their outcome felt significantly more frustrated about their
situation than individuals who were informed that they would perform the crossout task
for 2 minutes. In situations where both options presented to the participants would make
no difference at all in the outcome received (No-Actual-Control), those who knew they
would perform the crossout task for a long period felt significantly more frustrated than
individuals who would perform the task for only a short period.

Secondary Analyses
Perceived Contribution and Motivation to Participate

The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
independent variable are presented in Table 18. Table 19 displays the analysis of
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s Largest Root5revealed a

' Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for ACTUAL
CONTROL. The results indicated that the observed covariance matrices of the dependent
variables were significantly equal across groups, Box’s F (3, 4800000) = 0.21, p = .85.
Therefore, Roy’s criterion was considered instead of Wilks’ Lambda for ACTUAL
CONTROL.
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Table 18
Means and Standard Deviations on Perceived Contribution and Motivation Scoresfo r
each Experimental Condition

Dependent variables
Contribution
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ACTUAL
CONTROL

CHOICE

PREDICTED
OUTCOME

M

(SD)

Motivation
M

(SD)

Actual-Control (n = 250)

5.10a (1.56)

4.66a (1.53)

No-Actual-Control (« = 258)

4.94a (1.49)

4.89a (1.53)

Voluntary-Choice (n = 177)

5.08a (1.48)

4.84a (1.44)

Involuntary-Choice {n = 165)

5.00a (1.46)

4.78a (1.47)

No-Choice (n = 166)

4.98a (1.64)

4.73a (1.68)

Predicted-Success (« = 177)

4.94a (1.50)

4.66a (1.41)

Predicted-Failure (n = 162)

5.02a (1.51)

4.74a (1.57)

No-Prediction (n = 169)

5.1 l a (1.57)

4.95a (1.61)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 19
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Contribution and Motivation Scores (DVs)
dfo

Roy's Largest
Root

MS

F

Multivariate

2,489

.01

-

3.37*

Contribution

1,490

-

3.49

1.51

Motivation

1,490

-

6.95

2.93

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

0.40

Contribution

2,490

-

0.80

n.s.

Motivation

2,490

-

0.48

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

1.88

Contribution

2,490

-

1.49

n.s.

Motivation

2,490

-

4.17

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

<.01

-

1.81

Contribution

2,490

-

0.89

n.s.

Motivation

2,490

-

1.93

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

.02

-

3.19'

Contribution

2,490

-

8.55

3.10'

Motivation

2,490

-

0.40

0.17

Multivariate

4, 490

.01

-

0.72

Contribution

4,490

-

1.51

n.s.

Motivation

4,490

-

0.51

n.s.

Source

ACTUAL CONTROL (AC)

CHOICE (Ch)

PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO)

AC x Ch

AC x PO

C h xP O
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Table 19 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Contribution and Motivation Scores (DVs)
dfs

Roy's largest
Root

MS

F

Multivariate

4,490

.01

-

1.65

Contribution

4 ,490

-

3.70

n.s.

Motivation

4 ,490

-

1.50

n.s.

Contribution

490

-

2.31

-

Motivation

490

-

2.37

Contribution

508

-

27.54

-

Motivation

508

-

25.21

-

Source

AC x Ch x PO

Error

Total

* p < .05.
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significant multivariate effect for ACTUAL CONTROL, F (2, 489) = 3.37, p < .05, and
a significant two-way multivariate effect for ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED
OUTCOME, F (2, 490) = 3.79,/? < .05.
Table 19 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of
the two dependent variables (i.e., perceived contribution and motivation to participate).
For ACTUAL CONTROL, because the linear combinations of the two dependent
variables were not significant when perceived contribution and motivation to participate
were examined separately, but significant at the multivariate level according to Roy’s
criterion, it was concluded that a truly multivariate effect was at hand. In other words,
regardless of CHOICE and PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether participants had
ACTUAL CONTROL had a significant effect on the combined ratings for perceived
contribution and motivation to participate in the study.
Table 19 also presents the multivariate two- and three-way interactions on each
one of the dependent variables. According to Roy’s Largest Root6, only ACTUAL
CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly affected participant scores on
perceived contribution, F (2, 490) = 3.70, p < .05. The mean scores on motivation to
participate did not differ significantly.
The significant effect on perceived contribution was further examined using
univariate analyses of variance for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of

0 Box’s Test of the Equality of Covariance Matrices was examined for ACTUAL
CONTROL x PREDICTED OUTCOME. The results indicated that the observed
covariance matrices of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups,
Box’s F ( 15, 1347960) = 1.08,/? = .37. Therefore, Roy’s criterion was considered instead
o f Wilks’ Lambda for ACTUAL CONTROL.
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PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between-subjects effects for the Actual-Control
condition displayed marginally significant differences on participant scores for perceived
contribution among levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2, 258) = 2.93, p = .06.
Multiple comparisons tests revealed no significant differences among the levels of
PREDICTED OUTCOME. Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control
condition also displayed no significant differences for perceived contribution among
levels of PREDICTED OUTCOME, F (2 , 250) = 1.31,/? = .27.
In summary, neither level of CHOICE nor level of PREDICTED OUTCOME
affected the participants’ perceived contribution or motivation to participate in the
present study. However, ACTUAL CONTROL significantly affected the combination of
perceived contribution and motivation to participate. Specifically, mean scores on the
dependent variables show that participants felt they had contributed more but were less
motivated to participate under the condition of Actual-Control. Furthermore,
participants felt they had contributed less but were more motivated to participate under
the condition of No-Actual-Control.

Optimism Toward and Desire fo r a Positive Outcome

The means and standard deviations for the two dependent variables on each
independent variable are presented in Table 20. Table 21 displays the analysis of
variance for the combined dependent variables. Roy’s criterion7 revealed a significant

Although Wilks’ criterion was not significant, Roy’s Largest Root revealed a
significant multivariate effect for CHOICE. Therefore, Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance
Matrices was examined for CHOICE. The results showed that the observed covariance matrices
of the dependent variables were significantly equal across groups, Box's F (6, 6197568) = 1.70,
p = . 12. Therefore, Roy’s criterion was used instead of Wilks' Lambda.
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Table 20
Means and Standard Deviations on Optimism and Desire Scoresfo r each Experimental
Condition

Dependent variables
Optimism
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
ACTUAL
CONTROL

CHOICE

(SD)

M

(SD)

Actual-Control (n = 250)

4.05a (1.79)

6.45a (1.25)

No-Actual-Control (n = 258)

4.073 (1.72)

6.29a (1.32)

Voluntary-Choice (n = 177)

4.24a (1.71)

6.33a (1.37)

Involuntary-Choice (n = 165)

3.78b (1.74)

6.36a (1.27)

4.14ab (1.79)

6.40a (1.22)

Predicted-Success (« = 177)

4.18a (1.67)

6.48a (1.13)

Predicted-Failure (n = 162)

3.89a (1.89)

6.56ab (0.96)

No-Prediction (n = 169)

4.08a (1.71)

6.06°

No-Choice (n = 166)
PREDICTED
OUTCOME

M

Desire

(1.62)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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Table 21
Multivariate Analysis o f Variance fo r Optimism and Desire Scores (DVs)
dfa

Roy's
Largest Root

MS

F

Multivariate

2,489

<.01

-

0.66

Optimism

1,490

-

<0.01

n.s.

Desire

1,490

-

2.03

n.s.

Multivariate

2,490

.01

-

3.11’

Optimism

2,490

-

9.31

3.06'

Desire

2,490

-

0.21

0.13

Multivariate

2,490

.04

-

Optimism

2,490

-

4.41

1.45

Desire

2 ,490

-

13.15

8.49'”

Multivariate

2,490

.04

-

Optimism

2,490

-

2.85

0.93

Desire

2,490

-

15.83

10.21

Multivariate

2,490

.01

-

2.19

Optimism

2 ,4 9 0

-

0.82

n.s.

Desire

2,490

-

2.80

n.s.

Multivariate

4,490

.02

-

1.85

Optimism

4,49 0

-

5.60

n.s.

Desire

4,490

-

0.76

n.s.

Source

ACTUAL CONTROL (AC)

CHOICE (Ch)

PREDICTED OUTCOME (PO)

AC x Ch

AC x PO

Ch x PO
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Table 21 (cont’d)
Multivariate Analysis of Variance fo r Optimism and Desire Scores (DVs)
dfs

Roy's Largest
Root

MS

F

Multivariate

4,490

.02

-

2.14

Optimism

4,490

-

2.44

n.s.

Desire

4,490

-

3.12

n.s.

Optimism

490

-

1.55

-

Desire

490

-

3.05

-

Optimism

508

-

19.52

-

Desire

508

-

42.16

-

Source

AC x Ch n PO

Error

Total

* p < .05; * * p < .01; * ** p < .001.
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multivariate effect for CHOICE, F (2, 490) = 3.11, p < .05 and PREDICTED
OUTCOME, F (2, 490) = 8.69, p < .001. Also, a significant two-way multivariate effect
was found for ACTUAL CONTROL x CHOICE, F (2 , 490) = 10.50,/? < .001.
Table 21 also reports the findings pertaining to each main effect on each one of
the two dependent variables. These findings show that, regardless of ACTUAL
CONTROL and PREDICTED OUTCOME, whether or not participants had CHOICE
significantly affected ratings for optimism, F (2,490) = 3.06,p < .05. Specifically,
individuals who had Voluntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘salt’ or
‘pepper’) felt significantly more optimistic about getting a positive outcome than
individuals who had Involuntary-Choice (where participants chose either ‘blue’ or
‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour), M D = 0.46, p < .05.
The findings also indicated that, regardless of ACTUAL CONTROL and
CHOICE, whether or not participants had PREDICTED OUTCOME significantly
affected ratings for desire, F (2, 490) = 8.69,/? < .001. Specifically, participants who
Predicted-Failure wanted a positive outcome to a greater degree than individuals who
had No-Prediction, M D = 0.50,/? <.01, and participants who Predicted-Success wanted
a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who had No-Prediction,
M D = 0.42, p < .01. In other words, individuals who were informed about their outcome

(whether it involved performing the crossout task for 2 or 20 minutes) wanted a positive
outcome significantly more than individuals who did not know what to expect.
Table 21 also presents the multivariate two-way interaction for ACTUAL
CONTROL x CHOICE on desire for a positive outcome, F ( 2, 490) = 10.21,/? < .001.
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Figure 8 displays the mean scores on desire for the significant multivariate ACTUAL
CONTROL x CHOICE interaction. The significant effect for desire was further
examined using univariate analyses of variance for each level of ACTUAL CONTROL
by each level of CHOICE.
Table 22 reports the means and standard deviations of desire for each level of
ACTUAL CONTROL by each level of CHOICE. Tests of between-subjects effects for
the Actual-Control condition displayed significant differences on participants’ ratings of
desire among levels of CHOICE, F (2, 247) = 5.40, p < .01. Specifically, multiple
comparisons tests revealed significant differences between the mean scores for
Voluntary-Choice and Involuntaiy-Choice, M D = 0.47,/? < .05, and the mean scores for
Involuntary-Choice and No-Choice, M D = 0.60, p < .01. In other words, participants
with Actual-Control and No-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals
with Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice. Furthermore, participants with ActualControl and Voluntary-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals with
Actual-Control and Involuntary-Choice.
Tests of between-subjects effects for the No-Actual-Control condition displayed
significant differences on participant scores on desire for a positive outcome among
levels of CHOICE, F (2, 255) = 4.53, p < .05. Specifically, multiple comparisons tests
revealed significant differences between the mean scores for Voluntary-Choice and
Involuntary-Choice, M D = 0.53,/? < .05, and Involuntary-Choice and No-Choice,
M D = 0.51, p < .05. In other words, participants with No-Actual-Control and

Involuntary-Choice wanted a positive outcome more than individuals who had
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Figure 8. Mean Scores on Desire for the Significant two-way Interaction of ACTUAL

CONTROL by CHOICE Conditions.
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Table 22
Means and Standard Deviations on Desire fo r each level o f ACTUAL CONTROL by
each level of CHOICE

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
ACTUAL CONTROL
Actual-Control

No-Actual-Control

CHOICE

Desire
n

M

(SD)

Voluntary-Choice

85

6.S53 (1.14)

Involuntary-Choice

84

6.08b (1.55)

No-Choice

81

6.68“

Voluntary-Choice

92

6.12a (1.53)

Involuntary-Choice

81

6.65b (0.81)

No-Choice

85

6.14“

(0.91)

(1.41)

Note. Within each variable, different superscripts denote significantly different means.
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No-Actual-Control and Voluntary-Choice, and more than individuals who had
No-Actual-Control and No-Choice.
In summary, significant main effects were found for CHOICE and PREDICTED
OUTCOME. For CHOICE, participants who chose between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ were
more optimistic about getting a positive outcome than individuals who chose between
‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour. Level of CHOICE did not
significantly affect desire for a positive outcome. For PREDICTED OUTCOME,
participants who were informed about their outcome, whether positive (2-minutes)
or negative (20-minutes) wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals
who were not at all informed about their outcome. Level of PREDICTED OUTCOME
did not significantly affect feelings of optimism toward a positive outcome.
Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found for the ACTUAL
CONTROL by CHOICE variables. In situations where each option led to a different
outcome (i.e., Actual-Control), participants who either had no choice (i.e., where the
experimenter chose ‘right’ or ‘left) or made a choice between the options o f‘salt’ or
‘pepper’ wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who made a
choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour. In situations
where both options led to the same outcome (i.e., No-Actual-Control) participants who
made a choice between the options o f‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye
colour wanted a positive outcome significantly more than individuals who either made a
choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ or had no choice at all (i.e., where the experimenter
chose ‘right’ or ‘left’).
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CHAPTER 7
Discussion
Debate has surrounded the definition and conceptualization of control, particularly
with regard to people’s beliefs about the causal connections between action and effort,
and outcome. Whereas traditional control theorists postulate that providing a choice for
an individual’s actions increases feelings of control and decreases feelings of helplessness
(e.g., Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1973), recent findings indicate that the benefits of
control result only when a person’s choices make a difference in the outcome
(e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). These recent
findings have instigated a new conceptualization of the traditional view of control,
choice, and prediction in explaining responses to challenging situations.
Whereas traditional views have failed to unconfound the concepts of control,
choice, and prediction, the new conceptualization has permitted the separation of control
and prediction (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992), and
has also emphasized the importance of examining both choice and control as conceptually
separate entities (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al.,
2005). Nevertheless, the new conceptualization has had some difficulties in fully
disentangling the concepts of control and choice. For example, Langlois et al. (2002,
p. 172) omitted a choiceless control condition from their experimental design “...due to
conceptual difficulties.”
One reason why choiceless control has been a challenge for researchers is the
existence of an ambiguity inherent in the new conceptualization of control (Langlois
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et al., 2002). For instance, Nickels et al. (1992) broadly explain that having control
involves affecting an event, contributing to it, making an impact on it, or even simply
bringing it about. In addition to implying that actions or behaviours may not necessarily
be required for actual control to occur, this explanation also suggests that control may
even imply choice. It seems quite possible for individuals to make choices that affect an
event, contribute to it, or make an impact on it. Consequently, the new conceptualization
remains unclear about whether any observed psychological benefits are due to simply
having actual control, due to having choice, or due to having both actual control and
choice.

Theoretical Implications

The purpose of the present study was to further develop the new conceptualization
by systematically examining the separate effects of actual control, choice, and predicted
outcome. Appendix G summarizes the findings pertaining to the following variables:
(a) influence, responsibility, and perceived control over the outcome; (b) confidence and
prediction; (c) frustration and helplessness toward the outcome; (d) perceived
contribution and motivation to participate; and (e) optimism toward and desire for a
positive outcome. The theoretical implications of these findings will be discussed
accordingly.

Influence, Responsibility, and Perceived Control
Hypothesis I. Inconsistent with past research (Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al.,
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2002; Nickels et al., 1992), the present results only partly confirmed the hypothesis that,
regardless of whether they could predict their outcome, participants with Actual-Control
will perceive significantly more influence, responsibility, and perceived control over their
outcome. Indeed, individuals who were given Actual-Control (i.e., options that made a
difference in the outcome) felt more influence, more responsibility, and more control over
their outcome than individuals whose options made no difference at all.
However, inconsistent with the new conceptualization (e.g., Cramer & Perreault,
2005; Langlois et al., 2002) was the finding that unpredictable (rather than predictable)
situations increased the participants’ perceptions of influence, responsibility, and control.
Specifically, individuals felt more responsible for and perceived more control over
unpredictable situations than situations of Predicted-Failure. Individuals even felt more
influence over situations of No-Prediction than in situations of Predicted-Success. The
finding that unpredictable situations caused individuals to experience positive feelings is
surprising, especially considering the fact that the new conceptualization has consistently
reported that perceived control, influence, and responsibility over outcomes are affected
by actual control, regardless of predicted outcome (Cramer et al., 1997; Cramer &
Perreault, 2005; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992, Experiment 2).
Also inconsistent with the new conceptualization was the finding that, when
presented with options that made no difference, individuals who could not predict their
outcome felt more influence over their situation than individuals who were informed of
their outcome (whether negative or positive). In other words, when options did not
matter and individuals could not predict their outcome, perceptions of influence over the
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situation were significantly higher - when options did not matter and individuals could
predict their outcome, perceptions of influence were significantly lower.
Why would the participants take more credit for unpredictable situations, and take
significantly less credit for predictable situations? Perhaps the element of
unpredictability created some uncertainty about whether the experimenter would actually
follow through on the outcome. It might be easier for individuals to take credit for an
outcome they believe may not occur at all. On the other hand, being informed of the
specific details of a predictable outcome might have made it easier for the participants to
believe in its actual occurrence. It might be more difficult for individuals to take credit
for an outcome that they can predict in detail, because it might seem more tangible and
real. This might be especially true when the participants predicted a negative outcome.
For instance, the self-serving bias explains that individuals will attribute failure outcomes
to external factors (e.g., Bradley, 1978; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Fiske & Taylor,
1984; Greenwald, 1980).
However, the self-serving bias also states that individuals will tend to attribute
successful outcomes to internal factors (e.g., Campbell & Sedikides, 1999; Fiske &
Taylor, 1984; Greenwald, 1980). But why did the participants take less credit for their
situation when they predicted a positive outcome? Perhaps the participants felt the same
way about both the 2-minute and the 20-minute crossout tasks. If the participants
perceived both outcomes as being negative, then the finding that they took less credit for
a predictable outcome could be explained by the self-serving bias.
Indeed, it was found that those participants who could predict their outcome
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(whether 2 or 20 minutes) wanted to experience a short time period more than those
individuals who could not predict their outcome at all. In other words, the participants
were unhappy about any predictable outcome. According to the self-serving bias,
therefore, it appears that the participants took: (a) less credit for the predictable outcomes
because any outcome was considered a negative outcome; and (b) more credit for the
unpredictable outcome because an unknown outcome was possibly a positive outcome.

Hypothesis 2. The present findings only partly supported the hypothesis that,

regardless of predicted outcome, participants with Voluntary-Choice will perceive
significantly more influence, responsibility, and control over their outcome, but only
when Voluntary-Choice is presented under the Actual-Control condition. Consistent with
Nickels et al. (2005), the second hypothesis was confirmed in the fact that participants
who made a choice that mattered between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ : (a) felt more responsible for
their outcome than individuals who either made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ or
had the experimenter make a choice that matters between ‘right’ or ‘left’; and (b) felt
more influence over their outcome than individuals who had the experimenter make a
choice that matters between ‘right’ or ‘left.’
However, inconsistent with Nickels et al. (2005) was the finding that perceived
influence also increased when individuals made a choice that mattered between ‘blue’ or
‘non-blue.’ It seems that perceived influence increased when Actual-Control was
combined with any type of choice. In short, the act of choosing between options that
make a difference in the outcome (whether based on internal or external characteristics)
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increased individuals’ perceptions of influence over that outcome.
Also inconsistent with the new conceptualization (Cramer & Nickels, 2005;
Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 2005) was the finding that individuals’ perceptions of
influence and responsibility increased when they made a choice between ‘salt’ or
‘pepper’ - regardless of whether these options made a difference in the outcome.
Specifically, compared to individuals who had the experimenter choose for them, those
participants who had Voluntary-Choice felt more influence over and more responsibility
for their outcome (cf. Cramer & Nickels, 2005). Individuals also felt more responsible
for their outcome when they made a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’ rather than ‘blue’
or ‘non-blue.’ In short, it is not necessary that options that matter be combined with the
act of choosing (cf. Nickels et al., 2005) - the simple act of choosing between ‘salt’ or
‘pepper’ is sufficient for increasing perceptions of influence and responsibility.
Inconsistent with Langlois et al. (2002) and extending the new conceptualization
of control was the finding that Predicted-Failure, in combination with Actual-Control and
any type of choice, affected participants’ perceptions of influence. In fact, when informed
that they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes, individuals who made a choice
between options that mattered felt more influence over their outcome than those who had
not made a choice between options that mattered.

In other words, when individuals made a choice between options that made a
difference in their outcome and then found out that their choice had led to a negative
outcome, they took more credit for the outcome. However, when the experimenter made
a choice between options that mattered and then the participants were informed of a
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negative outcome, they took less credit for the outcome.
In situations in which a negative event is predicted, the amount of influence
perceived seems to hinge upon who is actually making the choices that make a difference
in our life. When a negative outcome was expected: (a) individuals who made their own
choice that matters (whether that choice was based on inherent physical characteristics or
on factors external to the individual) took more credit for the negative outcome that was
predicted; and (b) individuals took less credit when someone else made the choice (that
matters) for them.
The present findings support Paterson and Neufeld’s (1995) contention that the
most important issue is not the simpler confound between two variables (i.e., actual
control and choice, or actual control and predictability) but the confound among all three
variables. The re-conceptualization of choice as the act of choosing between options and
actual control as the presentation of options that make a difference in one’s outcome has
made it possible to investigate situations of choiceless control - whether or not these
situations were predictable. Separating the concept of choice from that of actual control
has permitted the emergence of a more complex depiction of how people respond in the
face of challenging outcomes.
Specifically, when a negative event is anticipated, the amount of influence
individuals feel over that event seems to hinge upon who is actually making the choices
that make a difference in their life. Specifically, when anticipating a difficult event:
(a) individuals who made their own choices that matter (whether these choices are based
on inherent physical characteristics or on factors external to our physical selves) felt more
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influence over the situation; and (b) individuals who did not make their own choices that
matter (i.e., someone else made the choice for them) felt less influence over the situation.
Whereas Cramer and Nickels (2005) have shed doubts on the necessity of choice
by demonstrating that control can be perceived even before a choice is made, the present
findings demonstrated the importance of each of the three independent variables
(i.e., actual control, choice, and predicted outcome) in determining perceptions of control,
influence, and responsibility over an event. Inconsistent with Cramer and Perreault
(2005), Langlois et al. (2002), and Paterson and Neufeld (1995) who demonstrated that
choice will not yield benefits unless meaningful options are provided, it was found that
having a choice can indeed yield benefits whether or not choice is combined with options
that make a difference. The finding that choice alone was sufficient in increasing
perceived influence and responsibility is consistent with the notion that individuals who
are given a choice show better personal adjustment and better coping (e.g., Burleson et
al., 1990; Harchiket al., 1993).
Perhaps one reason why the present findings are different from those of previous
investigations of the new conceptualization (e.g., Cramer & Perreault, 2005; Langlois et
al., 2002; Nickels et al, 1992) is because of important differences in the conceptualization
of the independent variables (i.e., choice and actual control). For instance, whereas the
present design conceptualized choice as the act of choosing and actual control as the
presentation of options that make a difference in the outcome, Cramer and Perreault
(2005) conceptualized choice in terms o f awareness that a choice was being made, and
Nickels et al. (1992) conceptualized choice as confounded with actual control, where
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actual control involved the presence of options that affect, contribute, or impact an
event - a definition which could also apply to choice or to situations of no actual control.
Therefore, conceptualizing choice as separate from actual control might produce findings
that emphasize the importance of all three independent variables (i.e., actual control,
choice, and predicted outcome) in determining feelings of influence over an outcome.

Confidence and Prediction
Hypothesis 3. Inconsistent with Cramer and Perreault (2005), Langlois et al.

(2002, Experiment 2), and Nickels et al. (1992), the present findings only partly confirm
the hypothesis that, regardless of actual control and choice, in comparison to participants
with No-Prediction, individuals with prediction (either Predicted-Success or PredictedFailure) will feel significantly more confident in their ability to predict their outcome.
Indeed, when the participants were informed that they would perform the crossout task
for 2 minutes, they felt more confident about how long they would perform the task, even
though they felt less able to predict how long they would actually perform it.
However, when the participants were informed that they would perform the
crossout task for 20 minutes, they felt less confident about how long they would perform
the task, even though they felt better able to predict how long they would actually perform
it. Furthermore, individuals who were not at all informed about their outcome felt more
confident (rather than less confident, as hypothesized) but less able to predict how long
they would perform the cross-out task.
In other words, when individuals were informed that they would perform the
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crossout task for 20 minutes, they felt they could predict it would occur but did not feel
confident that they would actually have to perform it. Furthermore, whether the
participants were informed that they would receive a positive outcome or were not
informed at all about their outcome, they did not feel they could predict what would
occur, but felt quite confident that they would actually have to experience the outcome
received. These findings seem to indicate that individuals felt ambivalent about what to
expect, whether or not they had been informed about their outcome. Perhaps the
participants had some doubts about whether the experimenter would actually follow
through with the implementation of the outcomes.
Also disconfirming Hypothesis 3 was the finding that, when the participants made
a voluntary choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ they felt: (a) more confident about how
long they would perform the cross-out task when they knew it would be for a short
2-minute period; and (b) less confident about how long they would perform the task when
they knew that it would be for a long 20-minute period. It appears that, when choices
were made based on options that were external to one’s own personal characteristics
(i.e., ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’), it was easier for individuals to believe that they would actually
engage in a positive outcome but more difficult to believe that they would have to engage
in a negative outcome. In other words, when choosing between options that are not based
on one’s own personal characteristics, individuals seem to feel that the experimenter
could not possibly follow through on an outcome so time-consuming as a 20-minute
crossout task. Perhaps the participants doubted that the experimenter would follow
through on the long time period, but more easily believed that the experimenter would
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implement the short time period.
Furthermore, when the participants made an involuntary choice between ‘blue’ or
‘non-blue’ based on their own true eye colour, they felt: (a) more confident about how
long they would perform the cross-out task while not at all being informed about their
outcome, and (b) less confident about how long they would perform the task while being
informed that it would only be for a short 2-minute period. It appears that, when choices
were made between options that were based on one’s own physical characteristics
(i.e., ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ eyes), it was easier for participants to believe that they would
actually engage in a task they could not predict but more difficult to believe that they
would have to engage in a task for a short time period.
In other words, when choosing between options based on one’s own physical
characteristics, individuals may have more difficulty believing that the experimenter
would actually follow through on a positive outcome. The participants may have
questioned whether the experimenter would follow through on a predicted outcome based
on a reason as personal as one’s own true eye colour. It did, however, seem easier for the
participants to believe that the experimenter would follow through on an unpredicted
outcome. The element of unpredictability seems to have increased the participants’ belief
that the experimenter would actually follow through with an unknown performance task.

Frustration and Helplessness
Hypothesis 4. The present findings disconfirmed the hypothesis that, under

conditions of Predicted-Success, participants with Actual-Control will feel less helpless
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over their outcome than those individuals who have No-Actual-Control (Cramer &
Perreault, 2005). Indeed, predicting a short time period significantly decreased feelings
of frustration, but feelings of helplessness were not affected.
Specifically, when presented with options that made a difference in the outcome,
individuals who knew they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes felt more
frustrated (but not significantly more helpless) about their outcome than individuals who:
(a) were informed that they would perform the task for only 2 minutes, or (b) were not
informed about their outcome. Furthermore, when options made a difference, individuals
who were not at all informed about their outcome felt more frustrated (but not more
helpless) than individuals who knew they would perform the crossout task for 2 minutes.
In other words, the anticipation of a positive outcome decreased feelings o f frustration. In
fact, when options made a difference in the outcome, frustration was highest when the
worst outcome was anticipated and frustration was lowest when the best outcome was
expected.
Interestingly, this finding also held true in situations o f No-Actual-Control.
Specifically, participants who had options that made no difference felt more frustrated
when they knew they would perform the crossout task for 20 minutes but felt less
frustrated when they predicted the task would only last 2 minutes. In other words, when
options made no difference, individuals who were informed of a failed outcome felt
more frustrated than individuals who were informed of a successful outcome.
In short, regardless of choice, predicting a positive outcome seems to decrease
feelings of frustration both in situations in which the options provided made a difference
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in the outcome and in situations in which options made no difference in the outcome. In
other words, situations of both Actual-Control and No-Actual-Control decreased the
participants’ feelings of frustration when a positive outcome was predicted, and increased
participants’ feelings of frustration when a negative outcome was predicted.
The fact that feelings of helplessness were not affected by any of the independent
variables is not entirely surprising considering the inconsistencies reported in the
literature8. For instance, whereas some research has found that outcome predictability is
not needed in order for participants to feel less helpless (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002,

Experiment 2; Nickels et al., 1992, Experiment 2), other studies report that ratings of
helplessness decrease when Actual-Control is combined with Predicted-Success
(e.g., Cramer and Perreault, 2005, Experiment 1). Furthermore, whereas Cramer
et al. (1997) reported that helplessness ratings decreased with Actual-Control independent
of decreases with Predicted-Success, Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 1) found no
significant results at all for helplessness ratings.

Hypothesis 5. Inconsistent with Langlois et al. (2002, Experiment 2), the present

findings disconfirmed the hypothesis that, regardless of predicted outcome, participants
with Voluntary-Choice will feel less helpless over their outcome, but only when
Voluntary-Choice is accompanied by Actual-Control. In fact, helplessness and frustration

8
It is important to note that, in studies examining the reconceptualization of
control, feelings of helplessness (based on the temporary and immediate effect of a short
lived environmental manipulation) rather than learned helplessness (based on
internal/external, stable/unstable, and global/specific attributions) have been assessed.
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scores were not at all affected by any type of choice nor by the combined effects of actual
control with choice (cf. Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Instead, the combination of
actual control (or lack of actual control) with the knowledge that a positive outcome will
occur decreased the amount of perceived frustration felt for the outcome. Ratings of
frustration also decreased when actual control was combined with lack of predictability.
In short, feelings of frustration were affected in situations that combined variables of
actual control with variables of predicted outcome.
The finding that feelings of helplessness did not decrease when Actual-Control
and Voluntary-Choice conditions were combined further demonstrates the inconsistent
effects of the independent variables on ratings of helplessness. Whereas some studies
have demonstrated that helplessness ratings significantly decrease when choice is
combined with actual control conditions (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002, Experiment 2), other
studies have reported non-significant effects for helplessness ratings (e.g., Langlois et al.
2002, Experiment 1; Cramer & Perreault, 2005, Experiment 2), or have demonstrated that
helplessness clearly decreases with increased actual control (e.g., Burger & Arkin, 1980;
Nickels et al., 1992; Tiggeman & Winefeld, 1987).
Partly consistent with learned helplessness theory, which predicts that a lack of
actual control is sufficient to produce emotional deficits (Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman,
1975), the present findings showed that the combination of lack of actual control with
predicted failure increased the participants’s ratings of frustration over their outcome.
Inconsistent with learned helplessness theory, however, was the finding that ratings of
frustration also increased in actual control conditions (combined with Predicted-Failure or
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No-Prediction). Furthermore, lack of actual control was not sufficient to produce higher
ratings of helplessness. In fact, helplessness scores neither increased nor decreased with
variations of actual control, predicted outcome, and choice.
Langlois et al. (2002) admit that the new conceptualization has been inconsistent
at uncovering significant differences in helplessness. It has also been suggested that
future research consider additional variables such as awareness of choice (Cramer
et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002) in order to further understand helplessness in the
context of the new conceptualization. However, varying methodologies and operational
definitions of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome variables are likely
responsible for inconsistencies among the studies that have examined helplessness.
Indeed, when comparing individual studies that have examined the new
conceptualization, there are inconsistencies in helplessness findings (Table 3;
Appendix G). For instance, whereas Nickels et al. (1992, Experiment 2) found that
helplessness ratings decreased in conditions of actual control regardless of prediction,
Cramer and Perreault (2005, Experiment 1) found that helplessness ratings decreased
when actual control was combined with predicted success. However, an overview of all
of these studies demonstrates that each o f the actual control, choice, and predicted
outcome variables, whether considered separately or in combination, can have significant
effects on helplessness ratings (Table 3; Appendix G). Additional research is necessary
to further clarify how levels of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome affect
feelings of helplessness (e.g., future studies might consider using a longer scale such as
Beck’s hopelessness scale).
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Perceived Contribution and Motivation to Participate

Although no hypotheses were related to the participants’ feelings of contribution
and motivation to participate, it is important to mention that these feelings did not seem
to play a significantly important role in the present study. Specifically, the participants’
mean scores for perceived contribution and motivation to participate were moderately
high, whether their options made a difference in the outcome or not. Overall, the
independent variables did not affect individuals’ feelings of contribution and motivation
to participate in the study. Based on their mean scores, it can be concluded that the
participants felt they contributed and were motivated to participate in the present study,
regardless of the experimental condition in which they were randomly assigned.

Optimism Toward and Desire fo r a Positive Outcome

Although no hypotheses were related to the participants’ feelings of optimism and
desire to experience a positive outcome, the findings should be briefly discussed as they
pertain to the present study. Specifically, when the participants made a choice between
‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ they felt significantly more optimistic about receiving a positive
outcome than individuals who made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ based on their
own true eye colour. It appears that making a choice between options that are based on
internal characteristics such as eye colour, as opposed to choosing between more external
options such as ‘salt’ or ‘pepper,’ decreased feelings o f optimism toward receiving a
positive outcome.
In other words, feelings of optimism toward a positive outcome seemed to
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increase based on the type of choice being made. When a choice was made based on
one’s own personal characteristics, a positive outcome seemed less likely. Feelings of
optimism were only affected when individuals were presented with some sort of choice.
Furthermore, when the participants could predict their outcome (whether the
outcome was negative or positive), they wanted to experience the short time period more
so than those individuals who could not predict their outcome at all. In other words,
desire for a positive outcome was stronger when the participants knew what their
outcome would be, whether the predicted outcome was positive or negative. Knowing
the outcome increased the desire to get a positive outcome. Getting a positive outcome
did not seem quite as important to those individuals who did not know what to expect.
Also, the participants’ desire for a positive outcome increased when they had
actual control with a voluntary choice, or actual control with no choice. Having actual
control while choosing between options that are based on personal characteristics
(i.e., eye colour) decreased individuals’ desire to receive the short time period. In other
words, individuals who wanted a positive outcome the least were those who had made an
involuntary choice.
Furthermore, lack of actual control combined with involuntary choice increased
the participants’ desire to receive the short time period in comparison to those individuals
who had no actual control with either voluntary choice or no choice. In other words, the
participants whose choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’ made no difference at all in the
outcome wanted a positive outcome more than individuals whose choice between ‘salt’ or
‘pepper’ (or whose choice was made by someone else) made no difference.
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In short, choosing between options that both matter and are based on
characteristics that are external to one’s own personal characteristics increased feelings of
optimism about receiving a positive outcome. Furthermore, the factors that significantly
increased one’s desire to receive the positive outcome were: (a) being able to predict the
outcome; (b) the combination of actual control with either voluntary choice or no choice;
and (c) the combination of no actual control with involuntary choice.

Social Psychological Applications

Although the new conceptualization has not yet been examined in non-laboratory
contexts, the present findings can be quite important in addressing issues such as patient
response to ineffective treatment options. For instance, regarding the finding that one’s
actions must make a difference in order to feel control, Langlois et al. (2002) described a
a scenario in which a cancer patient was given the choice of receiving a new drug that
might either completely eradicate the liver tumour (positive outcome), or might not at all
have an effect on the tumour (negative outcome). Langlois et al. (2002) explained that
what was important for perceiving control was not making the choice itself, but the
understanding that one’s choice would actually have an effect on one’s own health.
According to Langlois et al. (2002), therefore, it is not simply making a choice that
permits an individual to feel control over their situation, but the fact that one’s choice will
make at least some difference in the outcome.
As an extension of Langlois et al. (2002), the present findings demonstrated that
experiencing a combination of both actual control and choice is particularly important
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when a failed outcome is predicted. Whereas individuals responded with lower ratings of
influence and responsibility when they were put in situations of choiceless control, the
lowest ratings of influence occurred when choiceless control was combined with
predicted failure.
In returning to Langlois et al.’s (2002) scenario, therefore, it seems that the best
way of increasing patients’ feelings of influence over their own health is to let them make
their own choices between options that make a difference in their treatment - before they
are informed that their drug treatment failed. Therefore, when a failed treatment outcome
is predicted, the most important thing for a patient’s positive perceptions over that
outcome is who is making the choice between the options that matter —whether the
treatment option was chosen based on the patient’s age or gender (i.e., InvoluntaryChoice), or based on characteristics external to the individual such as drug name
(i.e., Voluntary-Choice). As long as the patients (rather than family members or health
professionals) choose between treatment options that make a difference, then their
feelings of influence over a failed treatment outcome will be higher.
Situations of choiceless control combined with predicted failure can also present
themselves in the realm of romantic relationships. For example, many individuals
actively search for a romantic partner who is caring and interesting (desired outcome)
rather than someone who is self-absorbed and dull (undesired outcome). On the one
hand, when a dating service sets up a blind date for a client (i.e., the blind date is chosen
between one of two people who could end up being either caring or self-absorbed), the
client will feel less influence over the situation when he or she finds out that the partner is
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self-absorbed. On the other hand, when the client chooses one of two dating partners who
ends up being dull company, then the client will feel more influence over the undesired
outcome. As long as the clients (rather than the dating service) choose between options
(i.e., dating partners) that make a difference, then their feelings of influence over a failed
dating outcome will be higher.
Similar scenarios can occur in the workplace. For example, many staff persons
prefer to work on engaging projects that end up making a profit (desired outcome) rather
than handle projects that make no profit at all (undesired outcome). On the one hand,
when a senior manager chooses a project for his staff members (i.e., chosen between one
o f two projects that could end up being profitable or not), the staff members will feel less
influence over their situation when they find out that the project has been unprofitable.
On the other hand, when the staff members have choosen a work project that ends up
being unprofitable, they will feel more influence over the undesired outcome. As long as
the staff members (rather than the manager) choose between project options that make a
difference, then their feelings of influence over a failed outcome will be higher.
Indeed, increased feelings of influence over an undesired outcome can have
beneficial consequences. For example, if an entrepreneur chose to develop a company
that ended up failing, then feelings of influence over that past failure will likely affect his
or her future choices. In other words, some individuals who feel they have influenced a
failed outcome perceive their situation as a learning experience that has provided them
with a hint about what does not work. Past failures might even increase one’s drive or
desire for success, especially for those individuals who are highly motivated to succeed in
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their endeavours. The expression ‘paying one’s dues’ refers to the idea that one must
experience difficulties and failures before eventually experiencing success.
However, increased feelings of influence over an undesired outcome can also have
negative consequences. For example, in their experience of illusion of control, some
gamblers who feel they have influenced a failed game of chance might develop
problematic behaviours. In other words, motivation from past failures can have different
consequences based on contextual and individual differences. Future research might
attempt to uncover such differences by manipulating the type or number of choices made,
or by examining the type or level of motivation that leads individuals to make certain
choices both before and after the discovery of a failed outcome.

New Directions fo r Future Research
A Positive Psychology Framework

Historically, the learned helplessness literature has emphasized responses to
aversive situations, and interest in responses to positive or enjoyable situations has been
comparatively minimal (Lefcourt, 1991b). However, as societal concern about good
character increases (Hunter, 2000), researchers seem to be moving away from traditional
views and conceptualizations concerning learned helplessness and other control-related
concepts. In fact, there has been a growing interest in positive psychology which
examines positive personality characteristics and positive affective responses to stressors
(Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
For instance, in the literature concerned with the link between stress and
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personality characteristics, there is evidence implicating positive mood, humour, and
optimism (Lefcourt, 1991b). Furthermore, it is becoming easier to study the effects of
positive moods because the measurement tools appropriate for that type of study have
increased in variety and number.
In concert with the growing interest in positive psychology, Peterson and
Seligman (2004) have introduced a classification of character strengths that is intended
“to reclaim the study of character and virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry”
(p. 3). Peterson and Seligman (2004) present many conceptual and empirical tools that
can help researchers focus on psychological health (i.e., strengths of wisdom and
knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence) rather than
psychological illness - a negative framework that still pervades much of the current
psychological literature. Other researchers have examined the role of positive situations,
perspective, and coping styles in moderating stress. For example, Lefcourt and
colleagues have focused on stress-moderating variables such as humour (e.g., Lefcourt,
2001; Lefcourt, Davidson, Prkachin, & Mills, 1997; Martin & Lefcourt, 1983).
Divergent from the positive psychology movement, the new conceptualization of
control has focused its research on aversive events or boring motor tasks. Despite the
distinction between predicted success and predicted failure conditions, both types of
predicted events nevertheless lie on a continuum from least aversive or least boring
(i.e., predicted success) to most aversive or most boring (i.e., predicted failure). The fact
that unpredictability led to higher ratings of perceived control, influence, and
responsibility in the present study leads one to question how the manipulation of
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predicted outcome conditions could have demonstrated itself to be so unimportant in
previous studies (e.g., Cramer et al., 1997; Langlois et al., 2002; Nickels et al., 1992). Is
the importance of unpredictability (and predicted failure) simply an artefact that appears
when the concepts of actual control, choice, and predicted outcome are completely
separated? Further research is needed in order to determine whether the present findings
occurred due to the excessive dissection of a simple concept, or due to the necessary and
appropriate separation of the components of a larger control-related construct.
According to Peterson (1991), an adequate investigation of explanatory style for
good events should measure both positive and negative life events, as well as the good
and bad moods that may follow as a consequence. Similarly, examining how individuals
respond to positive outcomes as well as negative outcomes might help proponents of the
new conceptualization determine the relevance and appropriateness of separately
manipulating each of the actual control, choice, and predicted outcome variables in a
variety of life contexts.

A Cross-Cultural Framework

The traditional control literature has seldom conducted any type of cultural
analyses. This has been so despite the findings reported in the cross-cultural literature
which explain that people’s tendencies to respond to events differ based on cultural
context. Peterson (1991) acknowledges the possibility that the tendency to respond to
negative events shows historical and cultural boundaries. This may be of particular
concern to the people of Western societies who value individuality and who try to control
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and predict the events with which they are faced (Baumeister, 1986; Weisz, Rothbaum, &
Blackburn, 1984). Similarly, socialization into a particular culture might entail culturespecific responses to events in which control-related variables are presented.
In the Western world, choice has been considered both a human right and an
essential human need (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Individual choice (as a means of
enjoying life) has become a dominant cultural value in much of the modem Western
world, particularly since the rise of the ‘me’ generation in the 1970s (Ahuvia, 2001). The
North American assumption that people will benefit from having choice is so ingrained
that psychologists have seldom paused to investigate the more general applicability of
these findings (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999).
However, personal choice is not considered beneficial in a ll parts of the world.
Whereas values like ‘uniqueness’ are stronger in Western societies (e.g., Markus &
Kitayama, 1991b), different values such as ‘honouring parents’ are particularly strong in
Eastern societies (e.g., Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990). Iyengar and Lepper (1999)
found that personal choice generally enhanced motivation more for American
independent selves than for Asian interdependent selves. It was also reported that Anglo
American children showed more intrinsic motivation when they made their own choices
than when choices were made for them by others (whether authority figures or peers). In
contrast, Asian American children showed more intrinsic motivation when choices were
made for them by trusted authority figures or peers.
An influential cultural analysis conducted by Markus and Kitayama (1991a,
1991b) seems to shed light on the mechanisms that might underlie these differences.
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Because North Americans and Western Europeans possess a model of the self as
fundamentally independent, making choices provides an opportunity to express one’s
internal attributes and to assert one’s autonomy. In contrast, most non-Westem
(particularly East Asian) cultures possess a model of self as fundamentally
interdependent, whereby the exercise of personal choice might threaten the harmony and
belongingness with their reference group. In cultures that value interdependence, choice
is often made by and for close others (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997).
Furthermore, the tendency to seek variety of choices depends in part on cultural
assumptions of choice and uniqueness (Kim & Drolet, 2003). Variety-seeking is the
tendency for a person to switch away from a choice that was made on a previous occasion
(Kahn, Kalwani, & Morrison, 1982; Ratner, Kahn, & Kahneman, 1999), and it appears to
be commonplace in North American culture (see McAlister & Pessemier, 1982 for a
review). For example, Kim and Drolet (2003) found that participants from an
individualist culture (i.e., United States) tended to vary their choice, whereas participants
from a collectivist culture (i.e., Korea) did not.
Because the actor is seen as the main cause of behaviour in Western cultures, it
could be assumed that a sense of personal control is more important in the West than it is
in the East (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). In fact, control is so important to Westerners that
they often fail to distinguish between objectively controllable and uncontrollable events,
tend to perceive more control than they actually have (Langer, 1975), and mistakenly
report high levels of predictability of events (see Presson & Benassi, 1996 for a review).
Cross-cultural research suggests that a sense of perceived personal control is more
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important for North Americans than it is for East Asians (Ji et ai., 2000). Perceived
control over external events is stronger for European Americans than it is for East Asian
and Hispanic Americans or for Asians (e.g., O’Connor & Shimizu, 2002; Sastry & Ross,
1998; Weisz et al., 1984). The evidence implies that North Americans and East Asians
respond differently to being given control (Ji et al., 2000). The protective effects of
perceived control seem most evident in individualistic Western cultures (O’Connor &
Shimizu, 2002).
Despite the fact that cultural context tends to promote characteristic response
patterns even among people who have different personalities (Triandis, 1994), some
researchers have investigated within-culture variation in values and behaviour tendencies.
For example, in their cross-cultural study of organizational behaviour, Brockner and Chen
(1996) found that some Chinese students ‘bucked the trend’ and responded in a more
idiocentric way. Similarly, some American students deviated from the group norms and
were more allocentric in their responses to negative feedback. Schaubroeck, Lam, and
Xie (2000) found similar results with regard to the role ofjob control in helping workers
cope with job demands.
The cross-cultural differences reported in the literature could affect the
generalizability of the new conceptualization of control. For instance, differences might
emerge between European-Canadian and Asian-Canadian ratings of influence,
responsibility, and perceived control or; differences might emerge among the individuals
of one particular cultural group. If the availability of actual control, or choice (or varietyseeking), or predictability is indeed less relevant for individuals from more socially
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interdependent cultures, then proponents of the new conceptualization of control might be
faced with the challenge of revising (contextualizing) their reconceptualization of
traditional control and learned helplessness theories. Based on previous cross-cultural
research, the new conceptualization of control might require a modification that includes
an examination of those individuals who fundamentally value fate, duty, and
interdependence, as well as those individuals who fundamentally value choice, personal
control, and independence.

Conclusion

In similarity to the subsequent investigators of locus of control who have
developed a number of domain-specific measures to increase the power of their
predictions for specific life areas (e.g., Miller, Lefcourt, & Ware, 1983), traditional
control theorists have adopted a wide variety of assessment tools, methodologies, and
conceptualizations that describe and explain how humans respond to life events.
Consequently, there exists much discordance in the literature, particularly with regard to
the effects of control. Further complicating matters are the numerous studies that have
combined and confounded concepts that are qualitatively different from one another
(i.e., actual control; perceived control; choice; prediction).
Traditional control researchers often focus on narrow literatures, which gives
them a sense of coherence that is false. Lefcourt (1991b) acknowledges this phenomenon
by explaining that: “Parochialism is comforting in the same way as religious
fundamentalism, providing simplicity where complexity could reign” (p. 34). Indeed,
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narrow theoretical conceptualizations do have some comfort value. However, much more
value can be gained by stepping “beyond the confines of one’s own research model to
other empirical areas” (Lefcourt, 1991b, p. 35).
For example, the original learned helplessness model hypothesized that
uncontrollable events produced a state of helplessness that was characterized by different
types of difficulties (Maier & Seligman, 1976; Seligman, 1975). Whereas induced
helplessness sometimes involved long-lasting difficulties, or pervasive difficulties, or the
loss of self-esteem, other times, induced helplessness did not affect these variables in the
same way at all. It is when these three sources of contradictory evidence were taken
together that explanatory style (i.e., dimensions of intemality, stability, and globality) was
presented as a means for accounting for the variance in the findings pertaining to the
original helplessness model (Peterson, 1991).
Furthermore, psychology often tries very hard to distinguish one concept or
variable from another when the individuals that are studied often do not (Lefcourt, 1991b;
Peterson, 1991). For example, Peterson (1991) describes a study which examined
students’ descriptions of bad events they had experienced in the recent past. These
descriptions were examined along a number of dimensions that were deemed important
by various theorists (e.g., many dimensions involving the event itself, the ‘one major
cause’ of the event in question, the ‘one major consequence’ of the event, and one’s
coping with the event).
An unexpectedly simple conclusion was drawn from the results from which a
clear two-factor solution emerged. One factor was labelled the ‘Big Deal’ way of
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perceiving events. The other factor was labelled the ‘Predict and Control’ way of looking
at events. The ‘Predict and Control’ factor included ratings of intemality of the cause
plus all the ratings of predictability and controllability, regardless of whether the rating in
question was made with respect to the event, its cause, or its consequence. This finding is
incongruent with the reformulation of learned helplessness theory (cf. Abramson et al.,
1978; Peterson & Seligman, 1984).
Indeed, those individuals included in our research studies do not always
“segregate their thoughts as neatly as our theoretical disagreements assume” (Peterson,
1991, p. 3). In the present study, despite previous research supporting the benefits of
separating predictability from actual control and choice (e.g., Langlois et al., 2002;
Nickels et al., 2005), the participants became significantly confused when actual control
and predicted outcome conditions were presented incongruently. This was demonstrated
in the fact that participants made more manipulation check errors when they experienced
situations of actual control without prediction, and when situations of prediction were
presented without actual control. In comparison, fewer manipulation check errors were
made when the participants experienced situations of actual control with prediction, and
no actual control without prediction.
In other words, the participants had difficulty conceptualizing actual control as
separate from predicted outcome, and confusion arose particularly when these two
variables were presented incongruently. This result is surprising when it is compared to
previous findings reported by proponents of the new conceptualization of control.
Perhaps individuals conceptualize actual control and predictability as yoked when choice
is completely extricated from the actual control variable. This interpretation can neither
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be confirmed nor disconfirmed until further studies are conducted which further test the
reconceptualization.
Furthermore, the generalizability of the new conceptualization to real life
situations remains unclear. Studies researching the reconceptualization of control have
employed experimental designs that tend to limit the generalizability of the findings to
real life settings. In the present study, for example, the participants made relatively
passive choices between dichotomous options that were linked to participation in either a
successful or a failed outcome. Furthermore, in the fact that the outcomes would be
short-lived and non-threatening, the experimental situation may have induced a somewhat
trivial context.
In real life situations, however, options are not so obviously dichotomous, choices
usually involve much more effort, and outcomes often have a much deeper effect on an
individual’s well-being. For example, despite the fact that individuals who have
combined medication with lifestyle changes tend to experience more successful health
outcomes, many cardiac patients often prefer to simply take medication rather than make
any significant changes in their diet or level of physical activity. Health-relevant choices
are likely much more important for our sense of well-being than choices that affect less
relevant outcomes such as amount of time participating in a non-threatening motor task.
The importance and the value we place upon the option-outcome relationship
(or lack thereof) might determine how we respond to choices. How do people respond
when they are faced with choices they value as particularly relevant to their well-being?
Individual differences variables such as locus of control orientation might be important in
further understanding the effects of control, choice, and prediction on perceptions of
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control. Whereas some individuals may prefer to take control and make their own
choices in important situations (i.e., internal locus of control), others may prefer to cede
control and avoid making choices in situations that are particularly relevant for their well
being (i.e., external locus of control) (see Burger, 1989 for a review).
Studies examining the reconceptualization of control have tended to rely on paper
and pencil assessments of the dependent variables. However, additional information
about such effects might be gained by using other types of assessments as well. For
example, the examination of physiological (e.g., blood pressure) or behavioural responses
(e.g., amount of time it took for a choice to be made) to varying levels of choice, control,
and predictability might provide additional information regarding individuals’ responses
to stressful events.
Furthermore, assessments of the dependent variables have typically been
presented immediately after the experimental manipulations have taken place. In many
life contexts, however, we do not often see the repercussions of our actions until some
time after the choice has been made (either for us or by us). There is often a delay before
we gain information about the successful or failed outcomes that have resulted from our
(or others’) choices. In fact, whereas some situations can remain unpredictable over
extensive periods of time (e.g., a delayed impact of unhealthy habits on physical health),
other situations can involve unawareness that an outcome has occurred (e.g., no
knowledge of a smoking-related cancerous tumour on the lungs). Yet despite our
unawareness or our uncertainty of future outcomes, we continue to make choices.
An individual’s previous experience with (or exposure to) various combinations
of choice, control, and predictability may provide important information about one’s
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possible reactions to stressful events. For example, it is well documented that individuals
who experience consistently stressful situations over a long period of time tend to have
lower immune system functioning. Similarly, the responses of individuals who have
often experienced situations of choiceless control (e.g., growing up in an abusive home)
will likely be different than the responses of those who have seldom experienced similar
situations.
What might be important for testing the generalizability of the reconceptualization
o f control is to investigate its application to areas such as medical treatment practices
(e.g., treatment follow-through), safety behaviours (e.g., wearing seatbelts), educational
programming practices (e.g., academic achievement), training and supervisory practices
(e.g., worker satisfaction), employee recruitment and selection (e.g., employee retention),
and coaching practices (e.g., athletic performance) in various cross-cultural contexts. As
researchers and practitioners begin to show more interest in a positive psychology
framework, and as the world becomes more globally integrated, it will become
particularly important to investigate both the generalizability and the practical
applicability of the new conceptualization of control.
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CONSENT FORM
As part of my dissertation research, I (Lynn Perreault) invite you to participate in my study (Department of
Psychology, University of Windsor). If you have any questions or concerns about my research, please feel free to
contact my research supervisor, Dr. Ken Cramer (253-3000, ext. 2239, or E-mail kcramer@uwindsor.ca).
PURPOSE O F T H E S TU D Y : I am researching the effects of motor skills performance.
PRO CEDURES: If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked (1) to practice a motor skill task
for 1-minute, and (2) to complete the exercise booklet that is included with this form. The total participation time is
a maximum of 20 minutes. If you would like a copy of the research findings once they become available, please
include your E-mail address underneath your signature at the bottom of this page.
P O T E N T IA L R ISK S & D IS C O M FO R TS : None.
P O T E N T IA L B E N E FITS : This study will provide you with an opportunity to explore your motor skills while
gaining experience about what it is like to participate in a psychological study. By participating in this study, you will
also be entered in a cash draw.
P A Y M E N T FO R P A R T IC IP A T IO N : Your name will be entered in a $50 cash draw.
C O N F ID E N T IA L IT Y : Your participation in this study is anonymous. Do NOT write your name on the booklet.

P A R T IC IP A T IO N & W IT H D R A W A L : Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You may
exercise the option of removing your data from the study, and you may refuse to answer any questions. Also, you
can end your participation in this study at any time without penalty or explanation.
R IG H T S O F R ESEA R C H P A R T IC IP A N T S : You may withdraw your consent at any time and discontinue
participation without penalty. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the University
of Windsors Research Ethics Board. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant contact:
Research Ethics Co-Ordinator, University o f Windsor, 253-3000 (x39I6), E-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca

Please sign the Consent Form at the bottom of this page, detach it and return it to me immediately prior to
your participation. You may retain the top portion for your records.
T H A N K Y O U !©

B A L L O T FO R SOS D R A W :
I understand the above information and agree to participate in Lynn’s study examining motor skills performance. I
also understand that the overall results of this study may be published at a later date, and that my identity will be kept
confidential. I have been offered a copy of this consent form to keep for my own records.

Printed name

Signature
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INSTRUCTION BOOKLET
DO NOT OPEN YOUR BOOKLET.
PLEASE WAIT QUIETLY FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□DO

□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
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Appendix B 1:
Experimental condition #1:
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (salt)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer o f the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

r------------------

SALT

!

PEPPER
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B2:
Experimental condition #2:
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (pepper)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

~i

i
1

SALT

PEPPER
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B3:
Experimental condition #1 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (salt)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer o f the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

PEPPER

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B4:
Experimental condition #2 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (pepper)
or
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

PEPPER

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B5:
Experimental condition #3:
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two eye colours (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

~i

BLUE

NON-BLUE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227

At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B6:
Experimental condition #4:
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two eye colours (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

BLUE

NON-BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix B7:
Experimental condition #3 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two eye colours (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

“ i

NON-BLUE

BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B8:
Experimental condition #4 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue)
or
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two eye colours (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one eye colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

NON-BLUE

BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix B9:
Experimental condition #5:
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right’
comer of this page.

“

LEFT

i

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the word ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you were assigned the word ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix BIO:
Experimental condition #6:
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (left)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right’
comer of this page.

~i

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the word ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you were assigned the word ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B 11:
Experimental condition #5 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer o f this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the word ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you were assigned the word ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B 12:
Experimental condition #6 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (left)
or
Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer of this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the word ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you were assigned the word ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

256

Appendix B 13:
Experimental condition #7:
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction(salt or pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

!

SALT

!

PEPPER
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Remember that your choice of word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B 14:
Experimental condition #7 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction condition(pepper or salt)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

261

IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

PEPPER
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Remember that your choice of word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

264

Appendix B15:
Experimental condition #8:
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction(blue or non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

BLUE

NON-BLUE
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Remember that your choice o f colour word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B16:
Experimental condition #8 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction(non-blue or blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to a different time period
than the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer o f the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

NON-BLUE

r

BLUE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271

Remember that your choice o f colour word
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... N E X T P A G E
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Appendix B17:
Experimental condition #9:
Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction(right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TU R N T H E PAGE T O C O M P LE TE TH E SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right
comer of this page.

~ !

LEFT

RIGHT
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Appendix B18:
Experimental condition #9 (counterbalanced):
Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction(left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes a difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to a different time period
than the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer of this page.

“ i

LEFT

RIGHT
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes a difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280

Appendix B19:
Experimental condition #10:
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success(salt & pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead
to the same time period as the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

~i

SALT

PEPPER
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B20:
Experimental condition #10 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success(pepper & salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead
to the same time period as the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

PEPPER
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B21:
Experimental condition #11:
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (salt & pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead
to the same time period as the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

SALT

PEPPER
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B22:
Experimental condition #11 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (pepper & salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead
to the same time period as the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

PEPPER

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SALT

295

At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘pepper’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period

If you chose the word ‘salt’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B23:
Experimental condition #12:
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

~ i

BLUE

NON-BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue5,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B24:
Experimental condition #12 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success (non-blue & blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TU R N TH E PAGE TO C O M P LE TE T H E SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

NON-BLUE

BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B25:
Experimental condition #13:
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer o f the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

BLUE

NON-BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B26:
Experimental condition #13 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure (non-blue & blue)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

309

IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

n

NON-BLUE

BLUE
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you chose the word ‘non-blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you chose the word ‘blue’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B27:
Experimental condition #14:
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (right & left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right’
comer of this page.

~i

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B28:
Experimental condition #14 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success (left & right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer o f this page.

r ----------------I

LEFT

!

RIGHT

I
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a SHORT time period.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a for a SHORT time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B29:
Experimental condition #15:
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (right & left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right’
comer o f this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a for a LONG time period.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B30:
Experimental condition #15 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure (left & right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer of this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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At this point,
we can tell you how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘left’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a LONG time period.

If you were assigned the bottom ‘right’,
then you will work at the cross-out task
for a for a LONG time period.

... N E X T P A G E
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Appendix B31:
Experimental condition #16:
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction (salt & pepper)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘salt’ or ‘pepper’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘salt’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘pepper’.

PLEASE TU R N T H E PAGE TO C O M P L E T E T H E SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer o f the page.

!

SALT

!

PEPPER
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Remember that your choice of word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... N E X T P A G E
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Appendix B32:
Experimental condition #16 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction (pepper & salt)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two words (‘pepper’ or ‘salt’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘pepper’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘salt’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one word.

Please choose one of these words
by tearing off that comer of the page.

~ i

PEPPER
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SALT

Remember that your choice of word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B33:
Experimental condition #17:
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction (blue & non-blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘blue’ or ‘non-blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘non-blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your true eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

~ i

BLUE

NON-BLUE
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Remember that your choice of colour word
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B34:
Experimental condition #17 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction (non-blue & blue)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

You must make a choice between
two colour words (‘non-blue’ or ‘blue’).

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that your choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the word ‘non-blue’ will lead to the same time period
as the word ‘blue’.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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Each comer of the page contains one colour word.

Please choose the word that represents your tme eye colour
by tearing off that comer of the page.

n

NON-BLUE

BLUE
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Remember that vour choice of colour word
m/

makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B35:
Experimental condition #18:
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction (right)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘right’
comer of this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix B36:
Experimental condition #18 (counterbalanced):
No-Actual-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction (left)
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IMPORTANT!!
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

A choice between two options
has been made for you.

This choice is important in determining whether
you will work at the cross-out task for
a short period (2 minutes) or a long period (20 minutes).

You should also know that this choice
makes no difference in the time period you receive.
That is, the one option will lead to the same time period
as the other option.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO COMPLETE THE SURVEY.
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A page comer has been pre-selected for you.

Please tear off the bottom ‘left’
comer of this page.

n

LEFT

RIGHT
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Remember that this pre-selected choice
makes no difference in how long
you will complete the cross-out task.

Before learning your time period,
please complete the brief questionnaire
that appears on the following page.

... NEXT PAGE
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Appendix C:
Script for Instructions
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INSTRUCTIONS
1.

[B E D IR E C T IV E ] M y name is Lynn. I'm a Ph.D. student in the Psychology Department, and
I'm here today to conduct some very important research on the effects o f fatigue on motor skills
performance. This w ill take about 20 minutes total, and I really need all the help I can get.

2.

It's very important that you remain quiet. Every one must listen very carefully.

3.

I w ill compensate you for your time.

4.

[S H O W 50$ B ILLJ I f you help me out, you w ill be entered in a draw for 50$ cash.

5.

[D IS T R IB U T E CO NSENT FO R M ] Y our ballots are being distributed.

6.

M ake sure to read the consent form very' carefully, and then return the bottom portion to me.
This way, I can include your ballot in the draw for the 50$. I f you would like to know the results
o f my study, please w rite your e-m ail address on the ballot as w ell.

7.

A re there any questions?

8.

[A L L BALLO TS W ILL B E PIC K ED U P] Are there any ballots left?

9.

It's very important that you remain quiet throughout the entire study. Do N O T share your
answers w ith anyone. This w ill make sure that your answers stay confidential. W hen you
receive your study booklet, do N O T look inside until I say it's time. Please follow' my
instructions to the 'T '

10. [D IS T R IB U T E BOOKLETS TO FEM A LES FIR S T] Do N O T look inside the booklet yet!
11. [-D IS T R IB U T E BOOKLETS TO M A LES-] Reminder - no peeking yet!
12.

Before we begin, I would like to give you an opportunity to practice the cross-out task that you
w ill later be asked to perform as part o f the study. On the front o f your booklet is a page that
contains some empty boxes. The cross-out task requires you to place an 'X ' in each individual
square, and you must do this as fast as possible. I w ill give you one minute to practice this motor
task. But do N O T open your booklet until I give you instructions to do so. You may begin your
practice session now. [W ait one m inutej

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

354
13. [ W A IT O N E M IN U T E f Time is up! That was 1 minute. Later on, some o f you w ill do this
cross-out task for 2 minutes, w'hile others w ill have to do it for 20 minutes. Remember, I am
studying the effects o f fatigue on your ability- to complete this motor task. So don't start yet!
14. To find out how long y o u 'll do the crossout task, you must first complete your study booklet.
Make sure to follow’ all o f the instructions carefully and quietly. Do not share your answers with
your friends.
15. Are there any questions?

16.

Once you have completed the survey, please w ait quietly for further instructions.

17.

You may begin.

18. [W A IT SO M E T IM E } W ho needs more time? You have about 1 minute left.

19.

Thanks so much for helping me out!

I really appreciate it. How- many o f you have to do the

cross-out task for 2 minutes? For 20 minutes? W e ll... You w ill N O T cross out anymore boxes.
The experiment is complete. N o one w ill do the cross-out task!
20.

Earlier, I told you I was testing levels o f fatigue on a motor task. But that is N O T the true
purpose o f my study. I just really needed you to believe that you w ould have to do the cross-out
task for a given amount o f time.

21.

I had to fool you because what I ’m really interested in are your thoughts and feelings about the
choices you made during the study. In order to get an honest assessment o f your true thoughts
and feelings, I had to have you convinced that you would do the cross-out task as part o f the
study.

22.

Because I am conducting this exact same study with another class, you absolutely must keep this
study a secret - at least until tomorrow afternoon w hen the true purpose o f my study w ill be
posted on the course website. Please - my entire study w ill be ruined if the other class hears
about my study. So keep this a secret "til tomorrow' afternoon!

23. A re there any questions? Comments?
24. M O N D A Y=> Draw held tomorrow at noon

— TUESDA Y=> Conduct draw immediately
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Appendix D:
Dependent Measures Questionnaire
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Please read the following questions and circle the MOST appropriate answer.

1.

To what extent did you control how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

2.

To a great
extent

To what extent were you responsible for how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

3.

To a great
extent

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

To a great
extent

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all

7
To a great
extent

To what extent were you frustrated with how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1
Not at all

6.

7

To what extent were you helpless in determining how long you would perform the crossout task? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

5.

7

To what extent did you influence how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

4.

7

2

3

4

5

6

7
To a great
extent

To what extent did you predict how long you would perform the cross-out task?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)

Not at all

To a great
extent
...NEXT PAGE
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To what extent were you confident about how long you would perform the cross-out
task? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
2

3

4

5

6

7
To a great
extent

Not at all

To what extent did you want to receive the short time period?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
2

3

4

5

6
To a great
extent

Not at all

9.

To what extent were you motivated to participate in this study?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

2

3

4

5

To a great
extent

Not at all

10.

6

To what extent were you optimistic that you would receive the short (2-minute) time
period? (Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

Not at all

11.

To a great
extent

To what extent do you feel you contributed to this study?
(Please circle one of the numbers below)
1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

To a great
extent

Please read the following questions and check (%/) the MOST appropriate answer.
12.

What is your gender? (Please check Sone answer only)
□ Male
□ Female

...NEXT PAGE
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13.

What is your birth date? (Please check Sone answer only)
B irth Year:
□ 25th
□ 13th
□ January
D ay: □ 1st
□ 2nd
□ 26th
□ 14th
□ February
□ 27th
□ 3rd
□ 15th
□ March
□
28*
□
4
*
□
16th
□ April
□
2
9*
□ 17th
□ 5th
□ May
□ 30*
□ 18th
□ 6*
□ June
□
19th
□
7
*
□
31*
□ July
□
20th
□ 8*
□ August
□ 9th
□ 21st
□ September
□ 22nd
□ 10th
□ October
O ther year (specify):
□ 23rd
□ 11th
□ November
□ 24th
□ 12th
□ December

M onth:

□ 1986
□ 1985
□ 1984
□ 1983
□ 1982
□ 1981
□ 1980
□ 1979
□ 1978
□ 1977
□

14.

Did the page comer make a difference in the time period you received?
(Please check Sone answer only)
□ Yes
□ No

15.

Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout task?
(Please check S one answer only)
□ Yes (a 2-minute short time period)
□ Yes (a 20-minute long time period)
□ No (I was not informed)

16.

Did you choose which page comer would be tom? (Please check Sone answer only)
□ Yes (I made a choice between 'salt’ or 'pepper')
□ Yes (I made a choice between 'blue' or 'non-blue')
□ No (the choice of 'right' or 'left' was made for me)

17.

(a) Have you heard any rumours about the real purpose of this study?
□ Yes
□ No
(b) If yes, what do you think this experiment is reallv about?

PLEASE WAIT QUIETLY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS

THANK YOU!

©
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Appendix E:
Debriefing Sheet
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PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL IN SITUATIONS OF
CHOICELESS CONTROL

Researcher: Lynn Perreault (perrea3@uwindsor.ca)
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: Whereas traditional control theorists postulate that providing choice increases
feelings of control and decreases feelings of helplessness (e.g., Seligman, 1975), recent findings indicate that the
benefits of control result only when a person's choices make a difference in the outcome experienced (e.g., Cramer et al.,
1997). These recent findings have instigated a new conceptualization of control, choice, and prediction in explaining
responses to difficult situations, which has permitted the complete separation of the effects of control and prediction.
PURPOSE: By refining and extending previous research designs, the present study will seek to completely
unconfound the effects of control and choice under both predictable and unpredictable conditions.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: Regardless of whether or not they know how long they will have to do the cross-out task,
(1) Will individuals feel more control, more influence, and more responsibility over the situation when their choices make a
difference in the outcome they will experience? (i.e., each page comer leads to a different time period)
(2) Will individuals feel more control, more influence, more responsibility, and less helplessness over the situation when
they have a made a choice between the words 'salf and 'pepped? (rather than choosing between the words 'blue' and
'non-blue', or'right and left).
(3) Will individuals feel less helpless when their choices make a difference (i.e., each page comer leads to a different time
period), especially when they are told that they will only do the cross-out task for 2 minutes?
(4) Will individuals feel more successful when they find out that they only have to do the cross-out task for 2 minutes?
(in comparison to those who were told they would have to do the cross-out task for 20 minutes, and to those who didn't
know how long they would have to do the cross-out task)
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN:
(1) CHOICE variable -> In order to decide the time period under which they completed the cross-out task, some
participants were asked to tear off either the bottom right or left comer of a page based on a choice between the words
'salt* and 'pepper1(voluntary-choice condition) or the eye-colour words 'blue' and 'non-blue' (involuntary-choice condition).
Others were told that they must tear off a pre-selected page comer containing the words 'righf and 'left* (no-choice
condition).
(2) CONTROL variable -> Some participants were informed that they would have to engage in the cross-out task for
either 2-min or 20-min depending on the page comer that was tom. In other words, their choice made a difference in the
time period they received (control condition). Others were told that both page comers would lead to either a 2-minute
time period ora 20-minute time period. In other words, their choice made no difference at all in the time they would
spend at the cross-out task (no-control condition).
(3) PREDICTION variable -> Some participants were informed about how long they would spend on the cross-out task
(prediction condition). Others were not told how much time they would spend on the cross-out task (no-prediction
condition)
DECEPTION: The participants were deceived with regard to the true purpose of the study. Deception was
necessary to:
► Ensure that the results remained unbiased for all participants.
► Prevent providing cues that might lead to participant demand characteristics.
► Prevent participants from making inferences & assumptions about the experimental hypotheses.
► Prevent participants from behaving according to any assumptions they may haveabout the study.
SOCIETAL APPLICATIONS:
(1) Discrimination - > includes situations where discrimination occurs based on genetically-determined factors that are
NOT chosen by individuals themselves, such as a person's ethnicity or their predisposition to certain genetically
transmitted illnesses For example, there are cases where disability claims have been denied due to 'potential1genetic
predispositions toward carpal tunnel syndrome.
(2) Privacy & misuse of personal information -> includes circumstances in which genetic information is taken or used
without the person's consent (especially DNA databanks). Also includes situations of genetic profiling, biopiracy, and
commercial weblining.
For a copy of the RESULTS, please e-mail perrea3@uwindsor.ca
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Preliminary Analyses: Details Regarding Data Reduction and
Data Screening
Data reduction
Missing values. Prior to conducting the main analyses, all of the experimental

conditions were examined (through various SPSS programs) for missing values,
manipulation check responses, and fit between data distribution and multivariate
assumptions. Each one of the 18 experimental conditions was examined separately.
Because the present data set consisted of very few cases containing missing values, a case
was deleted if it included one or more missing values. Overall, 18 cases were deleted
among the 18 experimental conditions (Table F I).
For experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/PredictedSuccess), out of 38 cases, two were deleted due to missing values on the actual control
manipulation check, where one of these cases also had missing values for the choice and
predicted outcome manipulation checks as well as age. One case with a single missing
value on the predicted outcome manipulation check was deleted from each one o f the
experimental conditions 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure),
8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction), and 12 (No-Actual-Control/
Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), leaving, in respective order, 31,29, and 32 cases
in each group.
One case with a single missing value on the choice manipulation check was
deleted from experimental condition 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedFailure), leaving 31 cases in that group. For experimental condition 5 (Actual-Control/
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Table FI
Number o f Missing Valuesfo r Each Experimental Condition During a Preliminary Data
Screening
Other relevant
variables

Relevant
manipulation checks

n

Actual
control

Choice

Predicted
outcome

Age

Frustration

Remaining
n (%)

1.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

38

2

1

1

1

0

36 (94.74)

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

32

0

0

1.

0

0

31 (96.88)

3.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

35

0

0

0

0

0

35(100.00)

4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

32

0

1

0

0

0

31 (96.88)

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

33

1

0

2

0

0

31 (93.94)

6.CtrI/No-choice/Predict-failure

32

0

0

0

0

0

32 (100.00)

7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

31

2

0

1

0

0

28 (90.32)

8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

30

0

0

1

0

0

29 (96.67)

9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

32

1

0

1

0

0

31 (96.88)

1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

33

0

0

0

0

0

33 (100.00)

11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/ Predict-feilure

32

0

0

0

0

0

32(100.00)

12.No-ctrl/lnv-choice/ Predict-success

33

0

0

1

0

0

32 (96.97)

13.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/ Predict-feilure

33

1

1

1

2

1

31 (93.94)

14.No-ctrl/No-choice/ Predict-success

33

0

0

0

0

0

33 (100.00)

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-6ilure

31

0

0

1

0

0

30 (96.77)

16.No-ctr!/Vo!-choice/No-predict

33

1

0

0

0

1

32 (96.97)

17.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/No-predict

33

0

0

0

0

0

33(100.00)

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

33

1

2

1

1

1

31 (93.94)

589

9

5

11

4

3

571 (96.94)

Total

Experimental
condition

Total
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No-Choice/ Predicted-Success), out of 33 cases, two were deleted due to missing values
on the predicted outcome manipulation check, where one of these cases also had a
missing value on the actual control manipulation check.
For experimental condition 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), two
cases with a single missing value on the actual control manipulation check and one case with
a single missing value on the predicted outcome manipulation were deleted, leaving 28
cases for that group. One case with missing values on both the control and predicted
outcome manipulation checks was deleted from experimental condition 9 (ActualControl/No-Choice/No-Prediction), leaving 31 cases in that group.
For experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-ControV Involuntary-Choice/PredictedFailure), one case was deleted because all values were missing, and another case was
deleted due to a missing value for age, leaving 31 cases in that group. One case was
deleted from experimental condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/ No-Choice/PredictedFailure), due to a missing value on the predicted outcome manipulation check, leaving 30
cases for that group. For experimental condition 16 (No-Actual-Control/VoluntaryChoice/No-Prediction), out of 33 cases, only one case was deleted due to a missing value
on the actual control manipulation check and a missing value on the frustration dependent
variable measure.
Finally, out of 33 cases, two were deleted because either one value was missing on
the choice manipulation check or all values were missing, leaving 31 cases for
experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/ No-Choice/No-Prediction). There were
no missing values and therefore no deleted cases for experimental conditions 3
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(Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/
Predicted-Failure), 10 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/ Predicted-Success),
11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 14 (No-Actual-Control/
No-Choice/Predicted-Success), and 17 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/
No-Prediction).

Incorrect values. A case was also deleted when an incorrect response was made

to the experimenter instruction regarding the word to be tom off the page. The tom word
manipulation check was considered incorrect if both words had been tom off the page or
if both words had remained intact (rather than one word tom by the participant as
instructed). Therefore, the remaning 571 cases were examined in terms of the
manipulation check responses to the tom word instruction.
Only five cases were deleted due to an incorrect response on the tom word
manipulation check. Specifically, one case was deleted for each of experimental
conditions 3 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), 10 (No-ActualControl/Voluntary-Choice//Predicted-Success), and 13 (No-Actual-Control/InvoluntaryChoice/Predicted-Failure), and two cases were deleted for experimental condition 15 (NoActual-Control/No-Choice/Predicted-Failure). All of the remaining 566 cases were
retained for further data screening analyses.

Univariate and Multivariate Outliers. Because outliers can produce either a Type I

or a Type II error, and MANOVA is sensitive to outliers, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001)
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highly recommend that a test for outliers accompany any use of MANOVA. Therefore, in
addition to screening for missing and incorrect cases, the present data were also screened
for univariate and multivariate outliers. Tests for univariate and multivariate outliers
were conducted separately for each cell of the present 2 x 3 x 3 design. Using the cutoff
criterion of critical standardized score = ± 3.29, p < .001, a total of 36 univariate outliers
were found among the experimental groups (Table F2).
Two univariate outliers were found on perceived control, specifically, one for
experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/ Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success) and one
for experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure).
The influence variable contained four univariate outliers, where two outliers were found
in experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), and one
outlier was found in both experimental conditions 12 (No-Actual-Control/InvoluntaryChoice/Predicted-Success) and 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedFailure).
The want variable consisted of eight univariate outliers, where one outlier was
found in each one of experimental conditions 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/
Predicted-Failure), 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predicted-Success), 6 (ActualControl/No-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), 11
(No-Actual-Control/ Voluntary-Choice/ Predicted-Failure), 12 (No-Actual-Control/
Involuntary-Choice/ Predicted-Success), 13 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice
/Predicted-Failure), and 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure).
Five univariate outliers were found for the actual control manipulation check,
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Table F2.
Frequency of Univariate Outliers per Variablefo r Each Experimental Condition (first set of
analyses)
Manipulation checks

°o!evant variables

n

Perceived
control

Influence

Actual
control

Predicted
outcome

Choice

l.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-S

36

1

0

0

0

3

0

4(11.11)

2.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-F

31

0

0

1

0

0

0

1 (3-23)

3. Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-S

34

0

0

0

0

0

1

1 (2.94)

-r.C iri/Inv-Ch/Pr-F

31

0

0

0

0

0

1

1 (3.23)

5.Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-S

31

0

0

1

2

0

0

3 (9.68)

6.Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-F

32

0

2

1

0

0

0

3 (9.38)

7.Ctrl/Vol-Ch/No-Pr

28

0

0

0

0

1

1

1 (3.57)

8.Ctrl/Inv-Ch/No-Pr

29

0

0

0

0

1

2

3 (10.34)

9.Ctrl/No-Ch/No-Pr

31

0

0

1

0

2

0

3 (9.68)

lO.No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-S

32

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

11 .No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/Pr-F

32

1

0

1

1

0

1

4(12.50)

12,No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-S

32

0

1

1

0

0

2

4(12.50)

13 .No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/Pr-F

30

0

1

1

0

0

0

2 (6.45)

14.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-S

JO

■*» «■»

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

15.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/Pr-F

28

0

0

1

2

0

0

3 (10.00)

16.No-Ctrl/Vol-Ch/No-Pr

32

0

0

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

17.No-Ctrl/Inv-Ch/No-Pr

33

0

0

0

0

1

1

2 (6.06)

18.No-Ctrl/No-Ch/No-Pr

31

0

0

0

0

1

1

1 (3.23)

566

2

4

8

5

9

10

36 (6.36)

Experimental condition

Total

Want

Total cases

f (° ^
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where experimental conditions 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Success) and
15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure) contained two outliers, and
experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure)
contained one outlier. The predicted outcome manipulation check contained nine
univariate outliers, where one outlier was found in each one of experimental conditions
7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), 8 (Actual-Control/InvoluntaryChoice/No-Prediction), 17 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction), and
18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ No-Prediction), two outliers were found in condition
9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), and three outliers were found in
experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success).
Finally, 10 univariate outliers were found in the choice manipulation check,
specifically, two outliers for both experimental conditions 8 (Actual-Control/InvoluntaryChoice/No-Prediction) and 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedSuccess), and one outlier for each of experimental conditions 3 (Actual-Control/
Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedFailure), 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction), 11 (No-Actual-Control/
Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure), 17 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/
No-Prediction), and 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction). No univariate
outliers were found in experimental groups 10 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/
Predicted-Success), 14 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Success), and
16 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction).
Tests for multivariate outliers were then conducted separately for each of the 18
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groups (i.e., experimental conditions). In considering the four main dependent variables
(i.e., perceived control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness), thus using the cutoff
criterion, y 2 (4, /?*) 18.47,/? = .001, only one multivariate outlier, y 2 (4, N = 29) = 22.53,
p = .001, was found in experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-Control/InvoluntaryChoice/Predicted-Failure). In addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate
outlier, the 36 cases containing univariate outliers were also eliminated from their
respective groups, leaving a total of 530 participants across the 18 experimental
conditions.
Both the univariate outliers analyses and the multivariate outliers analyses were
conducted a second, third, or fourth time, until no new outliers (p = .001) were found.
Table F3 reports the 21 new univariate outliers for each one of the experimental
conditions. Only one new multivariate outlier, y 2 (4, N = 3 0 ) = 18.77, p = .001, was
found in experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction). In
addition to deleting the one case containing a multivariate outlier, the 21 cases containing
univariate outliers were also eliminated from their respective groups, leaving a total of
508 participants among the 18 experimental conditions, where no new outliers were
revealed (Table F4).

Data screening

All of the experimental conditions were further examined to determine which
participants correctly responded to a set of manipulation checks. Out of the four

8 Where n = number of participants in 1 of the 18 experimental groups
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Table F3.
Frequency of Univariate Outliers per Variable fo r Each Experimental Condition (second.
third, andfourth set of analyses)

Relevant variables
Perceived
control

Responsibility

1.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

32

0

0

•»

0

3 (9.38)

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

30

0

0

1

0

1 (3.33)

3. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

33

0

0

0

1

1 (3.03)

4. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

30

0

0

2

2

4(13.33)

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

28

0

0

2

0

2(7.14)

6. Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

29

1

0

1

0

2 (6.90)

7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

27

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

8. Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

26

0

0

0

0

0(0.00)

9. Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

28

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

32

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

28

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

12.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/Predict-success

28

0

0

3

0

3(10.71)

13. No-ctrl/Inv-choicc/Predict-failure

28

0

1

0

0

1 (3.57)

14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

33

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

25

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

32

0

0

0

0

0 (0.00)

17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

31

0

0

2

0

2 (6.45)

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

30

0

0

0

2

2 (6.67)

530

I

1

14

5

21 (3.96)

Total

Want

Choice

n

Experimental condition

Total cases

/ (%)
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Table F4.
Total Number of Participants Remaining in Each Experimental Condition after Preliminary
Analyses

Experimental condition

n

1. Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success

29

2. Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure

29

3. Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success

32

4. Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure

26

5. Control I No-Choice / Predicted-Success

26

6. Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure

27

7. Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction

27

8. Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-prediction

26

9. Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction

28

10. No-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Success

32

11. No-Control / Voluntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure

28

12. No-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Success

25

13. No-Control / Involuntary-Choice / Predicted-Failure

27
«■>

14. No-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Success
15. No-Control / No-Choice / Predicted-Failure

25

16. No-Control / Voluntary-Choice / No-Prediction

32

17. No-Control / Involuntary-Choice / No-Prediction

29

18. No-Control / No-Choice / No-Prediction

27
TOTAL

508
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manipulation checks, one consisted in determining whether or not participants correctly
followed experimenter instructions concerning which word should be tom from the page,
and the other three were presented as questionnaire items: (1) ‘Did the page comer make
a difference in the time period you received?’ where options were ‘Yes’ or ‘No,’
respectively, denoting either the Actual-Control or the No-Actual-Control condition;
(2) ‘Did you choose which page comer would be tom?’ where options were ‘Yes (I made
a choice between ‘salt’ or ‘pepper’),’ ‘Yes (I made a choice between ‘blue’ or ‘non
blue’), or ‘No (the choice o f‘right’ or ‘left’ was made for me’),’ in respective order,
denoting the Voluntary-Choice, the Involuntary-Choice, or the No-Choice experimental
condition; and (3) ‘Were you informed about how long you would engage in the crossout
task?’ where options were ‘Yes (a 2-minute short time period),’ ‘Yes (a 20-minute long
time period),’ or ‘No (I was not informed),’ in respective order, denoting the PredictedSuccess, the Predicted-Failure, or the No-Prediction experimental condition.
Frequency and percentage of incorrect values for each manipulation check are
presented in Table F5. Two hundred and ten cases consisted of at least one incorrect
value on the manipulation check items, ranging from 6 to 19 cases per experimental
condition. In most instances, there was only one single incorrect value per case.
However, there were instances in which one case simultaneously contained incorrect
values on two of the manipulation check items.
For experimental condition 1 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/PredictedSuccess), all seven cases presented an incorrect answer on the actual control manipulation
check. Experimental condition 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure)
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Table F5
Number of Incorrect Values in Each Experimental Conditionfo r Each Manipulation Check.

Manipulation check errors
n

Actual
control

Choice

Predicted
outcome

Total cases
/( % )

1.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

29

7

0

0

7(24.14)

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

29

4

0

4

8 (27.59)

3.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

32

6

0

10

14(43.75)

4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

26

6

0

6

9 (34.62)

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

26

0

0

4

4(15.38)

6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

27

5

0

4

7(25.93)

7.Ctxl/Vol-choice/No-predict

27

11

0

j

11 (40.74)

8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

26

10

0

6

14(53.85)

9.CtrI/No-choice/No-predict

28

18

0

0

18(64.29)

10.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

32

5

0

14

19 (62.50)

11.No-ctrL^Vol-choice/Predict-failurc

28

0

0

18

18 (64.29)

12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

25

->

0

10

13 (52.00)

13.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

27

0

16

17(62.96)

14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

jj

«■%

8

0

9

16(48.48)

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failurc

25

0

0

15

15 (60.00)

16,No-ctrlA^oI-choice/No-predict

32

4

0

7(21.88)

17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

29

5

0

7(24.14)

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-prcdict

27

0

0

6

6 (22.22)

508

95

0

131

210(41.34)

Experimental condition

Total
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displayed eight incorrect cases, where four participants answered the actual control
manipulation check incorrectly, and four incorrectly answered the predicted outcome
manipulation check item by selecting the No-Prediction,/ = 3, or Predicted-Success,/ = 1,
options. There were fourteen incorrect cases for experimental condition 3 (ActualControl/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success), where six incorrect answers were given
for the actual control manipulation check, and ten incorrect answers were given for the
predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting the No-Prediction,/= 7, or PredictedFailure,/ = 3, options. Two participants incorrectly answered both the control and
predicted outcome manipulation check items.
Experimental condition 4 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure)
consisted of nine incorrect cases. Specifically, there were six incorrect responses on the
actual control manipulation check, and six on the predicted outcome manipulation check
where No-Prediction,/ = 4, or Predicted-Success,/ = 2, were incorrectly selected. Three
cases contained two incorrect answers on both the control and predicted outcome
manipulation checks. Experimental condition 5 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/PredictedSuccess) displayed only four cases with incorrect responses, where all four participants
incorrectly responded ‘No-Prediction’ to the predicted outcome manipulation check.
Experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure) contained seven
cases with incorrect values, where five participants incorrectly responded to the actual
control manipulation check, and four participants incorrectly answered ‘No-Prediction’ to
the predicted outcome manipulation check. Two participants incorrectly answered both
the actual control and predicted outcome manipulation checks.
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Experimental condition 7 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/No-Prediction)
displayed a total of eleven incorrect cases, where eleven participants responded
incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and three participants responded
incorrectly to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting Predicted-Success.
Experimental condition 8 (Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction) included a
total of fourteen incorrect responses to the manipulation check items. Specifically, ten
participants responded incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and six
participants incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting
Predicted-Success.
For experimental condition 9 (Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction), there
was a total of eighteen cases containing incorrect responses, all of which belonged to the
actual control manipulation check item. Experimental condition 10 (No-ActualControl/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Success) included nineteen cases which displayed
incorrect responses. Specifically, five participants had a single incorrect answer on the
actual control manipulation check, and fourteen participants had a single incorrect
response to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting No-Prediction.
Experimental condition 11 (No-Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/PredictedFailure) displayed eighteen incorrect responses to the manipulation checks, all of which
made an error in the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting No-Prediction.
For experimental condition 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedSuccess), thirteen cases displayed incorrect responses. Specifically, three participants
incorrectly answered the actual control manipulation check, and ten participants
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incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting either
No-Prediction,/ = 9, or Predicted-Failure,/ = 1.
Experimental condition 13 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/PredictedFailure) consisted of seventeen incorrect responses. Specifically, there were three
incorrect responses for the actual control manipulation check, and sixteen incorrect
answers to the predicted outcome manipulation check where No-Prediction,/ = 11, and
Predicted-Success,/ = 5, were selected. Two participants incorrectly answered both the
actual control and predicted outcome manipulation check items. For experimental
condition 14 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predict-Success), there were sixteen cases
with incorrect responses. Specifically, eight cases incorrectly responded to the actual
control manipulation check, and nine participants incorrectly answered the predicted
outcome manipulation check by selecting either No-Prediction,/ = 8, or PredictedFailure,/ = 1. One participant responded incorrectly to both the actual control and
predicted outcome manipulation checks.
Experimental condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/Predict-Failure)
included fifteen incorrect responses overall, which were all made during the predicted
outcome manipulation check. Experimental condition 16 (No-Actual-Control/VoluntaryChoice/ No-Prediction) consisted of seven incorrect responses, where four participants
responded incorrectly to the actual control manipulation check, and three participants
responded incorrectly to the predicted outcome manipulation check by selecting
Predicted-Success.
For experimental condition 17 (No-Actual-Control/ Involuntary-Choice/
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No-Prediction), there were seven cases with incorrect responses. Specifically, five
participants incorrectly responded to the actual control manipulation check, and three
participants incorrectly answered the predicted outcome manipulation check item by
selecting Predicted-Success. One participant incorrectly responded to both the actual
control and predicted outcome manipulation checks. Finally, experimental condition 18
(No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction) displayed six incorrect responses, which
all belonged to the predicted outcome manipulation check due to the selection of
Predicted-Success.
1-Tesl Analyses. Due to the large number of participants who responded

incorrectly to the manipulation checks in many of the experimental conditions, /-tests
were conducted to determine whether or not significant differences in the four main
dependent variables (i.e., perceived control, responsibility, influence, and helplessness)
existed between the responses of individuals who responded correctly to all four
manipulation check items and those who responded incorrectly to one or more items.
In order to compare the two groups, 72 /-tests were performed overall, where each
one of the four dependent variables was examined, in turn, for each one of the 18
experimental conditions. In respective order, Tables F6, F7, F8, and F9 display the /-test
results for the four main dependent variables: perceived control, responsibility, influence,
and helplessness. Overall, very few significant values were found. For perceived control,
only experimental condition 2 (Actual-Control/Voluntary-Choice/Predicted-Failure)
displayed a significant difference between participants who responded correctly to the
manipulation checks and those who responded incorrectly, / = 2.76,/? < .05.
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Table F6
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Resultsfo r Total Number ofManipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Perceived Control Variable

Experimental condition

n

M

SD

Correct (Incorrect)

Correct (Incorrect)

Correct (Incorrect)

df

t

1.Ctrl/VoI-choice/Predict-success

2 2 (7 )

3.36 (2.29)

2.13 (1.60)

27

1.23

2.CtrI/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

2 1 (8 )

3.10(1.75)

1.48(1.04)

27

2.76'

3 .Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

18(14)

2.00(2.71)

1.53(1.94)

30

-1.17

4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-faiIure

17(9)

2.82 (2.78)

2.01 (1.48)

24

0.06

5 .Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

2 2 (4 )

2.68 (3.00)

1.99(2.83)

24

-0.28

6 .Ctrl/N o-choice/Predict-failure

20 (7)

1.40(1.86)

0.88(1.57)

25

-0.96

7.Ctrl/V ol-choice/No-predict

16(11)

2.88 (3.36)

1.82(1.69)

25

-0.71

8.CtrI/Inv-choice/No-predict

12(14)

2.58 (3.07)

1.78(2.16)

24

-0.62

9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

10(18)

2.20 (2.78)

1.99(2.37)

26

-0.65

10.No-ctrI/Vol-choice/Predict-success

12 (20)

2.75 (2.55)

2.30(1.96)

30

0.26

1 l.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

10(18)

1.50(1.83)

1.08(1.47)

26

-0.63

12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

12(13)

2.25(1.31)

1.71 (1.11)

23

1.62

13 .No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

10(17)

1.60(1.76)

1.07(1.30)

25

-0.34

14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

18(15)

1.89 (1.80)

1.57(1.26)

31

0.18

15.No-ctr1/No-choice/Predict-failure

10(15)

1.60(2.53)

1.07(2.13)

23

-1.44

16.No-ctrl/VoI-choice/No-predict

25 (7)

2.60 (3.29)

2.14(1.70)

30

-0.78

17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

2 2 (7 )

2.00 (2.43)

1.66(1.62)

27

-0.60

18.No-ctrI/No-choice/No-predict

2 1 (7 )

2.57 (3.50)

2.18(1.97)

25

-0.94

* p < .05.
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Table F7
Means. Standard Deviations, and t-test Residts fo r Total Number o f Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Responsibility Variable

Experimental condition

n

M

SD

df

t

Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)
1.CtrWol-choice/Predict-success

22 (7)

4.50(4.14)

2.35 (2.27)

27

0.35

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

2 1 (8 )

3.95 (3.25)

2.25 (2.66)

27

0.72

3. C trl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

18(14)

3.28 (3.07)

2.32(1.98)

30

0.27

4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

17(9)

2.71 (3.11)

1.99(1.62)

24

-0.52

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

2 2 (4 )

2.68 (2.50)

2.19(3.00)

24

0.15

6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

20 (7)

1.75(1.86)

1.71 (1.57)

25

-0.15

7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

16(11)

3.38 (4.27)

2.45 (2.05)

25

-1.00

8. CtrL/Inv-choice/No-predict

12(14)

1.92 (3.86)

1.62(2.54)

24

-2.36"

9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

10(18)

3.00 (2.94)

2.83 (2.29)

26

0.06

10.No-ctr1/Vol-choice/Predict-success

12(20)

2.58 (2.55)

2.35 (2.11)

30

0.04

11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failurc

10(18)

3.60(1.89)

2.88(1.32)

26

1.78

12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

12(13)

3.67(1.54)

1.97 (1.33)

23

3.14“

13 .No-ctri/Inv-choicc/Prcdict-failure

10(17)

1.30(1.71)

0.67(1.31)

25

-0.91

14.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

18(15)

2.28 (2.40)

1.78(1.99)

31

-0.19

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

10(15)

2.20 (2.07)

1.99(1.91)

23

0.17

16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

25 (7)

2.96 (3.29)

2.07 (2.63)

30

-0.35

17.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

22 (7)

2.68 (2.86)

2.40 (2.27)

27

-.017

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

21 (6)

2.52 (3.50)

2.09 (2.51)

25

-0.97

* p < .05; * * p < .01.
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Table F8.
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-test Resultsfo r Total Number o f Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Influence Variable

Experimental condition

n

M

Correct (Incorrect) Correct (Incorrect)

SD

df

t

Correct (Incorrect)

1.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

22 (7)

3.55 (3.14)

2.18(2.04)

27

0.43

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

21(8)

4.71 (3.63)

1.71 (2.72)

27

1.06

3.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

18(14)

3.17(2.93)

2.26(1.94)

30

0.31

4.Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

17(9)

3.65 (4.00)

2.42(1.94)

24

-0.38

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

2 2(4)

2.45 (2.50)

1.95(3.00)

24

-0.04

6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

20(7)

1.20(1.29)

0.41 (0.49)

25

-0.45

7,Ctrl/Vol-choice/Nopredict

16(11)

3.19(3.91)

2.26(1.76)

25

-0.89

8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

12(14)

2.42 (3.86)

1.31 (2.38)

24

-1.95

9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

10(18)

3.00(3.11)

2.49 (2.32)

26

-1.12

10.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

12(20)

2.67 (2.45)

1.97(1.96)

30

0.30

11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

10(18)

2.60 (2.33)

2.41 (1.91)

26

0.32

12.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

12(13)

2.33 (1.54)

1.61 (1.05)

23

1.47

13.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

10(17)

1.30(1.88)

0.67(1.36)

25

-1.48

14. No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

18(15)

2.00 (2.40)

1.46 (2.10)

31

-0.65

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

10(15)

2.10(2.93)

1.60(2.40)

23

-0.96

16.No-ctrl/V ol-choice/No-predict

25 (7)

3.56 (3.57)

2.14(1.62)

30

-0.01

17.No-ctrI/Inv-choice/No-predict

22(7)

2.91 (3.86)

2.04 (2.04)

27

-1.07

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

21(6)

2.48 (2.67)

2.25 (2.25)

25

-0.18
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Table F9.
Means. Standard Deviations, and t-test Residtsfo r Total Number o f Manipulation Checks
Answered Correctly and Incorrectly on the Helplessness Variable

Experimental condition

n

M

SD

Correct (Incorrect)

Correct (Incorrect)

Correct (Incorrect)

df

t

1. C trl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

22 (7)

4.32 (5.00)

2.42 (2.08)

27

-0.67

2.Ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

2 1(8)

5.00 (4.50)

1.64 (2.73)

27

0.49

3. Ctrl/Inv-choiceTPredict-success

18(14)

5.89 (4.57)

1.53(2.14)

30

2.03

4. Ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-failure

17(9)

4.71 (3.89)

2.14(2.32)

24

0.90

5.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

2 2 (4 )

4.82 (3.75)

2.40(3.20)

24

0.78

6.Ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

2 0(7)

4.50(6.14)

2.65(1.21)

25

-2.19'

7.Ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

16(11)

4.94 (3.82)

2.38 (2.27)

25

1.22

8.Ctrl/Inv-choice/No-predict

12(14)

6.17(2.93)

1.19(2.37)

24

4.49'"

9.Ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

10(18)

4.70 (3.50)

2.54 (2.38)

26

1.25

1O.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-success

12(20)

5.17(4.60)

2.21 (2.52)

30

0.64

11 .No-ctrl/Vol-choice/Predict-failure

10(18)

5.70 (4.83)

1.95 (2.57)

26

1.00

12. No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-success

12(13)

4.33 (5.92)

2.50(2.14)

23

-1.71

13.No-ctrl/Inv-choice/Predict-fai!ure

10(17)

6.30 (5.53)

1.89(2.24)

25

0.91

14. No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-success

18(15)

5.06 (4.53)

2.15(2.59)

31

0.63

15.No-ctrl/No-choice/Predict-failure

10(15)

6.40 (3.80)

1.58 (2.48)

23

3.20"

16.No-ctrl/Vol-choice/No-predict

25 (7)

4.20 (4.29)

2.29 (2.43)

30

-0.09

17.No-ctrl/lnv-choice/No-predicl

22 (7)

4.82 (5.43)

2.46 (2.30)

27

-0.58

18.No-ctrl/No-choice/No-predict

2 1 (6 )

5.00 (2.33)

2.47(1.21)

25

3.65"

*p < .05; * * p < .01; *** p < .001.
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For responsibility, experimental conditions 8 (Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/
No-Prediction) and 12 (No-Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/Predicted-Success)
displayed a significant difference between participants who responded correctly to the
manipulation checks and those who responded incorrectly, respectively, t = -2.36,
p < .05 and t = 3.14,/; < .01. There were no significant differences found for influence.

For helplessness, however, four experimental conditions displayed significant
differences between those who responded correctly to the manipulation checks and
those who did not. These consisted of experimental condition 6 (Actual-Control/
No-Choice/Predicted-Failure; t = -2.19, p < .05), experimental condition 8
(Actual-Control/Involuntary-Choice/No-Prediction; t = 4.49,/? < .001), experimental
condition 15 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/ Predicted-Failure; t = 3.20,/? < .01),
and experimental condition 18 (No-Actual-Control/No-Choice/No-Prediction; t = 3.65,
p < . 01).

Although some significant /-test values were found for perceived control,
responsibility, and helplessness, these were not considered important enough to warrant
action, because a situation of inflated Type I error rate was quite likely present due to the
multiple tests that were conducted within each experimental condition for each one of the
four main dependent variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Although it was concluded
that no systematically important differences existed between participants who answered
the manipulation checks correctly and those who did not, it is cautioned that the data be
examined while considering the possibility of Type I error.
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Chi Square Analyses. Therefore, all 508 cases were retained for further analyses

which examined significant differences in the frequency of incorrect manipulation check
responses among the independent variables. Specifically, two-way chi squares were
calculated for the incorrect manipulation check responses for each of ACTUAL
CONTROL x CHOICE, * 2 (2, N = 210) = 2.66, p = .26, CHOICE x PREDICTED
OUTCOME, X2 (4, N = 210) = 2.54,p = .64, and ACTUAL CONTROL x PREDICTED
OUTCOME, X2(2, N = 210) = 21.90, p < .001.
Table F10 and Figure F I describe the significant two-way chi square results for
each o f the ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME conditions. When they
could predict their outcome (whether success or failure), the participants with ActualControl made significantly fewer manipulation check errors than those individuals who
had No-Actual-Control. However, these findings were reversed under conditions of
unpredictability. Specifically, when they could not predict their outcome, the participants
with Actual-Control made significantly more manipulation check errors than those
individuals who had No-Actual-Control.
Whereas confusion seemed to arise when the ACTUAL CONTROL and
PREDICTED OUTCOME variables were incongruent (i.e.,actual control without
prediction, and prediction without actual control), a better understanding occurred when
the two independent variables were congruent (i.e., actual control with prediction, and no
prediction without actual control). Although the decision was then to proceed with the
preliminary analyses, this finding was kept under consideration for later discussion.
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Table F10.
Standard Residuals and Frequency o f Incorrect Manipulation Checksfo r the Significant
Two-Way Chi Square o f ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions

PREDICTED OUTCOME
Predicted-Success

Predicted-Failure

No-Prediction

ACTUAL CONTROL

f m

f(SR)

f(SR)

Actual-Control

25 (-1.20)

24 (-1.50)

43 (2.90)

92

No-Actual-Control

48(1.10)

50(1.30)

20 (-2.60)

118

73

74

63

210

Total /
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Figure F I. Frequencies o f Incorrect Manipulation Checks for the Significant Two-Way

Chi Square of ACTUAL CONTROL by PREDICTED OUTCOME Conditions.
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Appendix G:
A Summary o f the Significant Findings
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Table G l.
A Summary o f the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent
Variables

Significant Findings

Dependent Variables
Influence:

Responsibility:

Perceived control:

•

AC + Vol-Ch + P-F > AC + No-Ch + P-F

•

AC + Inv-Ch + P-F >

•

No-AC + No-P > N o-AC + P-S

•

No-AC + No-P > No-AC + P-F

•

AC + Vol-Ch >

AC + No-Ch

•

AC + Inv-Ch >

AC + No-Ch

•

AC > No-AC

•

Vol-Ch >

•

No-P >

•

AC + Vol-Ch > AC + Inv-Ch

•

AC + Vol-Ch >

•

AC > No-AC

•

Vol-Ch >

Inv-Ch

•

Vol-Ch >

No-Ch

•

No-P >

•

AC > No-AC

•

No-P >

AC + No-Ch + P-F

No-Ch
P-S

AC + No-Ch

P-F

P-F

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

388
Table G l. (cont’d)
A Summary o f the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent
Variables

Significant Findings

Dependent Variables
Confidence:

Confidence + Prediction:

Frustration:

•

Vol-Ch + P-S > Vol-Ch + P-F

•

Inv-Ch + No-P > Inv-Ch + P-S

combined multivariate effect for P-F versus P-S
combined multivariate effect for P-F versus No-P

AC + P-F > AC + P-S
AC + P-F > AC + No-P
AC + No-P > AC + P-S
No-AC + P-F > No-AC + P-S
P-F > P-S
P-F > No-P
No-P > P -S

Frustration + Helplessness:
Perceived Contribution
and Motivation to
Participate:

Optimism toward a
positive outcome:

combined multivariate effect for AC versus No-AC

combined multivariate effect for AC versus No-AC
multivariate effect for Actual Control x Predicted
Outcome (at no particular level o f the I Vs)

Vol-Ch > Inv-Ch
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Table G l. (cont’d)
A Summary o f the Significant Effects o f the Independent Variables on the Dependent
Variables

Dependent Variables
Desire for a positive
outcome:

Significant Findings
•

AC + Vol-Ch > AC + Inv-Ch

•

AC + No-Ch > AC + Inv-Ch

•

No-AC + Inv-Ch > No-AC + Vol-Ch

•

No-AC + Inv-Ch > No-AC + No-Ch

•

P-S > No-P

•

P-F > No-P

Note. AC = Actual-Control; No-AC = No-Actual-Control; Vol-Ch = Voluntary-Choice;

Inv-Ch = Involuntary-Choice; No-Ch = No-Choice; P-S = Predicted-Success;
P-F = Predicted-Failure; No-P = No-Prediction.
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